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INTRODUCTION
With this inaugural issue of the Nevada Law Journal, we introduce what
we expect to become a regular feature of the Journal -- the Annual Survey of
Nevada Law. This section of the Journal presents a comprehensive set of
summaries of cases involving Nevada law, both statutory and common law de-
cisions. The bulk of the cases, of course, stem from the Nevada Supreme Court
but this section also includes discussion of federal court cases that address Ne-
vada law in significant part.
The objective of this section is to provide a chronicle of the state's legal
doctrine each year as an aid to practicing lawyers and other readers. It also
serves the function of providing a contemporaneous and continuing archive of
Nevada law for historical reference. Because Nevada's Boyd School of Law
and the Nevada Law Journal are relatively new on the state's legal scene, we
begin this feature with a look at the decision of 1999, the first full calendar year
of the Law School's existence. The next issues will address decisions rendered
in 2000 and 2001. Thereafter, the feature will become truly "annual".
Readers should be aware that this feature is a compendium of case summa-
ries written by the Law Journal staff as a whole, with each staff member re-
sponsible for a small number of cases. Although the case summaries have been
reviewed by the primary editors and other Journal staff, the descriptions of the
cases are written by different authors. Some readers may disagree with the
characterizations of some cases, just as lawyers and judges frequently disagree
over the proper interpretation of decisions.
The Annual Survey of Nevada Law does not purport to be the definitive
statement of Nevada law. Only courts can provide the last word on legal mean-
ing. Readers should therefore not attempt to rely upon the summaries pre-
sented here but must consult the actual opinions before relying upon them.
We hope readers enjoy this feature of the Journal as well as its articles stu-
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dent notes, and book reviews. Comments should be sent to me at stem-
pel@ccmail.nevada.edu and will be shared with the current editorial board of
the Journal.
Prof. Jeffrey W. Stempel
Law Journal Advisor
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In re: Hugo Galvez and Thelma Galvez, Debtors
990 P.2d 187 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999)
Court concludes a real estate commission is paid in a lump sum, thus Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g) does not exempt real estate commission payments
from execution.
The issue in this case was whether an independent contractor's real estate
commission was exempt from execution under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g).
The Nevada Supreme Court certified to the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Nevada that a real estate commission is not exempt from execu-
tion under this statute as the exemption applies only to periodic payments, and
not to lump sum payments such as real estate commissions. 990 P.2d 187, 190
(1999).
In 1997, Hugo and Thelma Galvez filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, Title 11 of the United States Code. The appointed trustee re-
quested that the debtor turn over $3,633.00 in real estate commissions which
were in escrow at the time of the bankruptcy filing. The debtors in turn
amended their filing and claimed an exemption for $2,750.00. The exemption
was based on Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (1) (g), which in relevant part, provides
for an exemption from execution of seventy-five percent of the disposable earn-
ings of a judgment debtor during a given period.
The Nevada Supreme Court determined the issue was one of first impres-
sion. The Court considered the legislature's -intent to conform the statute to the
Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"). It noted that some states have in-
terpreted the CCPA to exclude from execution all wages earned through per-
sonal services without distinction as to the independent contractor status of the
worker, while other states relying on identical language have exempted only
those wages earned through an employee-employer relationship. The Court,
however, rejected both approaches and instead found the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Kokszka v. Belford to be more persuasive. In that case
the Court found necessary the wage garnishment exemption to support wage
earners and their families on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis and only
exempts periodic payments of compensation. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 651 (1974).
In light of the holding in Kokoszka, the Court concluded that since a real
[Vol. 1:345
ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
estate commission is paid in a lump sum, rather than as a series of periodic
payments, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(g) did not exempt real estate commis-
sion payments from execution. 990 P.2d at 190.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Dow Chemical Company v Mahlum
973 P.2d 842 (Nev. Feb. 12, 1999).
Court holds petition for rehearing not a pending action, thereby rendering
new rule on en banc review inapplicable.
This case involved a petition to rehear an appeal and cross-appeal from the
district court, as well as an appeal from the district court's order denying a new
trial. In Dow Chemical v Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (1998), the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed a district court judgment against the appellant in a negligent un-
dertaking claim. The Court also affirmed the district court's denial of the ap-
pellant's motion for a new trial. The appellant also filed motions for en banc
review of the petition, and for permission to file amicus curiae briefs.
The Court addressed the motion filed by the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States and the Medical Device Manufacturers for leave to file amicus
curiae briefs. The Court quickly denied the motion, explaining that the issues
addressed in the briefs, "will substantially mirror those raised on appeal and re-
hearing." Dow Chemical Company, 973 P.2d at 843 n. 1.
The Court next considered the appellant's petition for en banc review. The
rule goveming en banc review, Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, was
amended and NRAP 40A was created. The rule, effective January 4, 1999, ap-
plied to all cases commenced after January 3, 1999, unless application would
not be logical, or would create an injustice. The appellant argued that because
its petition for rehearing was filed before January 4, 1999, it qualified as an ac-
tion that was pending at the time Rule 40A was implemented, thereby compel-
ling the use of the new provisions. The Court disagreed and held that the peti-
tion was not a pending action, thereby rendering the new rule inapplicable.
Moreover, Rule 40A's design is specifically for the seven-justice Court and the
panel system, which the appellant did not encounter.
Dow also argued that a rehearing was necessary because the Court, in its
decision to affirm the negligent undertaking claim, misapprehended the facts of
the case and the relevant tort principles. In addressing the appellant's conten-
tion, the court relied upon a prior Nevada rule, Nev. R. App. P. 40 (c) (2),
which dictated that a petition for rehearing be granted only if it appears that the
court overlooked or misunderstood a material matter or in an effort to avoid an
injustice. The Court denied the appellant's petition for rehearing because it did
not adequately show that the justices overlooked or misunderstood the facts of
the case or the elements of the negligent undertaking claim.
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NAD, Inc., A/K/A North American Drager v. Eighth Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada
976 P.2d 994 (Nev. Apr. 26, 1999)
Nevada Supreme Court denies petition for writ of mandamus.
Jason Nault suffered brain damage during a surgical procedure after the
endotracheal tube used to supply oxygen became disconnected and the anesthe-
siologist failed to notice the problem for some period of time. Nault's wife
filed a negligence claim against Southern Nevada Surgical Center (SNSC),
where the procedure was performed, Surgex, SNSC's parent company, Life
Support Services (LSSI), who inspected the medical equipment regularly, Clark
County Anesthesia Associates, the anesthesiologist's employer, and NAD, the
manufacturer of the anesthesia machine used in Nault's surgery. The Naults
dismissed NAD from the suit, but Surgex later filed a third-party complaint
against NAD for contribution and indemnity. In response, NAD filed a motion
to dismiss, along with a motion to name CNA, Surgex's and SNSC's insurer, as
a real party in interest.
Before the motions were heard, a settlement was reached between the
Nault family and LSSI, SNSC, Surgex, and CNA. As part of that agreement,
the Naults waived all future claims against CNA insured defendants, including
wrongful death claims. Further, the settlement made SNSC and Synex respon-
sible for $14 million of the $17 million settlement amount. In order to relieve
that debt, SNSC and Synex entered into an agreement with CNA, in which
CNA lent the companies the $14 million. The district court approved the set-
tlement agreement, and proceeded to deny NAD's motion to dismiss, as well as
its motion to name CNA as a real party in interest.
NAD and Invivo wanted the deposition of Nick Pisani, a CNA attorney
who took part in the settlement negotiations. CNA did not allow the deposition
because it felt that Pisani's information was either irrelevant to NAD's case or
protected by attorney-client privilege. NAD petitioned the Nevada Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus, compelling the district court to name CNA as a
real party in interest, in an effort to prevent the injustice caused when CNA de-
nied it access to discoverable facts from the attorney.
NAD claimed that CNA is the subrogee of its insured, who had taken re-
sponsibility for discharging the insured's accrued debt, and is accordingly, a
real party in interest. However, the Court pointed out that in Nevada, an in-
surer is not a real party in interest (or a subrogee for that matter), "when it en-
ters into a valid loan agreement with the insured." Central Nat. Ins. Co. v
Dixon, 93 Nev. 86, 87, 559 P.2d 1187, 1188 (1977). CNA entered into the loan
agreement with its insured, providing the $14 million needed to compensate the
Nault family. Because the district court determined that the agreement was en-
tered into in good faith, and the appellant was unable to demonstrate that the
transaction was not treated as a loan, the Court found no reversible error. Ac-
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cordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly denied
the motion to make CNA a real party in interest, and consequently, denied the
appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus.
Romo v. Keplinger
978 P.2d 964 (Nev. May 19, 1999)
Trial court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial and by failing to
ascertain the extent of witness tampering.
Appellant in this case sought review of a judgment dismissing appellant's
complaint alleging, inter alia, assault and battery. The case also involves a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus or prohibition on behalf of the attorneys of the ap-
pellant seeking a review of the district court's order awarding fees and costs to
respondents as sanctions.
The two parties in the original suit engaged in a fistfight resulting in physi-
cal damage to both parties. The respondent was dating the appellant's ex-wife
at the time. At trial, the respondent's attorneys invoked the rule of witness ex-
clusion, section 50.155 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Problems arose when
the court asked one of the appellant's witnesses if appellant's attorneys had
admonished him not to discuss the case with anyone. The witness replied that
he had not been admonished. There was some question as to whether the judge
told the attorneys it was their duty to warn their witnesses since it was not on
record.
The respondents' attorneys then moved for a mistrial, the judge com-
mented on the time of day, 4:55 p.m., and declared a mistrial. The judge then
awarded respondents fees and costs of almost $30,000.
The Nevada Supreme Court delineated several options available to the
judge in a similar situation. "The judge may hold the witness in contempt, al-
low cross-examination concerning the violation, prevent the witness from testi-
fying, give a curative jury instruction and, finally, declare a mistrial." Romo,
978 P.2d 964 (Nev. 1999). The Court further stated that the trial judge failed to
make a record explaining the extent of the violation of section 50.155 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes and failed to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the
witness in question. Therefore, the Court concluded that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting a mistrial and by failing to ascertain the extent of wit-
ness tampering. Pursuant to section 16.150 of the Nevada Revised Statutes,
appellants were granted a new trial. A writ of mandamus was also ordered va-
cating the sanctions against appellant's attorneys.
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Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas County, State of Nevada, and Estate of
Katrina D. Glide
978 P.2d 311(Nev. June 7, 1999)
Intervention and injunction allowed in Douglas County land case.
In 1977, the shareholders of Dangberg Land and Livestock sold their inter-
est in a Nevada ranch to several purchasers with the express condition that the
granddaughters of the ranch's founder would be allowed to use the ranch as a
residence for the rest of their lives. On the death of the last surviving grand-
daughter, the agreement provided that the ranch house and ten adjoining acres
would be offered to Douglas County and/or the State of Nevada for use as a
museum.
In July 1995, Katrina Glide, the last surviving granddaughter died. In Sep-
tember 1995, a company called Dangberg Holdings purchased, subject to the
1977 agreement, a parcel that included the ranch house and ten acres. In Octo-
ber 1995, the State of Nevada wrote a letter to Douglas County disavowing any
interest in using the ranch house for a state park, but expressed the willingness
to support Douglas County in any plans it might have to use it as a park. Dang-
berg, 978 P.2d at 315.
In July 1996, Douglas County filed suit against Dangberg seeking specific
performance of the 1977 agreement, with trial set for October 1997. On March
12, 1997, Dangberg made a settlement offer to Douglas County. The offer re-
quired Dangberg to take possession of the personal property in the ranch house,
transfer it to an existing county museum, and to make a $35,000 donation to the
museum. In return, Douglas County would relinquish all claims to the ranch
house and ten acres. Douglas County counter-offered asking the donation to be
raised to $50,000. Id.
On April 9,1997, the Glide Estate filed a motion to intervene in the specific
performance litigation claiming an unconditional right based on its interest in
the personal property. On May 6,1997, the State of Nevada also moved to in-
tervene to enforce the agreement that the property be used as a museum.
The district court granted both motions to intervene and a subsequent mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Dangberg and Douglas County
from finalizing the settlement agreement. Dangberg petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari to force the district court to vacate the order per-
mitting intervention and appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Dangberg argued that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by allow-
ing intervention because the litigation had been settled and that the court
abused its discretion by ignoring the prejudice inherent to Dangberg and Doug-
las County from the intervention. Id. at 316. Dangberg also challenged the
grant of a temporary injunction alleging that the intervenors had failed to show
that success of the intervention was probable or that the intervenors would be
irreparably harmed. Id. at 319. In addition, Dangberg argued that the injunction
failed to set forth in detail the reasons for the issuance or the actions to be re-
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strained. Id. at 320. Finally, Dangberg claimed that the order was void be-
cause the Glide Estate had not been required to post a bond required by statute
and that Dangberg had not received its due process right of notice in order to
respond to the request for an injunction. Id.
The Court upheld the district court's rulings on the intervention, and al-
lowed the injunction to continue. The Court held that there was no evidence
that the case had reached a final settlement, pointing out that Dangberg's coun-
sel had admitted that they had quit working on the settlement on order of the
court. Id. at 317. Since intervention is not barred until a final judgment has
been reached, the court determined that the intervention motions of the State of
Nevada and the Glide estate were timely.
In ruling on Dangberg's contention that the district court abused its discre-
tion, the Court found that Dangberg was not requesting a writ of certiorari, but
rather, actually requesting a writ of mandamus, which may be used to control
an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion. Id. at 318. The Court held that the
district court had not used their discretion arbitrarily or capriciously because
the State and the Glide Estate had shown an interest in the litigation. Id. In ad-
dition, the Court held that the intervention had not seriously prejudiced Dang-
berg's interests. The Court noted that there had not been unnecessary delay,
with both Glide and the State filing intervention motions within two months af-
ter being informed of the settlement negotiations between Dangberg and Doug-
las County. The Court recognized that the intervention caused Dangberg addi-
tional litigation expense, but pointed out that Dangberg would also receive
long-term benefits from the economy of consolidation of the litigation. Id. at
318-19.
The Court upheld the injunction by reiterating its finding that the State and
Glide had significant property rights. The Court held that the planned settle-
ment agreement may well violate the museum clause, thus showing that Glide
and the State had proven a likelihood of success. Id. at 319-20.
The Court rejected Dangberg's contention that the injunction lacked speci-
ficity. The district court had indicated that the reason for the injunction was to
prevent finalization of the settlement agreement and that the court had de-
scribed in reasonable detail the act to be restrained when it ordered that "any
further action on the purported settlement agreement" be stayed until further
order of the Court. Id. at 320.
The Court held that Glide was not required to post a bond despite NRCP 65
that requires an injunction not be issued without one. NRCP 65 provides an
exemption from the requirement for state agencies. The Court held that since
the State was eligible to obtain the injunction without a bond that Glide need
not be required to post a bond of its own. Therefore, the failure of Glide to post
a bond did not invalidate the district court's preliminary injunction due to the
State's exemption. Id. at 321.
Justice Maupin dissented. He agreed that the settlement had not been final-
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ized and that consequently the intervention motions were not untimely. But,
Justice Maupin argued, extraordinary relief should have been granted because
he saw the State's letter to Douglas County as an unequivocal renunciation of
their interests. Id.
Justice Maupin also argued that the Glide estate had conceded in oral ar-
gument that the estate had no claim to the personal property involved in the set-
tlement. For this reason, Justice Maupin claimed that any other property dispute
between Glide and Dangberg should have been addressed in separate litigation.
Also, since the 1977 agreement had considered the possibility that either the
State or Douglas County could reject the property outright, Justice Maupin ar-
gued that Douglas County had the right, upon the State's renunciation of inter-
est, to make whatever arrangement it chose with Dangberg unimpeded. Id.
Palace Station v. Jones
978 P.2d 323 (Nev. June 15, 1999)
Timeliness of offers of judgment calculated by counting backwards from
the trial date, excluding the date the trial is to begin.
This personal injury case involved a man whose foot suffered injury as a
result of a valet parking attendant's running over it with a vehicle. The Palace
Station Hotel and Casino made an offer of judgment. The lower court ruled the
judgment as untimely since the service of the offer was less than ten days be-
fore the trial date, not counting the trial date or the date of service. The offer
of judgment was made on Thursday, January 26, 1995, and the trial began on
Monday, February 6, 1995. Thus, even though the jury award of $2,811.75 to
the plaintiff was less than the $4,500 offer of judgment, the plaintiff was de-
clared the prevailing party by the district court, and was awarded attorney's
fees and costs. On appeal, Palace Station argued that pursuant to Rule 68(a) of
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and section 17.115 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes, the ten-day limit should be calculated from when the offer was made,
not by counting backwards ten days from the start of trial. The Court ruled
that, in determining if an offer of judgment meets the NRCP 68 and NRS 0]
17.115 guidelines for timeliness, the "more than 10 days before trial" is calcu-
lated by counting backwards ten days from the trial date, not including the date
the trial is scheduled to begin, to when the offer was made. Jones, 978 P.2d at
325. The Court found that the offer of judgment was timely. Since the jury
award was less than the offer, the defendant was actually the prevailing party.
Id. at 325-326. The jury award of attorney's fees and costs was reversed, and
the case was remanded to the district court to determine if the defendant was
entitled to attorney's fees and costs under NRS § 17.115.
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Telequest, Inc. v. Norton Cattle Co.
189 F.3d 474 (Table) (9 th Cir. July 30, 1999)
When a federal court has jurisdiction by diversity, the choice-of-law rules
of the original forum state determine which state's substantive law should be
applied.
Telequest appealed the entry of jury verdict in favor of defendants on all
claims and Norton cross-appealed the denial of its motion for attorney's fees as
a prevailing party.
The Court ruled that when a federal court has jurisdiction by diversity, the
choice-of-law rules of the original forum state determine which state's substan-
tive law should be applied. Thus, Nevada's choice of law rules for tort actions
was applicable. Under Nevada's choice of law rules, Oregon state law was the
applicable law in this matter.
Accordingly, the District Court for the District of Oregon correctly applied
Oregon law in this case because Oregon had an "overwhelming interest" in this
action by virtue of: (1) the alleged tortious conduct of failing to disclose mate-
rial facts regarding the sale of the aircraft occurred in Oregon, (2) the "spheres
of activity" were centered in Oregon, and (3) the plane and the parties meetings
were located in Oregon.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the award of attorney's fees to
Norton according to an abuse of discretion standard applicable under Oregon
law. Oregon law, specifically section 20.096(1) of the Oregon Revised Stat-
utes, permits the awarding of attorney's fees in a contract action where the con-
tract at issue "specifically provides for those fees." In this case, the contract
which the trial court ruled "did not create enforceable contractual rights" be-
tween the parties was submitted to the jury. This contract contained no explicit
provision referencing the awarding of attorney's fees. Norton should not be
permitted to recover attorney's fees from a contract that did not contain any
provision for the awarding of' such fees, especially when that contract did not
create any enforceable rights. Thus, the order denying fees was appropriate.
State Engineer of the State of Nevada v. South Fork Band of the Te-
Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada
66 F.Supp.2d 1163 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 1999)
Dispute ofjurisdiction over the Humbolt Decree, an adjudication of water
rights between Nevada and the Western Shoshone Tribe.
The State of Nevada sued the Indian Tribe and the United States as trus-
tees, to enforce the 1931 Humbolt Decree, an adjudication of water rights. The
United States removed the action to the United States District Court; the State
of Nevada sought remand back to state court. The Court examined three "juris-
dictional thresholds" to determine the propriety of removal. First, it looked for
statutory authority granting removal. Next, it considered subject matter juris-
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diction. Finally, it analyzed the removal "in light of the doctrines of abstention
and comity."
The Court found proper authority for removal under the plain language of
28 U.S.C. § 1442, which expressly allows for removal by the United States as a
defendant. South Fork, 66 F.Supp.2d at 1167.
The State considered subject matter jurisdiction and contended that state
courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions concerning state court de-
crees. The Court found that state jurisdiction was not exclusive in this action,
as it was not an in rem action, but rather an in personam enforcement action,
involving both state and Federal entities. Id. at 1169. The State further con-
tended that removal would frustrate the state's sovereign rights to allocate and
regulate water resources. Although the Court agreed that Nevada has "the right
to regulate and distribute its water resources," the Court went on to emphasize
that right is not exclusive. Id. The Court characterized federal court jurisdic-
tion here a "minor interference with Nevada's State sovereignty," since state
law is applied by the federal courts in such cases. Id. Thus the Court ruled that
state law interests "do not warrant staying the exercise of federal jurisdiction,"
expressing confidence that federal courts are competent to interpret state law.
Id. at 1170. Addressing the State's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit in Federal court, the Court cited an exception to that immunity when
a suit against a state is brought by the United States. Id. Thus the Court held
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 1174.
The State finally claimed that even if the Court finds that subject matter ju-
risdiction exists, the Court "should not exercise its jurisdiction due to the doc-
trines of abstention and comity," and should remand the case to State court.
The Court addressed each of the four categories of cases identified by the Su-
preme Court as appropriate for abstention of federal jurisdiction.
The Court held Pullman abstention, articulated in Railroad Comm'n. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), inapplicable "because we are not faced with
any questions of state law that would eliminate any federal constitutional ques-
tions if resolved in a certain way." South Fork, 66 F.Supp. at 1174.
The Younger abstention, found in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
is implicated when federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of re-
straining state judicial proceedings. Id. Since this action was removed in its
entirety to federal court, there were no other state proceedings. The Younger
abstention was not applicable. Id. at 1175.
The Burford abstention, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34
(1943), begins with the availability of "timely and adequate state-court review."
South Fork, 66 F.Supp. at 1176. The Court found such review available here,
and continued on to the three required factors for the application of the Burford
abstention to apply in the Ninth Circuit. Id. Burford abstention failed, how-
ever, since two of the factors weighed against its application. First, the Court
found that "the state issues are not complex here, nor difficult to separate from
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the federal issues involved." Id. Second, the Court found that Nevada water
law is well settled, and "federal review will not disrupt state efforts to establish
a coherent policy." Id. at 1177.
The last category of abstention involves special circumstances where ab-
stention "is appropriate for reasons of wise judicial administration." Id. Known
as Colorado River abstention, Colorado River v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976), eight factors must be weighed to determine if such special circum-
stances exist. South Fork, 66 F.Supp. at 1177. The "factors are to be applied in
a pragmatic.. .balancing process.. .heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction." Id., citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). The Court found that three of the factors weighed in fa-
vor of federal jurisdiction: "the policy of avoidance of piecemeal adjudication;
the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; and whether federal law or state
law provides the rule of decision on the merits." South Fork, 66 F.Supp. 1181.
The Court found four of the factors either neutral or inapplicable. Id. The
neutral factors were the geographic inconvenience of the forum, and the ade-
quacy of state court proceedings to protect the litigant's rights. The inapplica-
ble factors were forum shopping, and state court jurisdiction over Res or prop-
erty. The only factor weighing in favor of state court jurisdiction was the so-
called McCarron Amendment, which creates concurrent state and federal juris-
diction, intended to "facilitate state adjudication of stream systems that con-
tained both reserved and appropriated rights of the United States and Indian
tribes." Id. at 1179. The Ninth Circuit requires that the McCarron Amendment
be "weighed more heavily than each of the other factors," but the court found
that the other factors "more than counterbalance the effect of the McCarran
Amendment." Id. at 1181. Thus Colorado River abstention was ruled not ap-
plicable.
Since proper authority to remove to federal court existed, the Court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The Court ruled that it must exer-
cise jurisdiction in the matter, since none of the abstention categories applied.
The Tribe asked that. the Court, upon exercise of jurisdiction, to dismiss the
action based on the Tribe's federal immunity. The Court ruled that the Tribe's
participation in the original decree constituted a waiver of immunity, and the
subsequent fifty-plus years of complying with the decree implied a continuing
waiver of that immunity. Id. at 1172.
Derosa v. First Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. Carson City
985 P.2d 157 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing
Dec. 14, 1999)
The Court directs the clerk of the Court to change the language of the ear-
lier opinion.
The Nevada Supreme Court denied a request for rehearing of the petitions
of Jeffery DeRosa and Janice Louis Thomas which had been resolved in
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DeRosa v. District Court, 985 P.2d 157 (Nev. August 27, 1999). Thomas had
also filed a motion to correct two references to her counsel in the earlier opin-
ion. This motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The first alleged error was a statement that Thomas' counsel had waived
her rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses by failing to object to a lab
analyst's affidavit. The Court stated in its recitation of the facts that counsel
for Thomas had objected to the affidavit but later grouped together the actions
of DeRosa's counsel with those of Thomas' counsel, resulting in an inference
that Thomas' counsel had failed to object to the affidavit. The Court granted
this part of Thomas' motion and directed the clerk of the court to change the
language of the earlier opinion. The Court also directed the clerk of the court
to correct the caption of the earlier opinion because Thomas had named the
wrong judge as a respondent.
Thomas also complained that the court's suggestion that petitioners seek
post-conviction relief disparaged the reputation of her counsel. The Court dis-
agreed and denied this portion of Thomas' motion, stating that the language of
the opinion "does not impugn counsel's ability in any way."
Parodi v. Budetti
984 P.2d 172; 1999 Nev. Lexis 48 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999)
When separate and distinct suits have been consolidated into one action,
the trial court must offset all awards of monetary damages to determine which
side is the prevailing party and whether or not the total net damages exceed the
$20,000 threshold.
Appellant, Raymond Parodi, challenged a district court order, determining
Respondents to be the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding fees and
costs.
Frank Budetti owned three separate properties, 1289 Zinfandel, 1292 Zin-
fandel and 1286 Chardonnay in Gardnerville, Nevada. Raymond Parodi con-
tracted with the Budettis to construct residential homes on the three properties.
In 1995, Raymond Parodi filed three separate actions that were later consoli-
dated against the Budettis. The first two claims alleged breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. The third action involved an additional complaint for fore-
closure of a mechanic's lien on the Chardonnay property. The same complaint
included claims against Lori Musico for slander and interference with contrac-
tual relations. Allegedly, Musico made defamatory statements about Parodi
which adversely affected business relations. The Budettis filed counterclaims
for breach of contract.
After the consolidation, but prior to trial, three offers of judgment were
served upon Parodi. The last offer made on March 19, 1997 by both the Budet-
tis and Musico, for the sum of $20,000 including all fees, costs and pre-
judgment interest was unapportioned between the two parties.
Prior to trial, the court asked both Parodi and the Budettis to submit one
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last oral settlement offer. At this time, the Budettis agreed that all of Musico's
actions would be imputed to the Budettis. The court found that both Parodi and
the Budettis had breached their contracts and awarded various amounts with
respect to each property. In the end, the damage awards resulted in a total net
verdict in favor of Parodi in the amount of $18,798.61. The net verdict was
less than the oral offer made prior to trial, and $1,201.39 less than the 1997 of-
fer.
Parodi argued that fees could be awarded under section 18.010(2)(a) of the
Nevada Revised Statues, while section 18.020 mandated costs. Second the ap-
pellant asserted he was entitled to mandatory fees and costs under section
108.237 of the Nevada Revised Statues, the mechanic's lien statute. Alterna-
tively, the Budettis asserted they were entitled to fees and costs under Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure 68 and sections 17.115,18.010 and 18.020 of the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes. The district court ruled in favor of the Budettis, holding
that the oral settlement offer exceeded the net award of the Parodi's.
Parodi appealed the order, asserting that the district court lacked the
authority to base an award of costs and fees upon the oral offers made just prior
to trial. According to Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships, 110 Nev. 23, 866
P.2d 1138 (1994), absent an abuse of discretion, a district court's award of fees
and costs will not be disturbed upon appeal. However, absent a statute or rule,
a court does not have the authority to issue an award of attorney's fees. See
State, Dep't of Human Resources v. Fowler, 109 Nev. 782, 858 P.2d 375
(1993). The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in
basing its award upon the oral negotiations of the parties.
The Court considered the application of sections 18.010 and 18.020 to con-
solidated cases with separate claims. The Court found the present case to be
one of first impression and treated it similarly to the situations in two cases in-
volving multiple claims filed in a single action. In those cases, the courts
looked to the total judgment, disregarding the individual claims. The Court
held that when separate and distinct suits have been consolidated into one ac-
tion, the trial court must offset all awards of monetary damages to determine
which side is the prevailing party and whether or not the total net damages ex-
ceed the $20,000 threshold. Based on offsetting the three monetary awards, the
net verdict was in favor of Parodi. The Court also stated that since the net ver-
dict does not exceed $20,000, the district court may consider an award of attor-
ney's fees to Parodi under Chapter 18 of the Nevada Revised Statutes on re-
mand by involving itself in the discretionary analysis included in section
18.010(l)(a).
Lastly, Parodi argued that he was entitled to fees pursuant to section
108.237 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Court mandated attorney's fees
to Parodi with regards to preparation and representation relating to the Char-
donnay property and the mechanic's lien, since a lien claimant can recover less
than the amount of lien and still be the prevailing party.
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The Court, in addressing the Budettis' argument, looked to a number of
cases. The Court decided that since the 1997 offer was not apportioned, it was
invalid for the purposes of determining a prevailing party under Nevada Rules
of Civil Procedure 68 and section 17.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. See
Edwards Inds. v. DTE/BTE, Inc., 112 Nev. 1025, 923 P.2d 569 (1996); Morgan
v. Demille, 106 Nev. 671, 799 P.2d 561 (1990); Ramadanis v. Stupak, 104
Nev. 57, 752 P.2d 767 (1988).
The Court reversed the attorney fee and cost awards and remanded for re-
calculation pursuant to the offset of all damage awards.
Crossroads Partners v. Utah Crossing, Ltd.
191 F.3d 459 (Table) (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 1999)
A non-breaching party who successfully defended an action brought by
plaintiff in violation of a release agreement is not entitled to an award of attor-
ney'sfees without a statutory, rule-based, or contractual authorization for such
an award.
Plaintiff appealed a District Court order granting of summary judgment in
favor of defendants and an award of attorney's fees on defendant's counter-
claim for breach of a release agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment, but reversed the award of attorney's fees to the defendants.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of
defendant Bank of America, Nevada, (BAN) and reversed the award of attor-
ney's fees to BAN on its counterclaim for breach of a release agreement.
The Nevada Supreme Court has not adjudicated the issue of whether attor-
ney's fees may be awarded for a breach of a release agreement. However, the
Nevada high court has consistently adhered to the "American rule" that "attor-
ney's fees may not be awarded in absence of a statute, rule or contract granting
them," see Campbell v. Nocilla, 101 Nev 9, 692 P.2d 491, 492 (Nev. 1985), in
breach-of-contract claims.
Thus, a "non-breaching party who successfully defended an action brought
by plaintiff in violation of a release agreement is not entitled to an award of at-
torney's fees without a statutory, rule-based, or contractual authorization for
such an award." Since neither the release agreement between the parties nor
any statute or rule provided for the award of attorney's fees in an action such as
this one, the court held that the award of fees to defendant BAN under the re-
lease agreement was erroneous. However, the Ninth Circuit advised BAN that,
as the prevailing party, it may still move the trial court for the awarding of at-
torney's fees under section 18.010(2)(b) of Nevada Revised Statutes, which
"permits a court to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party when it finds that
a claim was brought without reasonable grounds or to harass the prevailing
party."
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Abreu v. Gilmer
985 P.2d 746 (Nev. Oct. 20, 1999)
There is no objective formulaic standard for determining what is, or is not,
due diligence and each case is to be decided on its merits.
This case involved an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for fail-
ure to effect service of process.
The Abreus were injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by
Gilmer. The parties did not call the police, but rather exchanged addresses and
insurance information. The address Gilmer provided was incorrect.
Under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), service of process must be ac-
complished within 120 days of filing a complaint. Here, the Abreus filed a
complaint against Gilmer on May 14, 1997. After repeated attempts to effect
personal service, an attorney finally contacted the Abreus. The attorney stated
that he would represent Gilmer on the insurer's behalf. The attorney would not
accept service, and refused to provide the Abreus any assistance in finding
Gilmer.
On July 29, 1997, the Abreus filed an affidavit of due diligence and an af-
fidavit for publication of the summons and complaint. The district court en-
tered an order to allow service by publication on August 6, 1997. On Septem-
ber 17, 1997, the Abreus filed an affidavit that service of process by publication
was completed.
Gilmer immediately filed a motion to quash service of process, arguing that
the Abreus had not exercised due diligence before resorting to publication. The
motion provided Gilmer's new address, and the Abreus obtained a new sum-
mons and personally served Gilmer on October 7, 1997, some 146 days after
the complaint was filed.
Gilmer filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i) for failure
to personally serve Gilmer within 120 days. On November 14, 1997, the dis-
trict court heard the motion to quash service of process. Despite testimony that
Gilmer had lived at some six different locations between the time of the acci-
dent and the hearing and that she would not have provided her address to
someone who asked for it, the court granted the motion to quash because the
Abreus had not exercised due diligence before service by publication. By sub-
sequent order, the court dismissed the complaint, finding that Abreus failed to
demonstrate good cause by failing to complete service within 120 days as pre-
scribed by Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
The Court accepted the case for review even though a petition for a writ of
mandamus, not an appeal, is the procedural vehicle for challenging an order
quashing service of process. See Jarstad v. National Farmers Union, 92 Nev.
380, 552 P.2d 49 (1976). Here, the order to quash service of process led di-
rectly to a dismissal of the complaint. Because the dismissal was a final order
of the district court, jurisdiction was properly vested in the Court, which may
review due diligence determinations for abuse of discretion.
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In its per curiam opinion, the Court reasoned that "there is no objective
formulaic standard for determining what is, or is not, due diligence." In light of
its "underlying policy to have each case decided on its merits," (citing Christy
v. Carlisle, 94 Nev 651, 654, 582 P.2d 687, 689 (1978)), the Court concluded
that the district court abused its discretion when it found that Abreus did not
exercise due diligence prior to serving Gilmer by publication. The Court found
that Abreus' efforts to effect service were "appropriate and reasonably calcu-
lated to accomplish service on Gilmer."
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the order of the district
court.
Medical Device Alliance, Inc. v. Ahr
988 P.2d 308 (Nev. Nov. 29,1999)
By appointing a temporary receiver, the plaintiff became aggrieved party
and had standing to appeal trial court's order.
This case involved an appeal from a district court decision appointing a
temporary receiver to Medical Device Alliance (MDA), the appellant. The re-
spondents, shareholders in MDA, filed the original motion with the district
court seeking a temporary receiver over the corporation. The motion alleged
MDA's management had engaged in improper conduct including fraud and
mismanagement. Subsequently, the district court found in favor of the respon-
dents and appointed the temporary receiver.
The question presented on appeal was whether the appointment of a tempo-
rary receiver to a corporation provides standing for the corporation to pursue an
appeal as an aggrieved party. Ahr, 988 P.2d at 310. The respondents argued
that MDA was not an aggrieved party and, therefore, had no standing to sue.
The respondents also alleged that, although the board of directors may be con-
sidered aggrieved parties in this suit, they were not parties in the original ac-
tion. Id. at 310.
The Court ruled that MDA did, in fact, have standing to appeal the order.
The Court held that, by appointing a temporary receiver, MDA became an ag-
grieved party because the appointment of a temporary receiver to a corporation
interferes with a corporation's, "normal operations and processes pursuant to its
articles of incorporation and bylaws." Id.
Greene v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
990 P.2d 184 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999)
Complaints may not be amended post-judgment unless judgment has been
set aside.
This case concerned a petition for a writ of prohibition. The writ chal-
lenged a district court order that permitted the amendment of a complaint fol-
lowing final judgment on the matter. Id.
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Following the district court's judgment against defendant/petitioner, Stan
Greene, and in favor of plaintiff/real party in interest, Dwaine Anderson,
Anderson alleged that Ronnie and Kathleen Ford had helped Greene to transfer
assets to other entities. Id. Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.330, Anderson
filed a motion to amend his complaint. Id. He intended to bar Greene from
further transfers and to set aside the previous, allegedly fraudulent, convey-
ances. Id. Over a year after the final judgment, the court granted the motion.
Id. Greene and the Fords then filed a writ of prohibition and an emergency
motion to stay with the Supreme Court of Nevada; the court granted the motion
to stay. Id.
Anderson argued that the district court should have power "to protect its
judgments by setting aside fraudulent conveyances by a judgment debtor, and
that this inherent power also allows the district court to grant leave to amend a
complaint and pursue fraudulent conveyance claims in a post-judgment sup-
plementary proceeding," but the court did not agree. Id. at 186. Instead, grant-
ing the petitioners' writ of prohibition, the court announced a prohibition
against post-judgment amendment of complaints where the judgment has not
first been set aside or vacated. Id. at 187.
However, the court's opinion makes clear that a party in Anderson's posi-
tion has other options. Id. at 186. Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.320, a court
can order that the property of the debtor be applied to the judgment even if it is
currently in the possession of a third-party (so long as the third party does not
have an adverse claim to the property in which case the judgment creditor must
institute a claim against that third party). Id..
MRO Communications, Inc., v. AT&T Corp.
197 F.3d 1276 ( 9 th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999)
A trial court, in exercising its discretion, must consider four factors and
make findings based on the evidence that attorney fees sought are reasonable
and justified.
MRO Communications (MRO) brought an action including claims under
state and federal law. AT&T Corp. (AT&T) moved for judgment as a matter of
law, which the court granted.
Thereafter, AT&T moved for an award of attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending the Plaintiffs state law claims from the time the MRO rejected the
AT&T's offer of judgment. The court granted the motion and awarded fees
under section 17.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes and Nevada Rule of Civil
Procedure 68. Plaintiff appealed this award. The Court reviewed the district
court's award of attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard and af-
firmed.
MRO argued on appeal that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in Delta Airlines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981),
precluded an award of attorney's fees because judgment was not obtained by
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the offeree (MRO), but by the offeror (AT&T).
The Ninth Circuit noted that the AT&T's offer of judgment made no refer-
ence to attorney's fees, but was expressly made "for the purposes set forth in
F.R.C.P. 68." F.R.C.P. 68 mandates that when a judgment awarded to a plain-
tiff is less than the offer made by the defendant, the plaintiff must pay the
"costs" which the defendant incurred after making the offer. MRO Communi-
cations, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 197 F.3d at 1280. "Costs" in the Rule 68 context,
as construed in Marek v. Chesney, 437 U.S. 1 (1985) was "intended to refer to
all costs properly awarded under the relevant substantive statutes" - most of
which were federal statutes by which courts could award attorney's fee's. Id.
Thus pursuant to Rule 68, "costs" signifies "all costs properly awarded under
the relevant substantive statute" which creates the mechanism to award costs.
However, Rule 68 is inapplicable in cases such as this one in which the defen-
dant, after making an offer in judgment that the plaintiff rejects, obtains a
judgment. Id. Thus, Rule 68 could not be the framework by which review is
conducted regarding the award of attorney's fees to AT&T. Id.
Nevada law, specifically section 17.115 of Nevada Revised Statutes and
Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 68, provides the basis for the awarding attor-
ney's fees to a defendant who makes an offer of judgment that is rejected by
the plaintiff, who subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable result. MRO at
1281. "Failing to obtain a more favorable result" includes not obtaining a
judgment at all. Id. at 1282.
Though Nevada law requires that an offer in judgment made in a state trial
court specify the source that provides for an award of the cost or fee sought, it
does not describe the procedure that should be followed in making an offer in
judgment in a federal court. This procedure is only found in Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 68, which AT&T followed. But applying Rule 68 leads to a
contrary result than does Nevada law. It would be a violation of national policy
as set forth in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) to permit a result
contrary to the policy set forth in Nevada law simply because the forum is fed-
eral. MRO at 1283. Even before Erie, the Supreme Court ruled in People of
Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928), that a state
statute requiring the award of attorney's fees, such as section 18.020 of the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes, be applied in a case removed from state to federal court.
In a case such as this, where MRO filed its state court claims supplemental to
its federal claims in federal court, the same principle of continuity in results ap-
plies, requiring the reviewing court to look to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure
68 for guidance.
Beattie, mandates that a trial court, in exercising its discretion to award
fees and costs under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 68, must consider four
factors and make findings based on the evidence that the fee's sought are "rea-
sonable and justified." Such inquiries evince the proper exercise of discretion.
The factors are:
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(1) Whether the plaintiffs claim as brought in good faith;
(2) Whether the defendant's timing and amount of judgment offer were
reasonable and in good faith;
(3) Whether the plaintiffs decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial
was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and
(4) Whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in
amount.
MRO at 1283.
Though the trial court made no specific findings as to these four factors
beyond announcing that the attorney's fees are "reasonable," it was only obli-
gated to "consider" the four factors. It was clear that the trial court reached its
decision only after "considering the various affidavits and exhibits of the
party's in support and opposition of AT&T's motion for attorney's fees." Id. at
1284. These documents contained sufficient information to inform the trial
court's decision relative to the four factors. Thus, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding AT&T attorney's fees.
State of Nevada v. Stu's Bail Bonds
991 P. 2d 469 (Nev. Dec. 28, 1999)
The district court lacked jurisdiction to exonerate the bail bond of a crimi-
nal defendant whofled to Mexico.
The district court exonerated a bail bond after a criminal defendant fled to
Mexico, and after the respondent, Stu's Bail Bonds, incurred legal barring from
retrieving the defendant pursuant to the United States/Mexico treaty. The dis-
trict court granted the respondent's motion to exonerate the bail bond after con-
cluding that the treaty made it impossible for the respondent to legally retrieve
the defendant from a foreign country and that Nev. Rev. Stat.
§178.509(1)(b)(4) accounted for this circumstance. See Stu's Bail Bonds, 991
P. 2d at 470. The appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court challenged the exonera-
tion of the bond. The Court concluded that the district court erred and reversed
and remanded the case.
The criminal defendant pled guilty to the offense of conspiracy to commit
grand larceny. Id. He was released on bail and when he failed to appear at his
sentencing hearing, the district court mailed a notice of intent to forfeit the bail
bond to the surety, Stu's Bail Bonds. Id.
Respondent moved to exonerate the bail bond because the defendant had
fled to a foreign country and could not be legally retrieved. Specifically, Re-
spondent alleged the treaty between the United States and Mexico and Mex-
ico's policy against extradition of nationals, prevented the lawful retrieval of
the defendant. Id. Further, respondent argued that these factors amounted to
civil detention of the defendant and therefore, were included under the Nevada
Statute that allowed for exoneration of a bond under certain circumstances. Id.
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The appeal issue was whether the district court correctly interpreted the
statute to include the situation where a defendant absconds to another country.
The court found that the lower court erred in granting the motion for exonera-
tion of the bail bond because a defendant's nonappearance may only be ex-
cused by death, illness, insanity or civil or military detainment. Id. at 471.
Since none of those situations occurred, the court lacked the discretion to exon-
erate the bail bond.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Geary v. Nevada
977 P. 2d 344 (Nev. Apr. 26, 1999)
Convicted murderer allowed waiver of right to appeal death sentence.
In Geary v. Nevada, 977 P.2d 344 (Nev. 1999), the Nevada Supreme Court
considered the appellant's decision to waive his automatic right to appeal his
death sentence. Geary, on parole for a 1973 murder conviction, was convicted
for first degree murder of Edward Theodore Colvin. Id. at 345. After a series
of penalty hearings and judicial proceedings, Geary decided to waive his right
to appeal his death sentence. In its mandatory review, the Nevada Supreme
Court noted that it had an obligation to order a hearing concerning Geary's
competence to make this waiver. Under the test for such competence, the court
must conclude that the defendant has sufficient present ability to make this de-
cision and that the defendant understands the ramifications of the proceeding.
Id. at 346.
In the hearing, Geary and his attorney stated that they had extensively dis-
cussed Geary's decision and that he understood the nature of the proceedings.
Further, two psychiatrists reported that Geary was competent to waive his ap-
pellate rights. Id. Having concluded that Geary was competent, the Nevada
Supreme Court, as required by its mandatory review, held that the death sen-
tence was not imposed due to passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. The
court also concluded that the sentence was not excessive due to the brutal na-
ture of the Colvin murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellant's con-
viction and death sentence. Id. at 347.
Kness v. Palmer, et al.
182 F.3d 926 (Table) (91h Cir. May 18, 1999)
Absent evidence ofjoint action in which a private party is a willful partici-
pant with the State or its agents, there is no state action for purposes of impos-
ing §1983 liability.
In these two unpublished opinions that involve the same pro se plaintiff
and almost identical claims arising from two separate incidents, the Court
waded through a laundry list of claims without merit, briefly citing its reasons
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for affirming summary judgment for defendants on each one. The first set of
claims arose out of an incident at a hotel/casino in Las Vegas, in which the
plaintiff, Thomas T. Kness was placed under citizen's arrest by three casino
employees for trespassing. The second set of claims arose out of another citi-
zen's arrest made by employees of a casino in Reno.
The Court affirmed summary judgment that dismissed Kness's claim
against the Las Vegas casino and its employees for allegedly illegally detaining
him because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that "a person acting under color of state
law committed the conduct at issue." The court held that "[a]bsent evidence of
joint action in which a private party is a willful participant with the State or its
agents, there is no 'state action' for purposes of imposing § 1983 liability."
The Court also found that summary judgment was proper on Kness's
claims that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), the City
of Las Vegas, a LVMPD officer, and a police records supervisor acted to de-
prive him of several constitutional rights. In order to establish municipal liabil-
ity, one must show that the alleged constitutional violations were the result of
policy or custom of a municipal agency. Kness offered nothing more than his
own conclusory statements to prove that it was the policy or custom of the City
or the police department to falsely charge casino patrons with trespassing and
obtain their social security numbers in order to ensure that they will not obtain
future employment in Las Vegas.
Goodson v. State
991 P.2d 472 (Nev. Dec. 29, 1999)
Trial before non-lawyer justice of the peace did not violate federal or state
due process or right to counsel guarantees.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko
County, Jack B. Ames, J., of felony count of driving while under the influence
of alcohol (DUI), and he appealed. The Supreme Court held that defendant's
prior misdemeanor DUI trial before non-lawyer justice of the peace violated
neither federal nor state constitutional due process or right to counsel guaran-
tees. The Nevada Supreme Court followed the holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which requires the state to show that the spirit of constitutional princi-
ples was respected in the prior misdemeanor proceedings before the record of
the prior misdemeanor may be used for enhancement purposes. The Nevada
Constitution provides that the legislature shall determine the qualifications of
justices of the peace and how appeals may be taken from the justice courts.
NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 8. The legislature has decided that justices of the
peace in rural areas and municipal judges need not be lawyers. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 4.010(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 5.020. However, justices of the peace and
municipal judges are required to receive instruction in court procedure and sub-
stantive law after they take office and in developments in the law approxi-
mately once each year.
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The United States Supreme Court has addressed "whether an accused, sub-
ject to possible imprisonment, is denied due process when tried before a non-
lawyer police court judge with a later trial de novo available." North v. Rus-
sell, 427 U.S. 328, 329 (1976). North left open the question whether such a
trial is constitutional absent the availability of a trial de novo on appeal. See id.
at 334. However, the Nevada Supreme Court doubts that the Supreme Court
would deem it a violation of due process. " '[Ojur federal system warns of con-
verting desirable practice into constitutional commandment. It recognizes in
plural and diverse state activities one key to national innovation and vitality.
States are entitled to some flexibility and leeway...' " Id. at 338 n. 6, 92 S.Ct.
2119, the Nevada Supreme Court recognizes that most questions concerning a
judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor,
not a uniform standard. Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by
common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar. This
holding is a bit suspect in that it casually dismisses the "de novo possibility"
caveat contained in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 329, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49
L.Ed.2d 534 (1976).
CONTRACTS
Garshman Co., Ltd. v. General Electric Co.
176 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. Mar. 29, 1999)
Nevada's Exclusive Listing Agreement applies to those agreements which
(1) are between an owner and a broker; (2) are for the sale of real property;
and (3) that exclude other brokers.
Garshman and General Electric (GE) entered into a contract where Garsh-
man would auction the assets of a tungsten mine GE owned but was not utiliz-
ing. Garshman was approached by a buyer, to which GE orally agreed to sell
the assets of the mine and real estate property. Garshman and GE agreed that
Garshman would be paid a commission upon receipt of a letter of intent to pur-
chase a non-refundable deposit of $75,000. Ultimately, the new buyer signed
the letter and made the non-refundable deposit, but the deal fell through. GE
denied any obligation to pay Garshman. A contract dispute resulted in which
Plaintiff Garshman obtained a favorable jury verdict on all its claims except for
its claim based on Chapter 93A of Massachusetts Law. Garshman appealed the
adverse judgment of the court under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. General Elec-
tric (GE) appeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the ap-
plication of the Nevada Exclusive Listing Statute, section 645.320 of the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes.
The Court ruled that Nevada's Exclusive Listing Agreement, section
645.320 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, applied to those agreements which (1)
are between an owner and a broker; (2) are for the sale of real properly; and (3)
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that exclude other brokers. Garshman Co. v. General Electric Co., 176 F.3d at
7. This statute only applies to "oral brokerage agreements, such as the oral
agreement between Garshman and GE which contemplated the sale of the as-
sets of the mine to the buyer and not at auction, which include a provision for
an exclusive listing." Id. at 8. The oral agreement in this case contained no
such provision, so the statute was irrelevant.
The Court also ruled that Garshman was not entitled to both a judgment for
$404,754.86 recoverable under the liquidated damages provision as well as the
$372,000 for GE's breach of the oral agreement as determined by the jury.
Damages for breach of contract "should only place the wronged party in as
good a position as it would have been had the other fully performed." Id. at 10.
The trial court could have appropriately inferred, though not precisely clear
from the jury verdict form, that the award of $404,754.86 for liquidated dam-
ages was based on the inclusion of the $372,000 (12% of the assumed sale
price of $3,100,000) plus Garshman's expenses of $32,754.86. Id. at 10-11.
Given these circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to not
award Garshman the $372,000 on top of the $404,754.86 it received as such
award would be duplicative and unjust. Id. at 11-12.
CRIMINAL LAW
Libby v. State
975 P.2d 833 (Nev. Apr. 2, 1999)
Court affirms the district court order denying defendant a new trial.
On April 17, 1990, a jury found Libby guilty for, among other lesser of-
fenses, two counts of first degree murder aggravated by two circumstances for
each murder, and was sentenced to a verdict of death for each count. During
the jury selection process, prosecutor Bullock used six of his eight peremptory
challenges to exclude women from the jury. The defense objected, citing Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106, S.Ct. 1712 (1986), which
held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors based upon race.
Libby appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which affirmed Libby's
convictions and death sentences in Libby 1, 109 Nev. 905, 859 P.2d 1050.
Libby then petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court, alleging discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during jury selec-
tion based upon gender. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
Libby I, and remanded to the Supreme Court of Nevada for further considera-
tion in light of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89.
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), which prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges
during jury selection.
The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Libby had successfully es-
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tablished a prima facie case of discrimination. However, the prosecutor had not
offered reasons for his peremptory challenges, preventing the court from re-
viewing the gender discrimination challenge as required by J.E.B. The Court
remanded so the district court could conduct an evidentiary hearing to provide
the prosecutor with opportunity to offer any gender-neutral bases for the chal-
lenges.
The district court conducted the evidentiary hearing on November 12,
1997, nearly eight years after the original trial jury selection. The court found
that the State's gender-neutral reasons were sufficient to rebut Libby's prima
facie case, and denied a new trial. Libby appealed the district court's denial of
a new trial.
The Court considered the three steps laid out by the Supreme Court in
J.E.B. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of gender dis-
crimination; second, the state must offer gender neutral reasons for the use of
peremptory challenges; and third, the trial court must evaluate the evidence to
determine if the state's reasons rebut the prima facie case, or are merely a pre-
text for purposeful discrimination. Libby, 975 P.2d at 836. The Court had al-
ready held that Libby established a prima facie case prior to the remand. Thus,
its consideration on this appeal concerned the district court findings about steps
two and three, as well as issues pertaining to the evidentiary hearing itself. Id.
The Court concluded that the state provided sufficient gender-neutral rea-
sons for its use of peremptory challenges, that the evidentiary hearing was not
meaningless, that the court did not err in omitting certain lines of questioning
by Libby, and that the court's written order was adequate.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court order denying Libby a
new trial.
Martinez v. State
974 P.2d 133 (Nev. Feb. 12, 1999)
A defendant who pleads guilty to criminal charges such as battery with use
of a deadly weapon is not required to pay restitution to an insurance company
that is not a victim.
The Court held that a defendant who pleads guilty to criminal charges such
as battery with use of a deadly weapon is not required to pay restitution to an
insurance company that is not a victim under section 176.015 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes. The Court further held that the trial court erred in consider-
ing the appellant's ability to pay when the trial court determined the amount of
restitution to be paid.
Martinez contested a district court's decision ordering Martinez to pay res-
titution in excess of $68,000. Martinez was involved in an altercation with two
victims on September 27, 1994. During this altercation, Martinez shot one vic-
tim in the chest and injured the other in the leg. At the time of the incident,
Martinez was an eighteen-year-old illegal immigrant with no financial assets.
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The Division of Parole and Probation did not readily identify his victims. After
some inquiries, the Division discovered that victim No. 1 had sustained medical
bills from Mercy Ambulance and University Medical Center in excess of
$66,000. Martinez v. State of Nevada, 974 P.2d 133, 134 (Nev. 1999). Fur-
ther, $200 of Victim No. 1 's medical bills was covered through Humana Insur-
ance Company of Louisville, Kentucky. Id. Victim No. 2 also owed Mercy
Ambulance and University Medical Center $1,500. Id. The Division of Parole
and Probation recommended to the district court that Martinez pay restitution to
cover his victims' medical bills to which the court agreed.
The issues before the Court in this case were 1) whether or not the hospital
and ambulance company could receive restitution as "victims" under Nevada
law; 2) whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the restitution
requirement; and 3) whether Martinez's ability to pay should have been con-
sidered when the lower court made the restitution sentence.
In addressing the issue of whether or not the hospital and ambulance
companies were victims under Nevada law, the Court looked to section
176.033(1)(c) of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Id. ("if a sentence of im-
prisonment is required or permitted by statute, the sentencing court shall:
... if restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each victim of
the offense."), and 176.015 (5)(b). Id. (Providing a "victim includes: 1) A
person, including a governmental entity, against whom a crime has been
committed; 2) A person who has been injured or killed as a direct result of
the commission of a crime; and 3)A relative of a person described in sub-
paragraph (1) or (2)"). Based on the statutory language, the Court held that
the district court's order to pay restitution for the victims' medical bills di-
rectly resulting from the incident was proper. Id. In reaching its decision
the Court specifically stated that medical care providers treating crime vic-
tims are not "victims" as defined by section 176.015(5)(b) of the Nevada
Revised Statutes. However, the Court has held in other cases that medical
care providers are entitled to restitution when the medical costs of treating
crime victims directly result from the crime. See e.g., Norwood v. State,
112 Nev. 438, 441, 915 P.2d 277, 279 (1996).
The Court refused to extend the restitution to insurance companies be-
cause insurance companies have a contractual obligation to cover its cus-
tomers. Id., citing Hewitt v. State, 113 Nev. 387, 936 P.2d 330, 332 (1997).
Specifically, the Court stated that an insurance company covering a
crime victim's medical bills does not suffer an unexpected loss because in-
surance companies are in the business of paying people's medical bills. Id.
The Court did state, however, that an insurance company may seek subro-
gation from the criminal defendant for medical bills resulting from a crime.
Id.
The Court also stated that the defendant was not entitled to a full evi-
dentiary hearing regarding restitution, but could challenge the amount
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sought by providing evidence to support his claim. Id. In this case, Marti-
nez never challenged the amount of restitution he was required to pay. Ad-
ditionally, the Court took the opportunity to state that it would not disrupt a
district court's sentencing decision so long as the decision was based on
sufficient evidence. Id., citing Lloyd v. State, 94 Nev. 167, 576 P.2d 740
(1978) and Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91. 545 P.2d 1159 (1976).
For the reasons stated, the Court declined to disturb the district court's
order for the amount of restitution Martinez was required to pay. Id. at 135.
Finally, the Court ruled that the district court did not err by failing to
consider Martinez' ability to pay the restitution. Id., citing section 176.015
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Court reasoned that there is no re-
quirement for such a consideration in determining the amount of restitution
a criminal defendant would be required to pay. Id.
Meegan v. State
1999 Nev. Lexis 5 (Nev. Feb. 16, 1999)
Court corrects mistake in the original opinion, but affirms murder convic-
tion.
James Meegan, convicted of first-degree murder of his ten-month-old
daughter, petitioned for rehearing pursuant to Nevada Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure 40(c). Meegan contended that the lower court erred by misstating the facts
of the case in the opinion, misapprehending the autopsy evidence, and by deny-
ing the defendant's right to self-representation.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and life sentence in
1998. However, the Court did take this opportunity upon petition to correct a
mistake in the opinion, in which it was purported that Meegan made a state-
ment about his daughter's death while testifying. This statement was never
made, as Meegan never testified, although there was a videotape recording of
statements made by Meegan during an interview with a reporter in jail, which
was played in court as evidence. The Court concluded that they did not over-
look or misapprehend a material matter warranting rehearing. They did, how-
ever, order a correction of the opinion.
Meegan then requested that the court identify the basis for a statement
made in the opinion regarding part of the prosecution's closing argument. The
Court accordingly identified the basis for the statement using the words of
Meegan's own attorney in defense counsel's opening statement.
Meegan also asserted that the court misapprehended autopsy evidence re-
garding a statement made by the court in its opinion. The Court acknowledged
that only one doctor spoke and during cross-examination he testified to the ef-
fect that his findings could have been consistent with a drug related death. The
doctor clarified this statement upon redirect to indicate his findings were not
consistent with a drug overdose. Therefore, after looking at the entire testi-
mony including redirect, the Court concluded that it did not misapprehend or
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overlook a material matter.
Finally, the appellant challenged the Court's conclusion that the lower
court properly denied his request for self-representation and that Meegan later
withdrew his request. Again, the Court concluded it did not overlook or mis-
apprehend a material fact or question of law. Even though appellant's petition
was denied, the Court ordered the opinion corrected regarding Meegan's state-
ments.
Davis v. State
974 P.2d 658 (Nev. Feb 17,1999)
Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel denied.
In Davis v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether an at-
torney is obligated to obtain a client's consent when deciding not to file an ap-
peal of a guilty plea conviction. The appellant, after pleading guilty to bur-
glary, was sentenced as a habitual criminal under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.010.
Davis v. Nevada, 974 P.2d 658 (1999). On appeal to the Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, the appellant claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
inform him of his right to appeal and for not directly appealing the conviction.
Id. at 659 (the appellant also made certain procedural challenges to the convic-
tion.) The appellant asserted that the state did not produce certified copies of
his prior convictions pursuant to Nev.Rev.Stat. § 207.010. The Nevada Su-
preme Court concluded that the record indicated that such documents had been
provided. Further, the appellant raised the issue of his adjudication as a habit-
ual criminal. Noting that appellant had failed to raise this claim on direct ap-
peal, the court rejected appellant's arguments.
In its review, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that, consistent with Cru-
zado v. State, 879 P.2d 1195 (Nev. 1994), a knowing and voluntary unequivocal
waiver of the right to appeal made pursuant to a plea bargain is valid and en-
forceable. Davis, 974 P. 2d at 659. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that
the appellant in Davis did not unequivocally waive his right to a direct appeal.
Specifically, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.015(4) provides for a right to appeal after a
guilty plea if the appeal challenges the legality of the proceedings on legitimate
constitutional, jurisdictional or other reasonable grounds. Id. According to the
court, this statute merely limits appellate rights as opposed to providing an un-
equivocal waiver of such rights. Id. Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court over-
ruled the lower court's ruling regarding the appellant's right to an appeal.
However, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected appellant's arguments con-
cerning the ineffectiveness of counsel. The court reasoned that a plea memo-
randum informs a defendant of the right to appeal, thus removing any obliga-
tion on behalf of counsel to provide this information. Id.
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Jackson v. State
973 P.2d 241 (Nev. Mar. 16, 1999)
A writ of habeas corpus may not be sought after an individual has already
served his sentence for a crime.
Appellant, currently serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole
in the Nevada State Prison, sought to challenge the validity of two 1975 crimi-
nal convictions, 14 years after he had completed the sentences imposed by
those convictions. Appellant claimed that his current sentence was enhanced
due to the 1975 convictions on the robbery and grand larceny charges (to which
he had pleaded guilty). However, he also claimed that those prior convictions
were unconstitutional inasmuch as he was never informed that he had a right to
an appeal.
The Court, for the sake of judicial economy, consolidated the appellant's
petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the two convictions and summarily dis-
posed of them. Jackson, 973 P.2d at 241. The court based its decision on the
rule that "a district court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus if the post-
conviction petitioner filed the petition challenging the validity of a conviction
after having completed the sentence for the challenged conviction." Id. at 242.
Parsons v. State
978 P.2d 963, (Nev. May 18, 1999)
A court may not use a prior misdemeanor DUI conviction to enhance a
DUI to a felony unless the records of the conviction demonstrate that the de-
fendant was either represented by counsel or formally waived his right to coun-
sel.
After a trial by jury, Parsons appealed a conviction of felony driving under
the influence, which he was charged with in 1991. The complaint contained
two prior misdemeanor DUI's which the prosecution used to enhance the
charge to a felony. The justice court struck one of the prior misdemeanors and
Parsons entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge misdemeanor DUL. The State
then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the district court. The court issued an
order reversing the conviction and rescheduling the preliminary hearing before
a different magistrate. In the second hearing, on August 21, 1995, Parsons ar-
gued that the prior misdemeanor DUI conviction was insufficient because the
complaint did not allege all essential elements. The complaint was also ques-
tionable as to whether Parsons waived the assistance of counsel or whether
there was actual counsel present. The magistrate agreed and dismissed the fel-
ony DUI charge.
The State then filed information by affidavit under section 173.035(2) of
the Nevada Revised Statutes, to the Fifth Judicial District Court of Nye County.
The district court overturned the magistrate below, and found that the error
committed was egregious. A one-day trial ensued, the prior DUI's were al-
lowed in and the jury found Parsons guilty of one count of felony Driving Un-
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der the Influence.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed Parsons' conviction citing Cranford
v. Smart, 92 Nev. 89, 91; 545 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1976), which held that section
173.035(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes "contemplates a safeguard against
egregious error by a magistrate in determining probable cause, [and is] not a
device to be used by a prosecutor to satisfy deficiencies in evidence at a pre-
liminary hearing."
Also, the court, looking to Bonds v. State, 105 Nev. 827 828;784 P.2d 1, 1-
2 (1989), stated that a court may not use a prior misdemeanor DUI conviction
to enhance a DUI to a felony unless the records of the conviction demonstrate
that the defendant was either represented by counsel or formally waived his
right to counsel. The Court overturned the district court's decision because the
magistrate was faced with ambiguous documentation regarding the prior mis-
demeanor. The court also believed the State impermissibly attempted to satisfy
deficiencies in the evidence at the preliminary hearing.
Barngrover vs. The Fourth Judicial Court of the State of Nevada
979 P.2d 216, (Nev. June 7, 1999)
Supreme Court reiterates that grand juries have a duty to either "indict or
be silent."
Petitioners sought a writ of mandate filed on behalf of petitioners to ex-
punge a grand jury presentment, report and transcripts involving petitioners.
The petitioners, employees of the Nevada Division of Wildlife (NDOW) were,
among others, the subjects of a grand jury investigation into federal and state
officials' management of public lands in Elko County. In particular, the peti-
tioners were involved in a transaction with the Independence Mining Company
(IMC), the United States Forestry Service (USFS) and NDOW, wherein the
IMC, desiring to expand its gold mining operations in the Independence Moun-
tain range, sought a permit to begin mining on public lands. As a part of that
permit procedure, IMC was required to pay an amount of money to certain
agencies in order to mitigate the negative impact that their operations would
have on the wildlife of the area. IMC agreed on a settlement, which required it
to pay $500,000.00 into a fund to be administered by NDOW, which was ulti-
mately responsible for the mitigation plan.
This transaction was, among others, the subject of a grand jury investiga-
tion, which looked into an alleged collusion between state agencies that limited
economic activity on public lands in Elko County. On January 9, 1997, the
grand jury filed its report, but no indictment or presentment accompanied it.
Nevertheless, the report did contain an allegation that NDOW employees had
"maliciously withheld ... permits to which the IMC was entitled in order to
force IMC to pay sums of money for habitat development."
The District Attorney submitted the Grand Jury report to the district
court, together with a letter noting that several names of individuals were
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contained in the report with accusations of indictable activity. Yet, since
the statute of limitations had run, no indictment could issue. Nevertheless,
the D.A. indicated that the grand jury desired that the report act as a "pre-
sentment" with regard to these individuals pursuant to section 172.267(2)(c)
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The opinion explained that ". . .a present-
ment is simply a criminal accusation initialed by the grand jury itself, as
opposed to an accusation requested by a prosecutorial agency. Black's Law
Dictionary 1184 (6th ed. 1990)." See Barngrover, 979 P.2d 220 (1999).
The district court, recognizing that the report did not comply with section
172.267(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes, requested that the grand jury clarify
its position (to officially press charges), or it would afford those accused with
the opportunity for expungement under section 172.267 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes. See Barngrover, 979 P.2d at 220. Despite the fact that the statute of
limitations had run as to the allegations contained in the report, the grand jury
still went forward with its presentment as to the respondents, which petitioners
learned of via local newspapers. Hence, the petitioners filed motions for or-
ders directing the grand jury to certify and file a transcript of their proceedings,
as required by statute, presumably so that they could go about seeking their ex-
pungement. The district court granted a limited order that required only the fil-
ing of the "witnesses relied upon by the grand jury in returning the Presentment
(citation omitted)" and denied later motions to expand the order to cover the
entire grand jury proceedings. Id. at 219.
The writ at issue herein was filed in an effort to obtain an order to expunge
the entire record. Petitioners were concerned that since they had been accused
of an offense warranting trial, for which they could not be prosecuted due to the
statute of limitations, they could not defend themselves against the accusation
in a public forum. The Nevada Supreme Court, citing Ormsby Grand Jury, 74
Nev. 80, 84, 322 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1958), stated a concern with the fact that".
. a man should not be subject to quasi-official accusation of misconduct which
he cannot answer in an authoritative forum." See Barngrover, 979 P.2d at 221.
The Court later clarified that "[t]here is no provision for the government to file
a document called a 'presentment' and then request the court to determine the
matter be closed with no further action" under section 172.267 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes.
The Court also clarified the dual role of the grand jury as that of "(1) re-
porting on matters involving the operation of the government and (2) making
accusations of possible criminal conduct." Id. at 220. It further stated that the
grand jury should not blur these functions together, as had apparently occurred
with this particular grand jury. Biglieri v. Washow Co. Grand Jury, 95 Nev.
696 (1979). Therefore, if the grand jury is acting in the role of making accusa-
tions, it must either "indict or be silent (citing Ormsby, supra, and Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 172.175(3)." See Barngrover, 979 P.2d at 220.
The Court held that "where the statute was circumvented by filing an inva-
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lid presentment, total expungement of the presentment, the report of the grand
jury and the grand jury transcripts is warranted." Id. at 221-22. The Court ex-
plained that, "if the district attorney believed a 'triable offense' had been com-
mitted, he should have requested a warrant. Petitioners would then have been
able to raise the statute of limitations issue by a motion to dismiss." Id. at 221.
Manley v. State
979 P.2d 703 (Nev. June 7, 1999)
Murder conviction set aside on grounds of deprivation of counsel.
Charles Manley killed Roxanne Logan with a shot to the head in March
1995. Manley contended this was an accident but a jury convicted Manley of
first-degree murder, robbery and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. The
jury found that five aggravating circumstances outweighed four mitigating fac-
tors and sentenced Manley to death. Manley, 979 P.2d at 705.
Manley appealed, contending that the district court committed error in rul-
ing that he waived attorney-client privilege. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed
and reversed the conviction.
The reversal focused on questions asked of Manley's attorneys, Mark Wolf
and Roland Robinson. The state wished to question the attorneys regarding the
chain of custody of Manley's truck and clothing. Manley filed a motion to as-
sert attorney-client privilege. The district court ruled that the attorney-client
privilege would not be violated if the state only asked whether the attorneys
brought Manley's truck and clothing to the police. The district court later clari-
fied that it had ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been waived between
Wolf and Manley but not between Manley and Robinson. See id. at 705-06.
Manley appealed on three grounds: 1) that the district court erred in waiv-
ing the privilege without making findings on the record as to the basis of the
waiver; 2) that the prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine him about conver-
sations with attorney Robinson; and 3) that the court allowed examination on
subjects outside the scope of the waiver. Manley contended that the examina-
tion on privileged matters violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Id. at 706.
The Supreme Court ruled that the attorney-client privilege was violated
under Nevada law and that Manley had not waived the privilege. The Court
held that the prosecutor delved into matters that were clearly confidential
communications.
The privilege is waived for an entire conversation in which the client vol-
untarily reveals parts of the conversation. However, for waiver to occur the
witness's answers must be wide and deep enough to be a significant part of the
communication. Id. at 707.
In this case, Manley testified that Wolf told him not to say anything, that
Wolf was upset that Manley had called him and that Manley did not tell Wolf
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where he was. The Court held that this was not sufficient to be a significant part
of his communications with Wolf and as such, that Manley had not waived his
privilege with that testimony. Id.
The Court also agreed with Manley's claim that the district court's actions
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Governmental intrusion in the
right to counsel violates the Sixth Amendment only when it substantially preju-
dices the defendant. The Court held that the prosecutor's inquiry into Manley's
confidential relationship was used to damage his credibility and that in this case
the defendant's credibility was crucial. Id. at 707-08.
The Court reviewed the case under the harmless error standard, using the
distinction between trial error and structural error established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991).
While not all deprivation of counsel errors are reversible per se the Court held
that it could not rule that the deprivation in this case was harmless error beyond
a reasonable doubt. Manley, 979 P2d. at 708.
Justice Leavitt argued in dissent that the Court should examine the errors to
determine if the verdict would be the same beyond a reasonable doubt had they
not occurred. As Justice Leavitt pointed out, the case against Manley was
overwhelming. Manley had threatened witnesses, failed to call an ambulance,
and fled to California to establish an alibi, all casting doubt on his claim of ac-
cident. In addition, the killing had occurred "execution style," and numerous
other facts pointed to Manley's guilt. Id. at 711. So, despite the Court's caveat
that some deprivations of counsel could be considered harmless, its ruling sug-
gests that virtually all deprivations of right to counsel will be seen as a violation
of Sixth Amendment rights due to the inability to find a lack of prejudice to-
wards the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court further ruled on various other issues raised by Manley on ap-
peal. The Court held that inappropriate comments made during trial by the
prosecution (prosecutors referred to defense attorneys as "mentally chal-
lenged") did not constitute reversible error, but admonished the prosecution not
to make such comments in the future. Id. at 709. The Court held that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the ex-felon in pos-
session of a firearm charge from the case, but recommended doing so at retrial.
Id.
Thomas v. State
979 P.2d 222 (Nev. June 7, 1999) (en banc)
Only when a defendant expresses a desire to an appeal does an attorney
have a duty to advise the defendant of the right to appeal and to perfect an ap-
peal on defendant's behalf
On March 7, 1995, Thomas was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of
trafficking a controlled substance. He was sentenced to six years in prison with
the possibility of parol in three years. Following the conviction, Thomas filed
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an untimely appeal, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 24, 19995, Thomas filed a proper person post-conviction peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and a motion for the ap-
pointment of counsel. Thomas claimed that he was not advised of his right to
file a direct appeal and that his counsel failed to perfect the direct appeal after
he expressed a desire to appeal.
The district court denied Thomas' petition due to lack of information re-
garding Thomas' claims. Thomas appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court first addressed Thomas' first claim that he
should have been advised of his right to appeal. The Court held that in cases
where the defendant pleads guilty, there is no constitutional requirement that
counsel always advise the defendant of the right to appeal. Thomas v. State,
979 P.2d at 223. Such does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court recognized that certain circumstances warrant advising of a de-
fendant's right to appeal. Therefore, the Court limited it's holding to cases
where a defendant does plead guilty. If, however, the defendant inquires about
an appeal or the defendant had a reasonable likelihood of success if he had ap-
pealed, then counsel is obligated to inform defendant of his right to appeal. Id.
at 223.
Regarding Thomas' second claim, the Court remanded with instructions to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if Thomas' counsel failed to per-
fect an appeal after he expressed a desire to appeal. Id. at 224. If so, Thomas'
attorney had a duty to advise Thomas of the right to appeal and to perfect an
appeal on his behalf. Id.
Bargas v. Burns
179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. June 14, 1999)
Ninth Circuit holds that state rule of procedure is interwoven with federal
law when resolution of state procedural law question depends on federal con-
stitutional ruling.
Willie Bargas, convicted of sexual assault in 1983, raised two contentions
in his petition for habeas corpus relief: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective;
and (2) that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. On his guilty plea
claim, Bargas claimed that the state attorney failed to mention that mens rea (a
guilty mind) was an essential element for conviction under the statute, and that
the trial court did not adequately inform him of the penalties associated with a
guilty plea.
Bargas filed two state and two federal habeas corpus petitions. The state
court denied the first petition. However, Bargas only appealed the denial on
the grounds that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. He failed to
appeal the decision to deny his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Nevada Supreme Court denied the second petition containing the plea
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argument. Bargas then filed the first federal habeas petition that contained both
of the original claims. The district court dismissed the petition concluding that
Bargas did not exhaust his state court remedies for ineffective assistance of
counsel. Bargas, with counsel, then filed his third petition, this time in state
court, consisting of both claims. The state court again denied his petition. The
court held that Bargas procedurally defaulted on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because he failed to raise the issue on appeal from the denial of
his first petition.
Bargas again sought the assistance of the U.S. District Court. In what was
now his fourth petition, the court again denied the plea argument and refused to
discuss the ineffective assistance of counsel claim finding that the state court
resolved the issue on independent and adequate grounds. In order for a rule to
constitute adequate and independent grounds, it must be firmly established and
regularly followed. Bargas, 179 F.3d at 1211. Under federal law, "when a
state prisoner has defaulted a claim by violating a state procedural rule which
would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review in the
U.S. Supreme Court, the claim may not be raised in a federal habeas petition,
without a showing of cause and prejudice." Id.
Research revealed no Nevada case law. However, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that firmly established Nevada law clearly requires a petitioner to raise
all claims in the first petition. Id. Thus, it would follow that if Nevada requires
all claims to be raised in the first petition, claims that were not raised would be
lost absent an appeal. Id. at 1212.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Bargas' contentions that denial of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was not predicated on independent state grounds
because it was interwoven with federal law. Id. at 1213. A state rule of proce-
dure is interwoven with federal law "when resolution of the state procedural
law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling." Id. at 1214. No ap-
plication of federal law was necessary to find that Bargas had defaulted, and
thus the state law claim was not interwoven with federal law. Id.
Reaching the merits of the federal law claim also did not affect the ruling.
As long as the state court articulated adequate and independent state law
grounds to support a finding of procedural default, the fact that the court also
issued an alternative holding on federal grounds was irrelevant. The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded its procedural default discussion by stating that "firmly estab-
lished and clearly followed" Nevada law required petitioner to appeal the de-
nial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his failure to do so
constitutes a procedural default. Id.
The Ninth Circuit then focused on Bargas' claim that his guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary because the trial court did not inform him of the
mens rea element of sexual assault. Bargas contended that the district attorney
should have given him notice that it would have to prove intent because sexual
assault is a specific intent crime. However, Nevada law clearly regards sexual
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assault as a general intent crime. See Winnerford Frank H. v. State, 112 Nev.
520, 915 P.2d 291, 294 (1996). The trial judge read the statute to Bargas and
adequately advised him of his rights, so the Ninth Circuit found Bargas had
adequate notice of the charges against him. Bargas at 1216.
Bargas also challenged his plea on the theory that the trial court failed to
inform him that he would have to appear before a state psychiatric panel before
he would be released. The Ninth Circuit held that a trial court does not have to
inform a defendant of each and every consequence of a plea. Id. Trial courts
must only inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea, not the col-
lateral consequences. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a statute requiring the de-
fendant to appear before such a panel is a collateral consequence, and thus Bar-
gas' due process rights were not violated. Id.
The dissent pointed out that even though the court found no authority, it
determined that Nevada had a firmly established and regularly followed rule.
Id. at 1217-1218.
Noonan v. State
980 P.2d 637 (Nev. July 22, 1999)
While defendant's initial statement did not indicate intentional endanger-
ment, his testimony at trial contained such an indication.
Defendant appealed a jury instruction outlining second-degree felony mur-
der based on the premise that the information filed against him was devoid of a
felony murder theory. Defendant was found guilty of second-degree felony
murder in the death of a 16-month old child under his care. At the time of the
incident, defendant called for an ambulance for victim, stating the child was in
"full arrest." When paramedics arrived, the infant labored to breathe and she
was intensely cold. Defendant gave differing versions of events that led to this
condition to each of the paramedics and to the police when they arrived. He
also initially gave police a false identity. The cause of the infant's death was
hypothermia. Defendant's trial testimony differed from versions given earlier
to authorities at the scene of the incident. He admitted he left the victim in the
bathtub while going to a nearby school to pick up another child, being absent
from the residence somewhere between twenty-five and thirty minutes.
The Court found that defendant's initial statement did not indicate inten-
tional endangerment, but his testimony at trial did contain such an indication.
Noonan, 980 P.2d at 639. Based on the new information obtained during this
testimony, the State would be entitled to pursue the underlying felony of willful
endangerment or neglect resulting in substantial bodily harm. Id.
Defendant also requested and received an instruction on involuntary man-
slaughter, which under section 200.070 of the Nevada Revised Statutes in-
cludes the language "but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commis-
sion of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy
the life of a human being, the offense is murder." This request, and the applica-
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tion of the language contained in the statutes, also supports a felony murder in-
struction. Id. at 640.
A secondary issue dealt with whether felony child neglect can support a
conviction for 2nd degree felony murder. The Court found in the affirmative,
stating that there was a strong causal connection between the defendant's deci-
sion to leave the victim alone in the bathtub and the eventual death of the vic-
tim, and that this risk was inherently dangerous and foreseeable. Id.
The final issue raised dealt with the constitutionality of Nevada's reason-
able doubt instruction as codified in section 175.211 (1) of the Nevada Revised
Statutes, under the due process clauses of both the federal and state constitu-
tions. Both the Nevada Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
have upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Id.
The Court ruled that the instruction was properly given and affirmed the
conviction.
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Dhadda
980 P.2d 1062 (Nev. July 22, 1999)
Corpus delicti must be demonstrated by evidence independent of the con-
fessions or admissions of the defendant.
Defendant left a note for her husband stating that she and their four-month
old infant daughter were "leaving this house and this world forever." The po-
lice were notified, and discovered defendant in the Truckee River. Defendant
claimed to have lost the child in a strong current while attempting to wash the
child, and to have spent several hours trying to find the child before requesting
help. Police found the child about 140 yards downstream, wearing a diaper and
sleeper, an apparent drowning victim. During questioning at the police station,
defendant admitted writing the note. Defendant stated that she stepped into the
river with the intent that the current would sweep them both away but changed
her mind upon entering the water. She bent to get some water to wash the in-
fant's face and lost control of the child in the strong current.
The State appealed a District Court decision suppressing defendant's
statement to police. The State also appealed the District Court decision grant-
ing a writ of habeas corpus based on a finding that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish that the death of the infant resulted from criminal agency.
There were three basic questions for the Court to answer: (1) can the prosecu-
tion use defendant's statements, made without a clear waiver of her Fifth
Amendment rights; (2) was there probable cause for the grand jury to indict the
defendant; and (3) was the defendant entitled to a writ of habeas corpus?
The Court stated that under section 172.155(1) of the Nevada Revised
Statutes, a grand jury must determine probable cause by establishing: (1) that a
crime has been committed, known as the corpus delicti; and (2) that the defen-
dant committed the crime. Sheriff v. Dhadda, 980 P.2d 1061, 1065. To estab-
lish the corpus delicti in a murder case, the State must demonstrate: (1) the fact
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of death; and (2) that death occurred through the criminal agency of another.
Id. The Court found that the State met this burden in this case. In habeas cor-
pus proceedings initiated by a defendant, the Court looks for any substantial
evidence that, if true, would support a conviction. Id. The State's evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to its case. Probable cause can be based on
slight, even marginal evidence at this point in the proceedings, as guilt or inno-
cence in not is question. The corpus delicti must be demonstrated by evidence
independent of the confessions or admissions of the defendant. Id. However,
the note left by defendant may be considered, as it is not a post-crime admis-
sion.
The Court reversed the lower court's ruling allowing writ of habeas corpus,
and its ruling discharging defendant on the grand jury indictment.
Ochoa v. State
981 P.2d 1201 (Nev. Aug. 20, 1999)
Supreme Court of Nevada allows extension of doctrine of transferred intent
to injured innocent bystanders.
In Ochoa v. State of Nevada, 981 P.2d 1201 (1999), defendant Arturo Tor-
res Ochoa appealed his conviction of second-degree murder with use of a
deadly weapon, and attempted murder with a deadly weapon. Defendant ap-
pealed contending that the trial court erred by: (1) applying the doctrine of
transferred intent to the charge of attempted murder; (2) allowing testimony re-
garding Ochoa's prior drug transactions; and (3) denying Ochoa's motion to
dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. The court disagreed with Ochoa's con-
tentions and affirmed the convictions. Id. at 1206.
Smith went to an apartment building to purchase cocaine. Smith negoti-
ated a deal with Ortiz. Ortiz, holding a baseball bat, went over to a car in
which Ochoa was sitting, and a "hostile" conversation began. Ochoa fired sev-
eral shots at Ortiz. Ortiz was killed and Smith was wounded. Ochoa testified
that he shot Ortiz in self-defense because Ortiz, accompanied by an unidenti-
fied man, opened the car door with a baseball bat and Ochoa thought Ortiz was
going to hit him with the bat, prompting Ochoa to shoot at him. Ochoa stated
he never intended to shoot Smith, and that Smith was wounded by accident. Id.
at 1202.
Ochoa argued that the court should not convict him for Smith's murder
without evidence of his intent to kill Smith. The government argued Ochoa's
intent to kill Ortiz could be attributed to Smith under the doctrine of transferred
intent. The court rejected the California approach, which suggests that if the
person who was marked for death was killed, liability could not extend to inju-
ries incurred by innocent bystanders. The court instead adopted the Connecti-
cut approach, which allows liability to extend to the death of the intended vic-
tim as well as the death of any unintended victims. Id. at 1205.
The court extended the Connecticut rationale beyond murder to attempted
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murder. The court held that "[t]he doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to
all crimes where an unintended victim is harmed as a result of the specific in-
tent to harm an intended victim whether or not the intended victim is injured."
Id. The court therefore affirmed the defendant's conviction for attempted mur-
der of Smith under the doctrine of transferred intent. Id.
Defendant also argued that his prior drug transactions were irrelevant and
highly prejudicial. The court concluded that the testimony was admissible un-
der Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.035(3). The court noted that the drug transactions
were so interconnected to the argument between Ortiz and Ochoa, in that the
event could not be properly described without referring to the transactions. The
court also noted that the transactions went to show motive and to rebut the as-
sertion of self-defense. Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1205.
This case illustrates the court's extension of the doctrine of transferred in-
tent. Prosecutors may now charge defendants with attempted murder of by-
standers who were accidentally injured if the defendant was attempted to kill an
intended victim.
Lee v. State
985 P.2d 164 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999)
Written plea agreement upheld as valid.
The district court convicted appellant, pursuant to a guilty plea, of at-
tempted robbery and ordered appellant to serve time and pay restitution. Ap-
pellant challenged his conviction on three bases, arguing: (1) the district court
failed to inform appellant that restitution was a possible consequence of his
plea; (2) the district court erred in denying appellant's pre-judgment motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because he did not receive a promised bail reduction
and release on own recognizance, that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to hold a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) the
district court sentenced appellant without an adequate factual basis because the
pre-sentence report contained insufficient information about him. See Lee, 985
P.2d at 164.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and restitution order of
the lower court. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.035(2) only requires the trial court to
canvass a defendant when a plea agreement is entered to orally. Here, appel-
lant pled guilty via a written plea agreement, which explicitly provided for res-
titution, and acknowledged reading it. Id. at 166. Appellant was not entitled to
a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. Bail reduction and his release
on his own recognizance were not part of the plea agreement. Id. Furthermore,
appellant confirmed in open court that no other promises were made to him
other than what was in the plea agreement. Id. The district court was not re-
quired to hold a hearing on appellant's motion to withdraw because appellant
was informed of charges, the consequences of his plea, and appellant admitted
to committing the crimes. Id. at 167. Finally, appellant's sentence was based on
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the illegal acts he committed, not on the length of the pre-sentence report. Id.
The Court also noted that the length of the report was due to the appellant's lack
of cooperation with the reporting investigator. Id.
Labastida v. State
986 P.2d 443 (Nev. Oct. 11, 1999)
Jury's verdict of second-degree murder could not have been product of a
finding offirst-degree murder tempered by a desire for leniency.
The Nevada Supreme Court granted Labastida's petition for rehearing. In
the prior opinion, the Court misapprehended material matters of law and fact;
therefore, the Court's present opinion takes its place. Labastida, 986 P.2d at
444.
The prior opinion affirmed Labastida's conviction of one count of felony
child neglect and one count of second-degree murder. On petition for rehear-
ing, amicus curie briefs were filed from two interested organizations: the Na-
tional Association of State Vocal Organizations and the Committee to Aid
Abused Women. After review, the Court found that its prior decision affirming
one count of second-degree murder was erroneous. The Court reversed Labas-
tida's conviction of second-degree murder and affirmed the conviction of one
count of felony child neglect.
A thorough recount of the facts is found in the prior opinion. Labastida v.
State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1335-1339. (1996). Michael Strawser, Labastida's hus-
band, abused his child, ultimately causing death. Strawser testified that Labas-
tida did not know of the abuse.
In the prior opinion, the Court held that the verdict of second-degree mur-
der could have resulted from a finding of first-degree murder tempered by a de-
sire for leniency. However, the Court on rehearing found that the facts and law
do not support such a conclusion.
The Court first erred in articulating jury instructions that were not given the
jury. Not only were the instructions not provided to the jury but also the Court
found that they inaccurately reflect a finding of first-degree murder. Id. at 445.
The Court suggested that one might passively aid first-degree murder, which is
inconsistent with the elements of first-degree murder defined in section
200.030(1)(a) of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Id. at 446. The Court reasoned
that "abuse" and "neglect" are statutorily distinct and that the former consti-
tutes first-degree murder while the latter does not. Id. Labastida's inaction was
neglectful but not abusive and, therefore, does not amount to first-degree mur-
der. To support this conclusion, the Court noted that the jury acquitted Labas-
tida of willfully committing or aiding and abetting in the commission of a
crime. Id. Since the jury did not find her guilty, the Court admitted it should
not speculate on Labastida's guilt in this regard. Id. For these reasons the
Court abandoned its prior conclusion that the verdict of second-degree murder
could be the product of a finding of first-degree tempered for leniency. Id. at
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Next, the Court admitted to erroneously applying a rule for second-degree
murder to Labastida case. In the prior opinion, the majority ruled that the jury
could find Labastida guilty of second-degree murder based on a holding in
Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983). In that case, the Court
held that second-degree murder could result from a combination of sections
200.070 and 200.030(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Labastida at 448.
However, Morris expressed a limitation that the Court felt applies to Labas-
tida's case. To apply the Morris second-degree murder rule, the felony must be
"inherently dangerous, where death or injury is a directly foreseeable conse-
quence of the illegal act, and there is a direct causal relationship - without the
intervention of some other source or agency - between the actions of the de-
fendant and the victim's death." Id. at 448-49. In Labastida's case, the victim
did not die because of Labastida's neglect. Rather, the victim died as a result
of Michael Strawser's abuse. Therefore, the Morris rule does not apply and the
second-degree murder conviction was reversed. Id. at 449.
Finally, the Court found insufficient evidence to sustain a second-degree
felony without the rule since Labastida did not commit any affirmative act to
harm the victim, she may have not known the child was in mortal danger and
there is insufficient evidence to show intent. Id.
Wade v. State
986 P.2d 438 (Nev. Oct. 11, 1999)
Rehearing denied for appellant convicted for controlled substance viola-
tions.
The Second Judicial Court convicted the appellant, a criminal defendant,
on one count of conspiracy to sell a controlled substance, and one count of sale
of twenty-eight grams or more of methamphetamine. The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the appellant's conviction in Wade v State, 114 Nev. 914, 966
P.2d 160 (1998). Appellant petitioned for a rehearing.
The charges against the appellant resulted from a federal drug trafficking
investigation, where the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) used an informant
to arrange meetings between DEA agents and the appellant. The informant
also taped several telephone calls, and face-to-face conversations with the ap-
pellant. Eventually, the informant made arrangements for the DEA agent to
purchase two pounds of methamphetamine from the appellant and two others.
At trial, the DEA's informant could not be located, and the Court allowed
the recorded conversations to be admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
The Court's decision to admit the tapes stemmed from the holding in United
States v Tangeman, 30 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 1994), which stated that tape re-
corded statements from an unavailable informant are permissible when
"...offered to provide context for the defendant's admissions, not to prove the
truth of the matters asserted." On appeal, the Court agreed. The appellant ar-
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gued that Tangeman was applied incorrectly because in that case, the jury was
given special instructions pertaining to the tapes, explaining that statements
made on the tapes by those other than the defendant were to be used only for
the purpose of placing the defendant's comments in context. No such instruc-
tion was given in the appellant's case.
The Court rejected the appellant's argument, however, because his attorney
never requested a jury instruction similar to the one given in Tangeman. In
fact, after voicing his objection to the jury instructions with respect to other
portions of the case, the appellant's counsel stipulated on the record that he had
no objection to the instructions provided in the case. In addition, the Court
cited other instances where courts have admitted recorded statements to estab-
lish the context of the defendant's remarks, without a special jury instruction.
See e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398 n.ll (1986); United States v.
McKneely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1074 ( 10 th Cir. 1995).
The appellant's second argument concerned the C.I. file on the informant.
The appellant first maintained that the Court's statement, in its prior opinion,
that the DEA refused to provide the informant's file to the State, is false. He
argued instead, with no support from the record, that the D.A. had the infor-
mant's file and refused to give it to the defense. The Court conceded that a
more accurate statement would have been that the appellant was not furnished
with all of the information about the informant. However, the appellant's in-
ability to cite to the record, combined with the oral arguments and briefs sub-
mitted to the Court, led to the inference of the DEA's neglecting to provide the
information to the State, not the State's refusing to provide it to the defense.
The appellant also asserted that the Court's prior opinion inaccurately
stated that defense counsel conceded that the State did not have the DEA's file
on the informant. The appellant contended that while this statement was cor-
rect before the trial, at the time of trial, it was no longer accurate. However,
according to Nev. R. App. P. 40(c), a rehearing is only warranted when the
court has misstated, misapprehended, or overlooked a material fact or law relat-
ing to the issue(s) raised on appeal. Here, the Court determined that, even if the
appellant was correct in his argument regarding the attorney's remarks, there
was no material misunderstanding to justify a rehearing.
Finally, the appellant claimed that his conviction should be overturned be-
cause the state failed to provide the information he requested during discovery.
In arguing this point on appeal, he relied, in part, on Roberts v State, 110 Nev.
1121, 881 P.2d 1 (1994), which stated that a reversal might be justified when
"material" Brady evidence is not given to the defense, and the possibility exists
that such information would have led to a different result at trial. Once again,
the Court disapproved of the appellant's position because his attorney had
plenty of opportunity to cross-examine the DEA agent during trial. Accord-
ingly, the missing information on the informant would not have changed the
outcome of the appellant's case.
Spring 2001 ]
NEVADA LA W JO URNAL
Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Kuemmerlin
985 P.2d 750, (Nev. Oct. 20, 1999)
Federal park rangers may enforce state traffic laws on federal land.
Kevin John Kuemmerlin was the driver in a motorcycle accident in the
Lake Mead National Recreation Area. A federal park ranger responding to the
accident found that Kuemmerlin exhibited signs of being under the influence of
alcohol and informed him that he would be required under Nevada's implied
consent law to provide a blood sample. The test showed Kuemmerlin to be well
over the legal limit for blood alcohol content for which the Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles (DMV) revoked his driver's license. Kuemmerlin appealed for ju-
dicial review to the district court, which overturned the DMV's action. The dis-
trict court held that Nevada's implied consent law did not apply because
Kuemmerlin was driving entirely within a federal park. Consequently, federal
law preempted state law and the DMV lacked jurisdiction. Kuemmerlin, 985
P.2d at 751.
The DMV appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. It argued that the fed-
eral park ranger was functioning as a police officer. In Nevada, "police offi-
cers" are defined by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.118 as those authorized to make ar-
rests for traffic law violations. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.118 defines police officer
as "every officer authorized to regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations
of traffic laws, ordinances or regulations." The DMV argued that federal park
rangers fell under that statute, citing the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in
Department of Motor Vehicles v. Lovett, 874 P.2d 1247, 110 Nev. 473 (1994).
The Lovett facts were nearly identical with this case with the exception that
Lovett was first spotted as a drunk driver inside the federal area but not appre-
hended until after driving out of the Recreation Area and onto state land. The
Court found that regulations governing traffic in federal parks is broad, provid-
ing that all state traffic laws are applicable in federal parks. Lovett, 874 P.2d at
478 (citing 36 C.F.R. §4.2 (1992)). The Court then held that the broad language
of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.118 supported the contention that federal park rangers
were police officers authorized to enforce state traffic laws. Thus, the Court
held in Lovett that federal park rangers were police officers authorized both by
federal regulations and by Nevada law to enforce the Nevada implied consent
laws.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, citing its Lovett
holding. The Court reaffirmed that federal park rangers are police officers
within the meaning of the Nevada statute and that they may act as agents of the
DMV in revoking a Nevada driver's license. Kuemmerlin incorporated Justice
Springer's Lovett dissent in his defense prompting the Court to clarify that it
did not decide Lovett based on the fact that Lovett drove outside of park
boundaries. Kuemmerlin, 985 P.2d at 751.
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Daniels v. State of Nevada
988 P.2d 791 (Nev. Nov. 29, 1999)
Probation conditions limited to initial sentencing hearing.
This case involved an appeal from a district court order revoking appellate,
a criminal defendant's probation. At the appellant's probation revocation hear-
ing, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.130(2)(e), the Second Judicial District
Court, Washoe County, revoked the defendant's probation and imposed incar-
ceration rather than rehabilitation. Daniels, 988 P.2d at 792.
At the time of the probation revocation hearing, Nev. Rev. Stat. §
193.130(2)(e) required district courts to suspend the sentences of persons con-
victed of category E felonies and place them instead on probation. Id. Condi-
tions that could be imposed as terms of probation were limited by Miller v.
State, 941 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1997), which held that incarceration cannot be a
condition of probation for a category E felony. Id.
The court addressed the issue of whether the limits on probation for cate-
gory E offenders imposed by Miller apply only to initial sentencing hearings or
extend to probation revocation hearings. The court found that Miller applied
only to initial sentencing hearings, reversing the decision of the district court.
As such, rehabilitation requiring a term of confinement could be imposed as a
condition of probation at a probation revocation hearing. Id.
The legislature amended Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.130(2)(e) in 1999 to allow
up to one year of confinement to be a condition of probation, abrogating the
application of Miller. Id. at 791.
McNelton v. The State of Nevada
990 P.2d 1263, (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999)
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada convicted Appel-
lant of murder and sentenced him to death. McNelton, 990 P.2d at 1266. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada subsequently rejected his "arguments
pertaining to the guilt and penalty phases of his trial." Id. Next, the district
court denied the appellant's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. Id. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada that considered his
claims (en banc) of ineffective trial counsel, ineffective appellant counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
In its opinion, the court states that though it generally defers to the dis-
trict court's factual findings in cases where ineffective assistance of counsel
is alleged, id. at 1268 (citing Hill v. State, 114 Nev. 169, 175, 953 P.2d
1077, 1082, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042, 119 S. Ct. 594, 142 L. Ed. 2d 537
(1998)), claims involving mixed questions of law and fact may be heard by
the court. Id. (citing Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102,
1107 (1996)). In such cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel, the
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appropriate standard is "reasonably effective assistance." Id. (citing Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)
and Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 683 P.2d 504 (1984)). To show a de-
ficiency based on this standard, the party must demonstrate: "(1) counsel's
performance was deficient, i.e., counsel's representation fell below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficient performance preju-
diced the defendant, i.e., 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694; citing
Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115, 825 P.2d 593, 595 (1992)).
The first issue addressed by the court concerned the admission of evidence
of a prior police response to the house in which McNelton was living and
McNelton's subsequent arrest. Id. The court stated that, pursuant to it's pre-
vious ruling in Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), the trial
court should have held a hearing prior to admission of the evidence. Id. at
1269. According to the court, a "Petrocelli hearing" must be conducted "on the
record outside the presence of the jury and determine that: (1) the incident is
relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. (citing Tinch v. State, 113 Nev.
1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997); Petrocelli, 101 Nev. at 51-52, 692
P.2d at 507-08). Evidence of McNelton's arrest would not meet this test be-
cause it was irrelevant. Id. Under Quails v. State, 114 Nev. 900, 961 P.2d 765
(1998), the failure to hold a Petrocelli hearing is not grounds for reversal if:
"(1) the record is sufficient to determine that the evidence is admissible under
Tinch; or (2) the result would have been the same if the trial court had not ad-
mitted the evidence." Id. at 1269 (citing Qualls, 114 Nev. at 903-04). The evi-
dence was not admissible under Tinch (since it was found to be irrelevant), nor
would exclusion of the evidence had altered the outcome of the trial. Id. at
1269-70. Thus, a reversal was not required. Id.
The court next addressed the appellant's contention that the prosecution
should not have been allowed to elicit testimony regarding the fact that McNel-
ton was in custody prior to trial. Id. at 1270. While the court agreed that wit-
ness testimony regarding the appellant's incarceration was improper, the court
concluded that it merely constituted harmless error and that this could not be
used to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. at 1270-7 1.
The court next inquired whether or not the appellant's trial counsel's
"[failure] to anticipate, prevent, and/or object to the prosecutor's statement in
closing argument that McNelton failed to call ... an alibi witness" constituted
ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. at 1271. The appellant asserted that this com-
ment improperly shifted to him the burden of proof. Id. at 1272. Citing Ross v.
State, 106 Nev. 924, 803 P.2d 1104 (1990), the court reasoned that, by calling
to the jury's attention the appellant's failure to take advantage of a presumably
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friendly witness, the prosecutor had improperly shifted the burden of proof to
the appellant. Id. at 1271. However, the court reasoned that the jury would
have reached the same verdict with or without the prosecutor's comment and
that it thus constituted harmless error. Id. at 1272.
Regarding the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, the appellant contended
that though he had forbidden his counsel to call his mother as a witness, coun-
sel was not bound by that direction and should have called her as a mitigating
witness. Id. at 1272-73. The court ruled that the decision of whether or not to
call the appellant's mother was a tactical decision and not indicative of ineffec-
tiveness, especially given the appellant's direction that she not be called. Id. at
1273.
Regarding his appellate counsel, the appellant had claimed that they had
failed entirely to communicate with him. Id. Though the court found that
counsel had not contacted the appellant and that such a failure may be deserv-
ing of disciplinary action. Id. (Citing State Bar of Nevada v. Schreiber, 98
Nev. 464, 653 P.2d 151 (1982) it ruled that no reasonable probability existed
"that the result of the direct appeal would have been different had McNelton
consulted with his counsel with respect to how to proceed." Id. at 1273.
Standley v. Warden, Southern Nevada Correctional Center
990 P.2d 783 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999)
Judge's comments were improperly coercive, although not every judicial
involvement in plea negotiation process is forbidden.
Appellant had been charged with three counts of sexual assault of a minor
under fourteen years of age and one count of open or gross lewdness. The State
offered to dismiss the charges if appellant would plead guilty to one count of
sexual assault. At a pre-trial hearing the judge address the appellant, compar-
ing the sentencing consequences that appellant could face, saying at one point,
"[It's] unlikely that you're going to get life, plus life, plus life, plus life. But,
you know, that's a possibility." The judge also spoke of his twenty-two years
of experience as a defense attorney and commented that he had had many cli-
ents who regretted not taking a plea offer when they had the chance. The ap-
pellant decided to accept the plea offer and was sentenced to nine years in the
Nevada State Prison.
Appellant filed a proper person post-conviction petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus in the district court. The district court denied the petition as suc-
cessive, but the Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the matter to the dis-
trict court for reconsideration. After appellant secured counsel, the district
court again denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, this time
on the merits. An appeal followed.
As the Court pointed out, "a plea of guilty must be the result of an in-
formed and voluntary decision, not the product of coercion." Standley, 990
P.2d at 785. The Court mentioned two factors in the judge's discussion with
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the appellant that made his comments improperly coercive and distinguished
his conduct from proper judicial involvement in plea negotiation. First, "the
judge did more than just facilitate the plea negotiations or make an isolated
comment about the plea offer." Instead, he engaged in a lengthy discussion
with the appellant and made clear his desire that the appellant accept the plea
offer. Id. The Court suggested that the coercive effect of a judge expressing a
desire that the defendant accept a plea offer can be very great because the same
judge would preside over the trial and would determine the sentence if the trial
resulted in a conviction. Id.
Second, the judge made repeated references to his prior experiences as a
defense attorney. "The judge thereby adopted the role of counselor to a crimi-
nal defendant, foregoing his duty as a neutral arbiter of the criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. The Court reversed the district court's order denying appellant's pe-
tition and remanded with instructions to allow appellant to withdraw his plea.
The majority cautioned against an "expansive interpretation" of its opinion
in this case, noting that the "constitution does not forbid all participation by the
judge in the plea negotiation process" and a defendant should only be allowed
to withdraw his or her plea when the judge's conduct is improperly coercive.
Id.
Sullivan v. State
990 P.2d 1258 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999).
Where the State agrees to make a particular recommendation, agreement
does not restrict State's right to argue in favor of sentence recommendation.
Sullivan v. Nevada involved an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pur-
suant to a guilty plea, of one count each of robbery with the use of a deadly
weapon, burglary, and possession of stolen property. Sullivan agreed to plead
guilty to the charges. In exchange for Sullivan's guilty plea, the state agreed to
concur with the recommendation of the Division of Parole and Probation. The
district court conducted a thorough plea canvass and accepted Sullivan's guilty
plea. Id. at 1259.
At sentencing, the prosecutor addressed Sullivan's "quite incredible crimi-
nal history" and the serious nature of the charged offenses, and Sullivan did not
object. Id. at 1260. Sullivan contended that the state failed to provide him with
notice that one of the victims would refer to prior bad acts during the victim
impact testimony and, therefore, this case should be remanded for a new sen-
tencing hearing. The court disagreed. Id. at 1259, nl. At issue was whether the
state breaches an agreement to concur with the recommendation of the Division
of Parole and Probation by advocating in favor of the recommendation.
The court stated that the general principles governing the state's obligation
to honor the terms of a plea agreement are well settled. Id. at 1260. "When a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecu-
tor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
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promise must be fulfilled." Id. The court held the state to the "most meticulous
standards of both promise and performance" in fulfillment of its part of a plea
bargain. The violation of either the terms or the spirit of the agreement requires
reversal. Id. The plea agreement is construed according to what the defendant
reasonably understood when he or she entered the plea. Id. In this case, the
state agreed to concur in the recommendation of the Division of Parole and
Probation. The initial question was whether Sullivan could have reasonably un-
derstood the plea agreement to preclude the state from advocating in favor of
that recommendation by commenting on the facts and circumstances that sup-
ported the recommendation. Id.
Sullivan argued that because the State failed to explicitly reserve the right
to present facts and argument at sentencing, he understood the plea agreement
to preclude the state from commenting on the facts and circumstances support-
ing the Division's recommendation. The Court noted that Sullivan failed to ob-
ject to the prosecutor's comments. Id. Defendant's failure to object may be
considered as evidence of the defendant's understanding of the terms of a plea
agreement. Id.
Where the State has agreed to stand silent or make no recommendation, the
defendant could reasonably understand the plain language of such an agreement
to restrict the State's right to make certain types of statements to the Court that
would influence the sentencing decision. Id. at 1261. A promise to recommend
a sentence is not a promise to stand silent. Where the State agrees to make a
particular recommendation, the agreement, unlike an agreement to stand silent
or make no recommendation, does not by its terms restrict the State's right to
argue or present facts in favor of the sentence recommendation. Id.
The Court held that the State may advocate in favor of a sentence that it
has agreed to recommend as part of a plea agreement so long as the State does
not explicitly or implicitly seek to persuade the sentencing court to impose a
harsher sentence than that which the State agreed to recommend. The State did
not breach the plea agreement. Id. at 1263. However, the court remanded the
case to correct what appeared to be an error in the judgment of conviction. Id.
Thus, unless specifically agreeing to stand silent, the State in entering a
plea bargain may comment at the sentencing hearing as long as the State does
not explicitly or implicitly seek to persuade the sentencing court to impose a
harsher sentence than that which the state agreed to recommend. The Court
may review a case with due process implications sua sponte even if defendant
failed to contemporaneously object.
Luster v. State
991 P.2d 466 (Nev. Dec. 28, 1999)
Court invokes plain view doctrine to uphold murder conviction.
Appellant Luster challenged his conviction for murder and kidnapping. He
argued that a search of his home produced evidence outside the scope of the
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search warrant. The court, however, concluded that the district court properly
admitted the evidence under the plain view doctrine and affirmed the convic-
tion.
On July 15, 1995, police issued a search warrant of Luster's home to seize
evidence pertaining to Luster's involvement in a murder. Upon entering the
home, police recognized similarities between Luster's home and the description
of a house given to police by a kidnap victim, also linked to Luster. Police took
pictures of the premises and seized evidence that implicated Luster in the kid-
napping.
The state charged Luster with numerous crimes including Kidnapping with
use of a deadly weapon and first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon.
Luster moved to suppress the evidence seized by police because it was beyond
the scope of the search warrant. He claimed that the evidence pertained to the
kidnapping charge, while the search warrant pertained to the murder charge,
therefore authorities obtained evidence as part of a search without a warrant
The district court denied Luster's motion to suppress the evidence and
convicted him of the charges. Luster appealed his conviction on the basis of the
evidence's wrongful admission.
The court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the
lower court did not err in admitting the kidnapping evidence because the
police had probable cause to associate the evidence with criminal activity.
The court recognized that the plain view doctrine allows seizure of objects
not specified in a search warrant in certain situations. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). For the plain view doctrine to apply the
initial intrusion by police must be lawful. Furthermore, the police must in-
advertently discover evidence that immediately appears to be evidence of a
crime. The only contested factor in the case was the "immediately apparent"
requirement. The court stated that the proper interpretation of "immediately
apparent" is seizure of property in plain view is presumptively reasonable,
assuming probable cause exists to associate the property with criminal ac-
tivity. See Koza v. State, 681 P. 2d 44, 49 (Nev. 1984) (applying the Coo-
lidge test); see also Johnson v. State, 637 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1981).
The court determined that probable cause existed, because the police
knew of the kidnapping and were already aware of Luster's possible in-
volvement. Also, during the execution of the search warrant, police realized
that the house matched the kidnapping victim's description and properly
concluded that it might contain evidence pertaining to the kidnapping.
Therefore, the seizure of the items was reasonable under the plain view doc-
trine and properly admitted because the court found probable cause to asso-
ciate the property with criminal activity.
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Barajas v. State
991 P.2d 474 (Nev. Dec. 29, 1999)
Guilty plea presumptively valid, and defendant has burden to prove that
plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily.
Following the entry of a guilty plea charge of possession of a controlled
substance, the defendant moved to set aside his plea on the ground that his plea
was involuntary. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant ap-
pealed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) the failure of trial court to ad-
vise the defendant of the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea
did not render the plea involuntary, and (2) the defense counsel's failure to ad-
vise the defendant of any possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea
did rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. A guilty plea is pre-
sumptively valid, and the defendant has the burden to prove that the plea was
not entered knowingly or voluntarily. The possibility of deportation of the de-
fendant is a collateral consequence that does not affect the voluntary nature of a
guilty plea. A trial court's failure to advise a defendant of the possible immi-
gration consequences of a guilty plea does not render the plea involuntary.
Schlafer v. State
979 P.2d 712 (Nev. June 16, 1999)
Untimely response to discovery order by State does not create a presump-
tion of bad faith.
The defendant appealed a guilty verdict on the grounds that the State had
not turned over in a timely manner notes made by a jailhouse informant. The
Court ruled that although the State did not exercise due diligence in responding
to a discovery order, the defendant's cross-examination of the witness was not
significantly impaired. Schlafer, 979 P.2d at 716. Since the defendant was not
deprived of a fair trial by the State's violation of the court's discovery order,
the conviction was affirmed. The Court admonished the State, however, and
held that in future cases, a similar violation "may result in a presumption" of
bad faith to prejudice a criminal defendant. Id. at 717.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Clark County School District v. Clark County Classroom Teachers
Association and Archie Kleingartner
977 P.2d 1008, (Nev. May 24, 1999)
Arbitration hearing officers have subpoena power.
Appellant, Clark County School District ("School District'), suspended Re-
spondent Kleingartner and notified him of the School District's intention to
recommend his dismissal to the School District Board. These actions were the
result of alleged statements Kleingartner made regarding his administrator,
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which students overheard and for inadequate professional performance, which
jeopardized the graduation of two other students. Kleingartner, represented by
the Clark County Classroom Teachers Association, filed a timely request for
binding arbitration and received it. He also requested that the hearing officer
issue subpoenas to provide the identification of the students who allegedly
heard Kleingartner's statements or were jeopardized by Kleingartner's per-
formance. He further requested the issuance of subpoenas to obtain documents
relating thereto.
The hearing officer issued the subpoenas and the School District sought
review of the decision through the Eight Judicial District Court that denied the
School District declaratory relief and granted the Respondents' counter-motion
for enforcement of the subpoenas. The School District then appealed the deci-
sion to the Nevada Supreme Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court findings. Kleingart-
ner, 977 P.2d at 1012. In its reasoning the Court examined Nev. Rev. Stat. §
391.3192 (2) and determined that while the word subpoena was not used in the
statute, the statute did grant authority to the hearing officer to require witnesses
to testify under oath and to produce evidence relevant to the investigation. The
court concluded the legislature must have intended the hearing officer to have
the power to order compliance with the authority conferred on him by statute,
including an implied right to use the subpoena authority for limited pre-hearing
discovery. Without such authority, the court ruled, the authority given to the
hearing officer would be meaningless.
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Southern Nevada Water
Authority
979 P.2d 224 (Nev. June 7, 1999)
Project labor agreements (PLAs) do not violate Nevada's competitive bid-
ding, right-to-work, or freedom of association statutes.
The Southern Nevada Water Authority, a political subdivision of the State
of Nevada created to address the water needs of southern Nevadans, is respon-
sible for preparation and implementation of the Capital Improvements Plan.
The Plan's goal is to develop a reliable water system to supplement the existing
system. In furtherance of the Plan, an excavation project was scheduled for
contract bidders.
On April 14, 1994, then Governor Bob Miller issued an executive order di-
recting all state boards, authorities, and agencies to implement project labor
agreements (PLAs) in public projects. A PLA is an agreement between the pro-
ject owner and a labor union that a contractor is obligated to sign to perform
work on the project. The PLA ensures that no labor disputes or strikes will dis-
rupt the project. The governor created an exception to the rule only if the bene-
fits of a non-PLA project exceed the benefits of a PLA project.
On March 21, 1996, the board approved a PLA. Although the Water Au-
[Vol. 1:345
ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
thority did not believe it was required by the governor's executive order to have
such an agreement, it favored the agreement due to concerns over possible la-
bor disputes or strikes that might interrupt water delivery to southern Nevadans.
The bid occurred on June of 1996. American Asphalt, a bidding competi-
tor, contacted the Water Authority and informed the project manager that it
would bid, but refused to comply with the PLA if awarded the project. The
manager replied that its bid would likely be rejected.
American Asphalt submitted the lowest bid, but it was not awarded the
project. American Asphalt instituted an action, which resulted in an appeal to
the Nevada Supreme Court.
The issue before the Court was whether the imposition of the PLA violated
Nevada's competitive bidding, right-to-work, and freedom of association stat-
utes. A sub-issue concerned whether the governor's executive order obligated
the Water Authority to proceed with a PLA. Under the sub-issue, the Court
held that the Water Authority had discretion to implement the PLA. Associated
Builders, 979 P.2d at 227. On the prevailing question, the Court held that the
PLA in question conformed to the mentioned statutes. Id. at 227-30.
The Court first addressed Nevada's competitive bidding statute, NRS
§§ 338.140; 338.147(1). Id. at 228-229. In determining whether the PLA
violated this statute, the Court followed the New York Court of Appeals
two-prong focus, which the Court found to comport with the statute as well
as Nevada case law. The two-prong focus includes: (1) prevention of favor-
itism; and (2) protection of the public funds. Under the first prong, the
Court found that since both union and non-union contractors were allowed
to bid on the project, non-union contractors could hire up to seven core em-
ployees, and employees were not required to join the representative union
under the PLA, competition would abound to guard against favoritism. Id.
at 229. Under the second prong, the Court found that the Water Authority's
concern about saving public tax funds by mitigating the likelihood of labor
strikes was indicative of true concern about protecting public funds. Id. In
addition, according to a statistical analysis on PLAs, the Court found that
after the adoption of PLAs, more funds were saved and competition in-
creased. Id. Accordingly, the PLA did not violate Nevada's competitive
bidding statute.
Next, the Court examined the PLA under Nevada's right to work stat-
ute, NRS §§ 613.250. Id. at 230. The Court found that unlike a previous
case that violated the statute by excluding non-union workers, this case al-
lows both union and non-union contractors to bid on projects and does not
require that a contract employer hire only union employees. Id. at 230; see
also Bldg. Trades v. Bonito, 280 P.2d 295 (Nev. 1995). Therefore, the PLA
did not violate the right to work statute. Finally, the Court examined the
PLA under Nevada's freedom of association statute, NRS § 614.090(1). Id.
The Court found that the PLA did not violate the statute simply because it
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did not interfere with the employees right to associate with a union. Asso-
ciated Builders at 230. No restrictions were imposed under the PLA to join
a union or not. Id.
Balint v. Carson City
180 F.3d 1047 (9" Cir. June 14 1999) (en banc)
Court remands Title VII case for consideration of burden caused by alter-
native policies.
This was an appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada, to grant summary judgment for the respondent in a Title
VII religious discrimination case brought by the appellant, a city employee.
Balint, 180 F.3d at 1049
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents religious discrimina-
tion against any individual with respect to that person's compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1964). The court set forth the two-step analysis to determine religious dis-
crimination under Title VII. First, the employee must establish a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination. Balint, 180 F.3d at 1050. A prime facie case for
discrimination exists if: "(1) the employee has a bona fide religious belief,
the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) the employee
informs the employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer threat-
ens or subjects the employee to discriminatory treatment because of the
employee's inability to fulfill the job requirements." Id. (quoting Tiano v.
Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 ( 9 th Cir. 1998)). Second, the
employer must show that attempts were made to accommodate the religious
beliefs of the employee or that any accommodation would be overly bur-
densome. Id. at 1050-51.
The court considered the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the appellant, because it was a motion for summary judgment, and the
court assumed a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 1051. Next, the court
considered whether accommodation of the appellant's religious practices would
place an undue burden on the respondent. Id. at 1051-56. The court noted that
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides that seniority systems are not unlawful unless
they are used to carry out the discriminatory intent of the employer. Id. at 1051.
Although an employer does not have to interfere with its seniority system to ac-
commodate the religious practices of an employee, it must examine whether there
is an alternative that would not cause an undue impact to the seniority system.
Furthermore, the employer must consider the costs. If implementing the alterna-
tive, its cost should be minimal. Id. at 1053.
The court looked at two methods of accommodating the appellant's religious
practices, voluntary shift trades and shift splitting, to determine whether the re-
spondent could reasonably implement them. Id. at 1054-1056. The Court de-
termined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether volun-
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tary shift trading would cause the respondent undue hardship, in view of the
cost and personnel problems involved. Id. at 1055. The Court found that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the implementation of a
split shift would cause the respondent undue hardship. Id. at 1056.
The Court reversed and remanded, finding that the case contained ques-
tions of fact that precluded summary judgment and that the district court failed
to apply the correct substantive law. Id. at 1054, 1056. The Court further
found that the use of a seniority system does not relieve employers of the duty to
make reasonable attempts to accommodate employees religious practices if those
accommodations do not interfere with the seniority system and do not present
more than a minimal cost to the employer. Id. at 1054.
Judge Kleinfeld, joined by Judge Brunetti, Judge Kozinski, and Judge Fer-
nandez, dissented. While they agreed with the majority as to the pertinent law,
they disagreed with the manner in which the majority applied the law to the facts.
Id. at 1056. The dissenting judges found no genuine issues of material fact as to
whether split shifts would cause undue hardship. Id. at 1056-57. The dissent fur-
ther found that "the majority gives too little weight to the preclusive effect a bona
fide seniority system has on religious discrimination claims, and erroneously
converts a de minimis cost standard into something more demanding." Id. at
1057.
Bank of America, Nevada v. Bourdeau
982 P.2d 474 (Nev. Aug. 30, 1999)
Statements made to FDIC subject to a conditional privilege.
Respondent Bourdeau was a branch manager of the Lake Tahoe branch of
Appellant bank, but was fired when an internal investigation revealed viola-
tions of bank policy, some of which exposed the bank to potential civil or
criminal liability. Respondent subsequently denied the allegations presented
against him alleging a conspiracy on the part of the bank's internal investiga-
tors. However, he resigned under an agreement that allowed him to retain his
bonus if he did not consult an attorney.
Respondent then assembled a group of investors who contributed $3.5 mil-
lion as part of a plan to start the Bank of Lake Tahoe, which would be run by
respondent as CEO and president. As part of the application process for the
new bank, an investigation was conducted by, the Nevada Division of Financial
Institutions and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), pursuant to
these agencies' typical procedure. An investigator for the FDIC spoke with
several employees of Bank of America and thereafter filed a report recom-
mending that Bourdeau not be approved as CEO and president of the new bank.
Respondent filed an action in the district court against Bank of America
Nevada and several of its employees alleging, among other things, intentional
interference with a prospective business relationship due to the allegedly de-
famatory statements made to FDIC investigators. On this interference claim,
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the jury found for the respondent and granted an award of $1.2 million.
In this appeal, Bank of America Nevada sought a finding that the trial court
had abused its discretion by not allowing a jury instruction with regard to an
absolute or conditional privilege as to any communication made to the FDIC,
inasmuch as it claimed that the agency was acting in a quasi judicial capacity.
The Court held that the statements made to the FDIC were subject to a condi-
tional privilege, as long as they were made "in good faith on [a] matter in
which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
has a right or a duty, if it is made to a person with a corresponding interest or
duty." Bourdeau, 982 P.2d at 476. Hence, as the Court explained, in order for
Bourdeau to overcome the privilege, he must prove that the privilege was
abused in some way, such as if the statements were made with "actual malice,
knowledge they were false, or reckless disregard for whether the statements
were false." Id. at 475.
In this regard, the Court found that since the statements were made by bank
employees to an FDIC investigator, and since the employees had a duty to co-
operate with the examiner, the appellant bank or its employees could not be
held liable for any statements made in good faith. Id. at 476. As a result, the
Court reversed the part of the opinion with regard to the intentional interference
claim and remanded the action for a new trial on the issue of the conditional
privilege as it relates to this claim.
Dillard's Department Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith
989 P.2d 882, (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999)
Wrongful discharge of long-term employee may violate public policy.
Deloris Beckwith (Beckwith) injured her back at work and filed a workers'
compensation claim. Beckwith worked 25 years for Dillard's Department
Stores (Dillard's), 19 of those years as an area sales manager. Even though she
was an exemplary employee, when she failed to return to work because her
doctor refused to release her, Dillard's filled her position with another manager.
Upon her return, Dillard's demoted her to an entry-level position. Beckwith
filed suit against Dillard's, claiming tortious constructive discharge and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded more than $600,000 in
compensatory damages and $1,872,084 in punitive damages. Dillard's ap-
pealed.
The Supreme Court of Nevada, en banc, affirmed the district court's ruling,
holding Dillard's retaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation
claim by an injured employee was actionable in tort, and that trial judge's deci-
sion to allow Dillard's' nationwide worth, rather than in-state worth alone, to
determine the amount of punitive damages, was not error. Beckwith, 989 P.2d
at 88.
Dillard's contended that Beckwith had no cause of action since Nevada
Revised Statute, § 616D.030 states, in pertinent part, "1. No cause of action
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may be brought or maintained against an insurer or a third-party administrator
who violates any provision of this chapter. . . 2. The administrative fines pro-
vided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616B.318 and § 616D.120 are the exclusive
remedies for any violation of this chapter. . . ."). The court disagreed, reason-
ing that a retaliatory discharge stemming from the filing of a worker's compen-
sation claim is actionable in tort and the cause of action and remedies governed
by the law of torts, not the worker's compensation statutes. Beckwith, 989 P.2d
at 885.
"At-will employment" gives the employer the right to discharge an em-
ployee for any reason, so long as the reason does not violate Nevada's public
policy favoring "economic security for employees injured while in the course
of their employment." Id. at 885-86. In this case, the court found that Dillard's
request for Beckwith to return to work without a medical release from her doc-
tor authorizing her return, coupled with a demotion when she did return to
work, was improper and violated public policy. Id. Consequently, the court
affirmed the tortious constructive discharge judgment.
Substantial evidence existed to support Beckwith's claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Dillard's did not offer Beckwith her previous po-
sition as area sales manager when she returned to work in spite of the fact that
there were two openings; Beckwith was forced to take a 40% pay reduction and
entry-level position; and the demotion was directly related to her claim for
worker's compensation. Therefore, the court affirmed judgment for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 886.
Dillard's also contested the damages, citing the lack of evidence showing
that Beckwith took steps to mitigate her damages. The court held that
Beckwith's attempts to obtain employment at three other department stores
were adequate efforts to mitigate damages for purposes of claim of constructive
discharge against public policy. Id. at 886-87.
The court affirmed the use of Dillard's nationwide worth in determining
punitive damages for constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The court reasoned, based on Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co.,
104 Nev. 587, 763 P.2d 673 (1988), that the award of punitive damages is
meant to deter the defendant from repeating the misconduct as well as punish
for the past behavior, and as such, the wealth of the defendant is directly rele-
vant to the size of an award. Id. at 887. The determination of that award rests
with the trier of fact and, unless evidence shows that the award would destroy
or annihilate the defendant, there will be no adjustments. Id. Since the award
would not financially destroy or annihilate Dillard's, the punitive damage
award was affirmed.
The court also affirmed the award of attorney's fees to Beckwith because
Beckwith's offer to settle for $187,000 prior to discovery was refused by Dil-
lard's and trial court found rejection of this "rock bottom" offer unreasonable.
Therefore, award of attorney's fees was proper. Id. at 888.
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WORKERS COMPENSATION
Russell Mauer v. Employers Insurance Company of Nevada
983 P.2d 411 (Nev. Aug. 26, 1999)
Self-inflicted injury not an accident under worker's compensation.
Appellant, while working, twice hit his head on the comer of a large roof-
top air conditioning unit. Mauer v. Employers Insurance Company of Nevada,
983 P.2d 411 (1999). When appellant hit his head a second time, he angrily hit
the unit with his fist. Id. Appellant suffered a superficial skull abrasion, which
Respondent Employers Insurance accepted. Id. Appellant was denied his claim
for his fractured right hand. A hearing officer and an appeals officer upheld the
claim denial, and the district court denied judicial review. Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of appel-
lant's petition for judicial review, finding that appellant's injury was self-
inflicted. The Court followed the analysis of McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 598 P.2d 375 (Utah 1979), Glodo v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Arizona, 191 Ariz. 259, 955 P.2d 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) and Klein v.
New York Times Co., 317 N.J.Super. 41, 721 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998), which concluded that "accidents," means an unforeseen happening
or unexpected mishap; and the resulting injury must be unexpected; therefore, a
self-inflicted injury is not the result of an accident. Id. at 412-413.
NRS § 616A.030 n7 defines "accident" as "an unexpected or unforeseen
event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and pro-
ducing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." Id. at 413. The result of
appellant's angry act could not be characterized as either unexpected or unfore-
seeable. Id. Thus, the Court held that an intentional violent act that produced a
foreseeable and reasonably expected self-injury was not an "accident" and the
resulting injury was not covered under Nevada's workers' compensation law.
Id. at 414.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.
174 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1999)
A court was able to enjoin proceedings in another court regarding prop-
erty that was first subject ofjurisdiction in the other court.
Churchill County appealed a lower court decision granting a water rights
transfer application to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS").
The district court enjoined the state court proceedings as it interfered with the
district court's exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals regarding the water rights
that had been originally adjudicated in the district court. The County appealed
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again to the Ninth Circuit.
The Newlands Reclamation Project started a massive project along the
Truckee and Carson River that would irrigate nearby lands and store water
from the rivers. A decree adjudicating the water rights of the users of the
Truckee River in northern Nevada was entered in 1944 known as the Orr Ditch
Decree. A similar decree, known as the Alpine Decree, adjudicated the rights
along the Carson River and was entered in 1980. Under the decrees, applica-
tions to change water rights governed by the decrees were to be directed to the
state engineer.
In 1996, USFWS filed two applications with the state engineer to change
the manner of water use rights purchased from other users under the two de-
crees. Churchill County protested the applications asserting that the new uses
would deplete the County's groundwater supply, harm its tax base, and create a
dust hazard. The state engineer conducted a study and found that none of the
County's concerns would arise. Churchill County then appealed the state engi-
neer's ruling. The state court denied the engineer's motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. The engineer then filed a motion to enjoin the proceedings in
state court. Before a ruling was entered on the state engineer's motion, the
state court granted a motion filed by Churchill County to enjoin the federal
proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Churchill County's contention that the district
court did not have jurisdiction. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d at
1011. The three-judge panel found that the decrees expressly provide for con-
tinuing jurisdiction over transfer applications. Although the Orr Ditch Decree
did not expressly provide the federal district court jurisdiction over the state
engineer's decision, the panel interpreted Nevada law to provide for federal
court review of the engineer's decisions. Id. The panel rejected arguments that
federal courts only have jurisdiction when federal interests are implicated. The
jurisdictional arrangement has been called "highly extraordinary" because it
permits federal district court review of state court rulings. Id. at 1012. Never-
theless, the Ninth Circuit has specifically approved of this arrangement. Id.
After the panel determined that the transfer application falls within the dis-
trict court's continuing jurisdiction, it then addressed whether that jurisdiction
was exclusive. The district court found that it had exclusive jurisdiction be-
cause the Alpine and Orr Ditch matters are in rem actions and the district court
gained jurisdiction over the property first. Id. at 1013.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed and expressed two reasons why the district
court has exclusive jurisdiction. Id. The panel analogized the situation to a set-
tlement agreement where a court retains jurisdiction over the matter. If the
court did not retain exclusive jurisdiction over the matters, a subsequent state
court could apply its judgment to the future conduct of the parties. Then, a
state court would be construing the district court ruling potentially frustrating
the district court's purpose. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's discussion then focused on the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283. Id. at 1014. The Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining
state court proceedings unless an exception of the Act applies. Exceptions in-
clude: (1) express authorization by Act of Congress; or, (2) where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction; or, (3) to protect or effectuate its judgments. The district
court relied on the second exception of the Act. Id. at 1015.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court acted appropriately be-
cause courts have long been able to enjoin proceedings in another court regard-
ing property that was first the subject of jurisdiction in another court. The
Court also revisited its settlement agreement analogy and found that the "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception applies because subsequent juris-
diction in another court would frustrate the district court's original jurisdiction.
Id.
EVIDENCE
Hansen v. University Health Services of Nevada, Inc.
974 P.2d 1158 (Nev. Mar. 24, 1999)
Supreme Court addresses evidentiary rulings and trial court discretion.
Thalgott performed spinal surgery on Hansen attaching a steel plate to
Hansen's spine, using bone screws. The surgery was performed at Valley Hos-
pital, which at the time was owned by University Health Services of Nevada,
Inc. (UHS).
Following the surgery, Hansen's incision became infected resulting in
"gross contamination." Hansen thereafter brought a negligence suit against
Thalgott and UHS. The cause of the infection was debated at trial, with Han-
sen's expert witness attributing the cause to negligence of either the Hospital or
the doctor. Conversely, the defense attributed the cause to Hansen's adjacent
tissue.
A jury found in favor of Thalgott and UHS. Hansen appealed, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings that
prevented him from adequately presenting his case.
First, Hansen argued that the district court erred in excluding evidence
that the FDA did not approve of the surgical procedure performed on him.
Several medical documents mentioned this fact. Hansen claimed that a
heightened standard of care is required when the FDA does not approve of a
procedure. However, the district court, in its discretion, redacted any men-
tion of FDA status at trial finding that such evidence would be irrelevant
and confuse the jury. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion "even though a contrary finding would
also have been within the trial court's discretion with regard to the standard
of care upon which the jury was instructed." Hansen, 974 P.2d at 1160.
Hansen argued that the district court erred in excluding the State Industrial
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Insurance System (SIIS) survey of medical complications experienced by Thai-
gott's patients who also had the surgery. Hansen argued that use of the reports
would show a pattern of Thalgott's unsuccessful surgeries. However, the dis-
trict court excluded the evidence because of the possible misleading effect it
may have had on the jury. The Court upheld the district court's ruling since the
evidence could prolong the trial and confuse the jury. Id.
Next, Hansen argued that that the district court erred in excluding inade-
quacies in Valley Hospital's infection control practices. For the same reasons
mentioned above, the Court upheld the district court's ruling. Id.
Finally, Hansen argued that the district court erred in refusing to allow
Hansen's untimely-designated experts to testify at trial. The district court set a
deadline for the designation of experts. Hansen submitted a second, untimely
designation of experts, which the district court refused even though it was sub-
mitted within the time limit allowed by Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B). The Court agreed, stating that a district court is vested with dis-
cretion to limit the number of witnesses and such discretion also supercedes the
mentioned statute. Id. at 1161.
The dissent favored allowing the evidence because of its probative value.
Specifically, the dissent believed that the non-FDA evidence and the SIIS audit
would have been relevant, and influential evidence at trial. Id. at 1161-62.
Mortensen v. State
986 P.2d 1105 (Nev. Sept. 27, 1999)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding exclusion of a witness's
prior bad acts, admission of expert testimony, preservation of evidence, and
admission of newly discovered evidence.
On May 14, 1997, Mortensen was tried and convicted of first-degree mur-
der with the use of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to two consecutive
terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On December 27, 1996, Mortensen, an officer with the Las Vegas Metro-
politan Police Department, celebrated his thirty-first birthday at a Las Vegas
drinking establishment. He left the party with a fellow police officer, Chris
Brady. Both men were armed with their police weapons. Brady, the driver,
pulled into an alley, which was an area known for gang activity. A group was
gathered in the alley at that time. Mortensen was the only passenger in the ve-
hicle, which faced the group. Six shots were fired and Daniel Mendoza was
killed. The vehicle pulled away from the scene.
Following the accident both men in the vehicle went to a bar. Later, Brady
drove Mortensen home. The next morning, Brady claimed to discover
Mortensen's gun in the vehicle. Brady removed the bullets and placed the gun
on his bathroom cabinet, Brady contacted his father, also a police officer, and
went with him to the police station to report the incident and turn in
Mortensen's weapon.
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Evidence used at trial included Mortensen's gun, which according to expert
testimony, was the weapon that produced strikes at several objects at the mur-
der scene. The gun had Mortensen's fingerprints on it. Also, Brady's vehicle
was produced as evidence, although it had been altered in several ways.
Mortensen requested on two occasions that the vehicle and other possible evi-
dence be preserved but the Court did not intervene. When Mortensen finally
obtained the evidence, it had already been altered. Five witnesses testified that
the perpetrator was a large, white male who wore sunglasses the night of the
incident. This description better fit Mortensen than it did Brady.
Mortensen testified at trial that Brady was the actual shooter. According to
Mortensen, Brady used Mortensen's gun and reached across the cab to fire on
the group. After asking Brady why he did such a thing, Mortensen said that
Brady called himself "evil."
There were several issues raised on appeal: (1) whether evidence of
Brady's prior bad acts should have been admitted and not restricted by section
48.045 of the Nevada Revised Statutes; (2) whether the State's failure to pro-
vide the defense with expert testimony reports prior to trial justified a mistrial;
(3) whether Mortensen's due process rights were violated by the State's failure
to preserve evidence; and, (4) whether newly discovered evidence should have
required a new trial.
Mortensen attempted to introduce into evidence that Brady was reported to
internal affairs on two prior occasions for ruffian acts. Mortensen argued that
the district court should not have barred the evidence under NRS 48.045(2) be-
cause the provision applies only to the accused and not witnesses. The Court
disagreed. The Court held that NRS 48.045(2) applies to "persons" as it states,
which also includes witnesses, so the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Mortensen, 986 P.2d at 1110. Also, the Court noted that the exception to the
rule against character evidence is available only where a positive identification
of the perpetrator has not been made, and the offered evidence establishes a
signature crime. Id. The Court found that Brady's prior bad acts would not
apply to the exception because they did not demonstrate a signature crime. Id.
On the same issue, Mortensen argued that NRS 48.045(2) is unconstitu-
tional since it denies his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The Court disagreed. It rea-
soned that since Mortensen was able to cross-examine Brady and that
Brady's acts did not exculpate Mortensen, Mortensen's rights were not vio-
lated. Id. at 1110 n.6.
Mortensen next argued that the State's failure to provide the defense
with expert testimony reports prior to trial amounted to a mistrial. The
Court again disagreed. Mortensen cited McKee v. State, 112 Nev. 642, 917
P.2d 940 (1996), where the State secretly and purposefully kept evidence to
impeach the accused by surprise. The Court found that the State's actions
in that case were more egregious than in the instant case. Mortensen, 986
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P.2d at 1111. Moreover, the evidence pertained to the vehicle used in the
murder and not to the accused as in McKee. Lastly, there was nothing to
suggest the State intended harm as it received the reports late. Id. The
State forwarded the reports as soon as it received them. Id.
A sub-issue raised by Mortensen concerned the probative value of the
expert's testimony. Mortensen cited Wrenn v. State, 89 Nev. 71, 506 P.2d
418 (1973) to argue that the expert testimony was speculative and unin-
formed. In Wrenn, the Court ruled against the testimony of an expert where
the expert attempted to recreate an event, which occurred two years prior
and relied on several factual assumptions. Id. at 73-74, 506 P.2d at 419-20.
The Court found in this case, however, that the expert was competent and
the crime scene, unlike Wrenn, was still fresh for examination. Mortensen,
986 P.2d at 1111.
Mortensen argued that his due process rights were violated by the
State's failure to preserve Brady's vehicle and clothing involved in the ac-
cident. To establish a violation of this sort, the Court reasoned that the
State must (1) lose or destroy the evidence in bad faith, or (2) the loss of
evidence must unduly prejudiced the defendant's case because it possessed
an apparent exculpatory value before it was destroyed. Id. at 1111-1112.
The Court found that Mortensen failed to show either. Id. at 1112.
Mortensen did not show bad faith because the State did not intend to try
Brady or even consider him a suspect. Therefore, the State had no reason to
preserve the evidence. Mortensen argued that he notified the State of his
legal strategy to pin the blame on Brady through several avenues. Regard-
less, the Court found that no notification was presented to satisfactorily
substantiate his claim of bad faith by the State. Id. at 1112 n.7.
Likewise, the Court found that Mortensen failed to demonstrate the
second prong of the test, that Mortensen was unduly prejudiced. Mortensen
argued that altered evidence prejudiced his case and based his argument on
Cook v. State, 114 Nev. 120, 953 P.2d 712 (1998). In Cook, the Court re-
versed a conviction because the police lost certain evidence. The Court dis-
tinguished Cook from the present case since the police did not actually lose
anything. Mortensen, 986 P.2d at 1112.
Moreover, certain evidence Mortensen claimed was sold was recovered
and available for trial. Id. All other alteration claims relied on by
Mortensen the Court found as insignificant to have any prejudicial effect.
Id. at 1113.
Mortensen's final argument was that newly discovered evidence warranted
a new trial. The new evidence included: allegations of people who heard Brady
refer to himself as "evil;" letters written by the expert witness; and allegations
supposedly made by a fellow officer that Brady desired to do a drive by shoot-
ing.
As to the occurrences where Brady referred to himself as "evil" to oth-
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ers, Mortensen argued that these statements conform to a similar reference
allegedly made by Brady after he fired the weapon. The Court held that this
new evidence was not likely to produce a different result upon a new trial,
mainly because such references are inapposite in showing culpability and
they tend to demonstrate character more than anything, which is barred un-
der section 48.045(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Id. at 1114.
As to the letters written by the expert witness, Mortensen argued that
the letters suggest the possibility of a third gun and that such letters dis-
credit the expert's testimony. The Court held again that the evidence would
not produce a different result because Mortensen himself testified that his
gun was the murder weapon. Id. at 1114-15. As to the effect of the letter
on the expert's testimony, the Court found that it would have no effect on
retrial. Id.
Lastly, Mortensen argued that Brady's statement made to a fellow offi-
cer demonstrate that Brady had a propensity to engage in a shooting of this
nature. The Court held that this new evidence would not render a different
result upon retrial because the officer denied that any statements when
questioned. Id. Moreover, at trial, Brady's own testimony demonstrated
that it was his idea to commence a pattern of citizen harassment that night.
Id. With this and other concessions about Brady's propensities, the Court
found that the jury had ample evidence to make a proper decision about
Brady's involvement. Id. The Court added that Brady's involvement, as
cast at trial, might warrant criminal prosecution. Id. Nevertheless, the
weight of the evidence, according to the Court, clearly pointed more toward
Mortensen and any testimony by the proposed fellow officer would be in-
sufficient to satisfy a new trial. Id.
Roever v. Nevada
979 P.2d 1285 (Nev. Mar. 24, 1999)
Lower court did not "overlook or misapprehend any material matter."
In a per curiam opinion issued to replace an earlier unpublished order, the
Nevada Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of the court's decision to
reverse and remand appellant's conviction. Roever was convicted of first de-
gree murder and possession of a controlled substance, but the Court reversed
the conviction in 1995 and remanded for a new trial. Roever v. Nevada, 114
Nev. 867, 869; 963 P.2d 503, 504 (Nev. 1998). At Roever's second trial, the
jury once again found her guilty of the same charges. Id. Again, the Court re-
versed and remanded the conviction, holding that the testimony of several wit-
nesses to prior bad acts was improperly admitted as rebuttal evidence to rebut
several statements made by Roever in an audiotaped interview.
The issue presented by the state's petition was whether the court had cor-
rectly concluded that the admission of the rebuttal evidence was reversible er-
ror. The court had given several reasons in its earlier opinion for its holding
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that the evidence should not have been introduced, one of which was that it did
not rebut evidence presented by Roever in her defense. Roever v. Nevada, 979
P.2d at 1285. The court acknowledged that it had incorrectly determined that
the audiotape, which was a defense exhibit, was first used by the state in its
case-in-chief. However, the court held that the other grounds discussed in its
earlier opinion were sufficient to support the holding that the admission of the
rebuttal evidence was reversible error. Id. Because the court found that it did
not "overlook or misapprehend any material matter," it denied the petition for
rehearing.
Derosa v. Nevada; Thomas v. Nevada
985 P.2d 157 (Nev. Aug. 27,1999)
Affidavits of lab analysts deemed insufficient as evidence in DUI trials.
In the cases of Derosa v. Nevada and Thomas v. Nevada, the Nevada Su-
preme Court considered issues involving the Confrontation Clause rights of the
Sixth Amendment and the admissibility of lab analysts affidavits for D.U.I.
convictions. The petitioners, Jeffrey DeRosa and Janice Louise Thomas, were
convicted in separate trials for misdemeanor D.U.I. In both cases, the state in-
troduced affidavits of lab analysts who sampled and tested the petitioners'
blood for alcohol content. Derosa, 985 P.2d at 159 (1999). In each trial, the
municipal court rejected petitioners objections to the admission of such affida-
vits in the absence of corresponding live testimony from the affiants. Id. On
appeal, both petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme
providing for the admissibility of such affidavits. Specifically, they argued that
their right to confront witnesses against them as provided by the Sixth Amend-
ment was violated by the statutory exceptions. Id. at 160-61. Petitioner Tho-
mas also challenged the statutory distinctions made between misdemeanor and
felony defendants as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 160.
In its analysis of the Confrontation Clause issue, the Nevada Supreme
Court noted that an initial inquiry must be made as to whether the evidence was
admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 161. The state ar-
gued that the affidavits concerning DeRosa were admissible under a business
record exception and that those concerning Thomas were admissible under a
public record exception. Id. Concluding that the affidavits did not constitute a
record conducted in the ordinary course of business consistent with Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 51.135, the court rejected the states business record exception. The
documents lacked the required indicia for such an exception. In particular, the
analysts prepared the documents for litigation purposes and not for use by a
business responsible for the documents preparation. Id.
Further, the court rejected the state's public records exception arguments.
In order to qualify as a public record, a public official or agency must prepare
the document. Id. In both the Thomas and DeRosa cases, the documents were
not prepared by public officials, but by laboratory and hospital employees. Id.
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at 161-62.
However, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that the affidavits could be
admissible if they "possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at
162. If such evidence is at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a hear-
say exception, its admission would not violate the Confrontation Clause. The
court noted the indicia of trustworthiness that it associated with the lab ana-
lysts' affidavits. The affiants who prepare such affidavits are trained profes-
sionals whose primary duty is to provide accurate results. The utility of live
testimony and cross-examination is consequently questionable since the ana-
lysts may not have specific recollections of the individual tests. Id. Further,
the court noted that a number of jurisdictions already permit the admission of
such statutory evidence. Id.
According to the court's rationale for admissibility, the statutory scheme
also provides for the defendant's protection by allowing the defendant to object
in writing and to compel the affiant's testimony where a bona fide dispute of
facts exists. Id. Within this framework, the right to appeal provides an addi-
tional safeguard against possible abuses. Id. As a result, the court held that the
absence of a bona fide dispute of fact in the petitioners' cases and their failure
to provide a written objection to the admission of the affidavits precluded a
Confrontation Clause claim. Id. at 163. The court asserted that if the affidavits
concerned a controversial or particularly subjective test, it is possible that com-
plete reliance upon the chemist's affidavit may violate the Confrontation
Clause.
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, Petitioner Thomas argued that the
statutory scheme placed a heavier burden on misdemeanor defendants than fel-
ony defendants in asserting their right to cross-examination. In rejecting this
claim, the court reasoned that the state had a reasonable objective in promoting
judicial efficiency by expediting the prosecution of less serious cases. Id. at
164. Further, the court held that misdemeanor and felony defendants could be
statutorily distinguished in terms of applicable procedural protections. A fel-
ony defendant faces a more substantial loss of liberty and higher penalties than
a misdemeanor defendant, thus justifying additional levels of protection for the
felony defendant. Id. The court also noted that the statutory scheme, while
limiting the misdemeanor defendant's statutory rights, did not entirely elimi-
nate procedural protections for such defendants. NRS§ 50.315 states that a
misdemeanor defendant can object to the lack of cross-examination where the
defendant can demonstrate that a bona fide dispute of the facts exists. Id. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that such protections were sufficient for Equal Protec-
tion Clause purposes despite the disparity in procedural treatment between the
two types of defendants.
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Potter v. West Side Transportation, Inc.
188 F.R.D. 362 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 1999)
Parties may have had the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but waived
their rights to it when they voluntarily placed their mental state at issue in the
case.
On September 12, 1997, the Potter family was involved in a severe car ac-
cident. Both parents and one of three children survived. As a result of the ac-
cident, psychological professionals treated each of the surviving Potters. It was
reported that there was some psychological treatment before the accident.
Residents of the State of California performed the psychological treatment in
that state.
The Potters objected to the Defendant's motion to compel the production
of all of the psychological records pertaining to the Potter's mental and emo-
tional well being and sought to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
They maintained that this is a private matter and would result in great embar-
rassment if disclosed. Further, the Potters argued that they did not intend to
call their treating psychotherapists but would rely on an expert to prove their
emotional distress claims. Id.
The Court held that the Defendants were entitled to this information be-
cause it was relevant to the subject matter of the Potters' claims and might re-
veal more admissible evidence. Id. Additionally, the Court found that the Pot-
ters were not entitled to protection under the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because, by initiating a claim of emotional distress, they voluntarily placed
their psychological well being at issue. Id.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court looked at two issues. First, the Court
determined the relevance of the prior records. Second, the Court addressed the
issue of privilege.
In determining whether or not the prior treatment was relevant, the Court
relied on the Federal Rules of Evidence 401. The Court reasoned the records
were necessary to determine the extent of the Potters' emotional suffering as
well as determine their psychological state before and after the accident in or-
der to gauge whether or not the accident was a contributing factor to their cur-
rent mental state. Id. The Court held that it would not simply rely on the Pot-
ters' word that it was a private matter. The Court determined that the evidence
should be admitted because the Potters' expert would need to review their pre-
vious mental history prejudicing the Defendants' ability to properly cross ex-
amine the expert about his opinion. Id.
In analyzing the issue of privilege, the Court relied on State law. The
Court held that because the action was brought in the State of Nevada and the
accident occurred in the State of Nevada, Nevada law governed. Id. As a re-
sult, the Court looked to section 49.209 of Nevada Revised Statute governing
the privilege between psychologist and patient. Id. The statute provides, "no
privilege for communication relevant to an issue of the treatment of the patient
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in any proceeding in which the treatment is an element of a claim or defense."
Id.
Relying on the statute, the Court concluded that the Potters may have had
the privilege, but waived their rights to it when they voluntarily placed their
mental state at issue in this case. Id.
Lincoln v. State
988 P.2d 305, (Nev. Nov. 29, 1999)
Failure to hold the requisite trustworthiness hearing may not result in a
reversal if the failure to grant the trustworthiness hearing was harmless error
under circumstances.
The Appellant, Lincoln, was married to Richardson. They had three
daughters together. They divorced four years after they were married. At the
time of the divorce, Richardson resided in New Mexico and Lincoln was sta-
tioned in Virginia. Their divorce agreement provided that neither parent could
take the children out of their state of residence without the permission of the
other.
Lincoln owned a Ford Bronco that he gave to Richardson. In June 1993,
Richardson was cleaning the car and found a receipt for a motel in Reno, Ne-
vada. The receipt contained dates covering a period of time when Lincoln had
visitation time with the children. Richardson never permitted Lincoln to take
the girls to Nevada.
Richardson questioned her older daughter about the incident and recorded
the conversation with a tape recorder. When Richardson asked her daughter
about the trip she testified that her daughter would "curl up in a ball, stick her
fingers in her mouth, and talk like a baby" Lincoln, 988 P.2d at 306. Richard-
son noted that this behavior was uncharacteristic of her daughter. Richardson's
daughter stated that her father's "pee-pee had come to get her." Id. After more
questioning, Richardson's daughter denied that her father molested her. How-
ever, based on her daughter's tone of voice and body language, Richardson be-
lieved the incident did in fact occur and her daughter just did not want to talk
about it.
Richardson notified military authorities of the incident and the military au-
thorities interrogated Lincoln. Eventually, Lincoln signed a confession detail-
ing the molestation of his daughter. He initialed six separate lines in the con-
fession indicating that he understood his rights and acknowledging that he
could end the interview at his own discretion.
After the confession, Lincoln also spoke with counselors and a naval social
worker. The social worker informed Lincoln the conversation would be confi-
dential unless there were any incidents of child abuse. Id. The social worker
told Lincoln he would be required to disclose those conversations to the au-
thorities. Id. Lincoln told the social worker he was sorry for it but he never
specified what "it" meant. Id.
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Lincoln was tried and convicted of lewdness with a minor and sentenced to
four years in prison. The four-year sentence was suspended, and Lincoln was
placed on probation for an indeterminate period of time, not to exceed sixty
months.
Lincoln appealed his conviction arguing that the court committed reversi-
ble error by not holding a separate hearing, outside of the jury, to determine
whether or not his daughter's testimony was trustworthy. In its decision, the
Court agreed that the district court erred. Id. at 307. However, the Court re-
fused to reverse the district court's ruling.
In reaching its decision, the Court relied on section 51.385 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes. Id. The statute provides that a child under the age of ten may
make a statement of "any sexual conduct performed with or on the child" and
that statement will be admissible in a criminal proceeding. Id. Additionally,
the statement will only be permitted if, in a separate hearing, without a jury
present, the Court finds that the statement "provides sufficient circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness; and the child testifies at the proceeding or is un-
available or unable to testify." Id. The Court has previously found that a fail-
ure to hold the requisite trustworthiness hearing constitutes reversible error.
See Brust v. State, 108 Nev. 872, 877, 839 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Nev. 1992);
Quevedo v. State, 113 Nev. 35, 38, 930 P.2d 750, 751 (Nev. 1997); Lytle v.
State, 107 Nev. 589, 591, 816 P.2d 1082, 1083 (Nev. 1991). However, the
Court noted that such an oversight may not result in a reversal, if the failure to
grant the trustworthiness hearing was a harmless error under the particular cir-
cumstances. In this case, the Court held that the error was harmless and there-
fore affirmed Lincoln's conviction. Lincoln, P.2d at 307.
The Court concluded that the hearsay statements from Richardson's daugh-
ter resulted in harmless error. The Court affirmed the decision based on other
evidence including Richardson's own testimony, the social worker's state-
ments, and Lincoln's signed confession. Id.
In addition to the ruling on the evidence, the Court also struck down Lin-
coln's argument that his conversations with the naval social worker were privi-
leged. The Court found that Lincoln was not entitled to privilege protection
because the social worker informed him that any reports of child abuse had to
be disclosed. Therefore, Lincoln could not have expected any additional com-
munications to be confidential. Id. at 308.
Wood v. Nevada
990 P.2d 786 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999).
Hearsay statements excluded. Fast track appeals process held constitu-
tional.
In Wood v. Nevada, 990 P.2d 786 (Nev. 1999), the Nevada Supreme Court
considered the appellant's challenges to his convictions for attempted murder,
solicitation to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit murder. Wood, 990
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P.2d at 787. The appellant, Allen Dwight Wood, argued that the admission of
out-of court statements implicating him in a murder conspiracy constituted a
reversible error and that his conviction for solicitation to commit murder was
invalid under Nevada's criminal statutes. The appellant also asserted that Ne-
vada's Fast Track criminal appeals procedure was unconstitutional.
In 1996, the appellant and his ex-wife had an altercation, which led to a
subsequent violent attack upon the appellant's ex- wife. Two minors, Justin
Anderson and Brian Bardin, were arrested for the assault upon the appellant's
wife. After receiving immunity, they implicated the appellant in a murder con-
spiracy. Id. One of the minors, Brian Bardin, made a statement to a third
party, Amanda Greene, that the appellant had asked Bardin to murder the
appellant's ex-wife. This statement was admitted at trial as a valid form of
hearsay, although Bardin, as the hearsay declarant, did not testify. Id. at 789.
The appellant argued that the trial court's admission of statements made by
Bardin to Amanda Greene violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 789. In its reversal of the appellant's conviction on Sixth
Amendment grounds, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the Confrontation
Clause serves as a limitation on the state's ability to use hearsay as evidence
when the hearsay declarant does not testify. In order to be sufficiently reliable
as a substitute for cross-examination, such hearsay statements must fall within
an "affirmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. If the hearsay does not qualify for
such an exception, the state must show that particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness support the statements. Id. Further, a court must analyze such
statements specifically within the context of a conspiracy to commit murder
case. In such a case, the prosecution must establish the existence of a conspir-
acy by independent evidence. The prosecution must then show that the hearsay
statement occurred during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Id.
In Wood, the court noted that Bardin's statements to Greene were not made
in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. In order for such statements to constitute
valid hearsay, the hearsay declarant must make the statements to a third party in
order to induce that party to either join the conspiracy or to assist in the con-
spiracy's objectives. Id. (citing U.S. v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 444 (4 th Cir.
1994)). Bardin, however, did not inform Greene of the intentions to murder the
appellant's wife in order to induce Greene's participation in the conspiracy. Id.
Further, Bardin's statements were not valid under a firmly rooted hear-
say exception since a co-defendant's statements against the accused are inad-
missible when they implicate both the accused and the co-defendant. Id.
Moreover, the prosecution did not provide particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness that would validate the statements as admissible hearsay. Although
Bardin's implication of himself may suggest trustworthiness, his contradictions
at a preliminary hearing, that the appellant alone assaulted the victim, under-
mined the statement's veracity. Id. Under the required harmless error analysis,
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the court noted that Bardin's statements could have been the deciding factor in
the jury's decision. This necessitated a reversal of the appellant's conviction
since the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bardin's
statements were harmless at trial. Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court also reversed the appellant's conviction for so-
licitation to commit murder. The court concluded that Nevada's criminal stat-
utes prohibit a conviction for solicitation to commit murder if the accused is
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Id. In fact, a conspiracy "triggers
the exclusionary clause in the solicitation statute." Wood, 990 P.2d at 789.
Since the state can only convict a defendant of either solicitation to commit
murder or, alternatively, a conspiracy to commit murder, the court must reverse
the redundant convictions. Id. The court therefore remanded the appellant's
case since he could only face conviction for one of the charges.
The court, however, refused to accept the appellant's constitutional chal-
lenge to Nevada's Fast Track appellate process, which attempts to expedite ap-
pellate procedures. The appellant argued that the system violated his unre-
stricted right to a fully briefed appeal. Id. Procedurally, the Fast Track process
provides that the defendant has an opportunity to examine the transcripts of the
lower court proceeding prior to presenting an appellate claim. Id. at 791. The
process also provides for a written presentation of the arguments and a confer-
ence with one justice if the court concludes that the case warrants such a re-
view. If the case presents a substantial, substantive issue, which is not suscep-
tible to quick disposition, the full court may examine the appeal. Id.
In its review of the Fast Track process, the Nevada Supreme Court ex-
plained that the system provides procedural protections absent in similar sys-
tems in other states. For example, the court noted that New Mexico does not
provide for the filing of a transcript prior to appeal and does not permit oral ar-
guments. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has validated this more restric-
tive process. Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court also distinguished Nevada's system from New
Hampshire's system, the only appellate process that a court has invalidated as a
violation of a defendant's due process rights. New Hampshire used a discre-
tionary procedure which disposed of appeals without any indication of the
court's view on the merits. Id. The First Circuit rejected this process as a due
process violation since the system did not provide the defendant with either a
transcript or with an opportunity to persuade the court to accept the appeal. Id.
(citing Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1987)). The Nevada Supreme
Court concluded that the Fast Track system was valid since it lacked similar
defects and provided adequate procedural protections for the defendant. Wood,
990 P.2d at 791.
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Fletcher v. Nevada
990 P.2d 192 (Nev. Dec. 28, 1999)
Court sets out requirements of the automobile exception regarding exclu-
sion of seized evidence.
Smith filed a police report alleging that she had been kidnapped and beaten
by Fletcher. At that time, Smith informed the police that Fletcher was involved
in drug trafficking. She also informed the police of Fletcher's manner of sell-
ing drugs and the location of the drugs in Fletcher's automobile. A detective
attempted to purchase drugs from Fletcher but, feeling uncomfortable, Fletcher
refused. A week later, the police decided to arrest Fletcher for the kidnapping
and battery of Smith. The officers pulled his car over and conducted a search
upon the vehicle. During the search, the officers removed two bags of cocaine
from the steering column area of Fletcher's car, the location identified by
Smith. Fletcher was charged with kidnapping, battery, coercion, and drug traf-
ficking.
The district court denied Fletcher's motion to suppress the drug evidence
obtained during the search of his vehicle. The court ruled that there was prob-
able cause to arrest Fletcher on the trafficking charges that allowed police to
perform a search without a warrant. Alternatively, the court found the evidence
admissible as a proper inventory search or under the doctrine of inevitable dis-
covery. Fletcher was convicted of trafficking and misdemeanor battery.
Fletcher appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, claiming the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the drug evidence seized from his vehicle.
The Court held that the automobile exception states that a warrant-less
search of a parked, immobile, unoccupied automobile requires: (1) probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband; and (2) exigent circum-
stances sufficient to dispense with the need for a warrant. Fletcher, 990 P.2d at
194. The Nevada Supreme Court has not done away with the exigency re-
quirement in the same manner as the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 195.
The Court found that the police had probable cause to believe Fletcher's
car contained evidence of drug trafficking due to Smith's testimony and the
previous unsuccessful attempt to buy drugs. Id. Next, the Court distinguished
the case from those where exigent circumstances were not present by noting
that the search without a warrant arose from an arrest on a separate charge. The
Court determined that because Fletcher's car would be left on the roadside until
impounded, sufficient exigent circumstances existed. Id. It would be unrea-
sonable to require the police to wait for a warrant or ride along with the car to
the impound yard and then conduct the search, so the Court concluded that the
district court properly admitted the drug evidence in Fletcher's automobile. Id.
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FAMILY LAW
Hayes v. Gallacher
972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. Feb. 12, 1999)
Court remands custody challenge for consideration of the best interest of
the child analysis.
This case was an appeal from a decision of the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County, which denied appellant's motion to relocate outside the
state of Nevada with her minor children. Hayes, 972 P.2d at 1139. Also ap-
pealed was the district court decision granting change of custody to the respon-
dent, the children's father, if the appellant chose to leave the state. Id.
The Nevada Supreme Court had to determine whether the district court had
followed the appropriate standards in making its decisions in this case. Id. at
1140. See Primm v. Lopes, 853 P.2d 103, 104 (1993); Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev.
1146, 1148 (1993). The court additionally had to consider three conflicting
policies: (1) the right of a child to associate with and have a relationship with
both parents, (2) the right of a parent to chose where to live, and (3) the right of
a parent to have access to their children. Hayes, 972 P.2d at 1140.
The Court set forth a two-step analysis for determining whether to grant a
motion for relocation. The trial court must first consider whether the parent has
a good faith reason for moving, which was not here in conflict, as the appellant
wished to move to be with her new husband who had been transferred to Japan
by his employer, the United States Air Force. The court must then consider ad-
ditional factors including the availability of alternative visitation options. Id.
Here, the alternative visitation options posed a problem because of the cost and
difficulty involved with the children's visitations to either parent. Id.
The Supreme Court adopted the approach set forth in Section 2.20 of the
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 3, Mar. 20, 1998), for cases where the relocation would eliminate
the possibility of traditional visitation options. Id. The first consideration un-
der these standards is whether the changed circumstances would impair the
other parent's ability to exercise his or her responsibilities under the current
parenting plan. Id. at 1141. As the respondent's ability to exercise his respon-
sibilities would be significantly impaired, a reexamination of the best interest of
the children was justified. Id. The Court found that the district court failed to
conduct such an examination, as it did not hear any evidence and made findings
of fact contrary to the evidence. Id. The lower court also failed to consider the
fact that a protective order had been issued against the respondent as a result of
domestic violence he committed. Id. Such consideration is required by Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 125.480(4). Nev. Rev. Stat. § 124.480(5) establishes that when it
has been proven that a parent has committed domestic abuse, a rebuttable pre-
sumption exists that the best interests of the child include no parental sole or
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joint custody. Id.
The Court further found fault in the district court's decision in that it was
punitive in nature. Id. at 1142. It altered the custody of the children without
provision for visitation by the appellant, and thus forced her to chose between
her new husband and her children. Id. Courts are not permitted to utilize child
custody to punish parents for their actions, but must instead consider what
would be in the best interest of the child. Id.
The Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that the district court
failed to consider all relevant factors in making its decision. Id. The court ac-
knowledged that the appellant's proposed move to Japan would interfere with
respondent's responsibilities to his children. Id. at 1141. As such, the court di-
rected the lower court to conduct a reexamination of the children's custody,
considering all appropriate factors, but primarily the best interests of the chil-
dren as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.480(4). Id. at 1042.
Manson v. Manson
975 P.2d 340 (Nev. Apr. 20, 1999)
Supreme Court affirms decision preventing parent from relocating with
minor child.
The appellant argued that the court erred in denying her motion to relocate
to Florida with her minor child. When the parties divorced in April of 1996, the
district court awarded primary custody of the minor child to the appellant. The
respondent had specified visitation rights. The appellant wished to relocate to
the state of Florida with the child.
The district court, after a lengthy evidentiary hearing, denied the motion to
remove based on its application of the five factors set forth in the case of
Schwartz v Schwartz. 107 Nev. 378, 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). Schwartz sug-
gested that a court should consider the following criteria when evaluating a mo-
tion for relocation:
(1) the extent to which the move is likely to improve the quality of life for
both the children and the custodial parent; (2) whether the custodial parent's
motives are honorable, and not designed to frustrate or defeat visitation rights
accorded to the non-custodial parent; (3) whether, if permission to remove is
granted, the custodial parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders
issued by the court; (4) whether the non-custodian's motives are honorable in
resisting the motion for permission to remove, or to what extent, if any, the
opposition is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing
support obligations or otherwise; (5) whether, if removal is allowed, there will
be a realistic opportunity for the non-custodial parent to maintain a visitation
schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship with
the non-custodial parent. See Manson, 975 P.2d at 341 n. 1.
The district court concluded that the appellant had not satisfied Schwartz's
first element, requiring a good faith basis for the relocation. The appellant's
lack of good faith was evidenced by her history of attempts to frustrate the visi-
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tation rights of the respondent. When all five of the Schwartz factors were
taken into account, the district court found that the appellant would most likely
continue to intrude upon the respondent's visitation rights, thereby eliminating
the possibility of establishing alternative custody and visitation agreements.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the ruling from the district
court, and elaborated on the significance of attempts to frustrate a non-custodial
parent's visitation rights. Although previously regarded as an issue of good
faith, in connection with Schwartz's first prong, the Court held that the appel-
lant's propensity to interfere with the respondent's visitation is relevant to
Schwartz's fifth factor. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs could demonstrate a
good faith motive for removal, such as a job offer, and still intend to frustrate
the opposing parties' visitation schedule from the new location.
Hardy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
181 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. June 2, 1999)
Court finds woman liable for taxes on her husband's income.
This was an appeal from a decision in the United States Tax Court affirm-
ing income tax assessment upon appellant's community property share of her
husband's income. Hardy, 181 F.3d at 1003.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court decision, finding the appel-
lant liable for a one-half interest in her husband's income. Id. at 1008. The
court observed a presumption in the Tax Court that deficiency notices are cor-
rect as long as some substantive evidence supports them. Id. at 1004. If such
evidence is presented, the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to show that
the deficiency was arbitrary or erroneous. Id. If the taxpayer is able to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the deficiency is arbitrary or erroneous,
the burden returns to the Commissioner to show that the assessment was justi-
fied. Id. at 1005.
Substantive evidence of unreported income existed in the form of proof of
Mr. Hardy's income, shifting the burden to the appellant. Id. Hardy claimed
that she and her husband had made an oral agreement to manage their finances
independently during their marriage, and thus she should not be held liable for
tax assessments on his income. Id. at 1006. The court rejected this argument
however, on the basis that Nevada is a community property state, and there is a
presumption that income earned during the marriage is community property.
Id. This presumption can only be rebutted through clear and convincing evi-
dence to the contrary. Id. The court found that spouses' opinions as to the
status of their income and property are irrelevant. Id.
The court noted four exceptions to the presumption of community property
in Nevada as set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.220 (1997): "(1) an agreement
in writing between the spouses, which is effective only between the spouses;
(2) a decree of separate maintenance issued by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion; (3) a written agreement from one spouse to another to permit that spouse
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to maintain his or her own earnings; (4) a court decree or an agreement to di-
vide property when one spouse is institutionalized." Id. at 1006. None of these
exceptions apply in this case, as there was neither a written agreement nor a
court decree dividing control of property. Id. at 1006-07.
Hardy further argued, based on Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d
358 (9 th Cir. 1979), that the assessment should not be presumed correct because
unreported income is involved. Id. at 1005. The Court rejected the argument,
finding that Weimerskirch applies only in cases of illegal income where the
Commissioner is unable to provide any evidence to support the deficiency no-
tice. Id. The Court observed that by conceding that certain facts were incor-
rect, the Commissioner does not lose the presumption of correctness for other
facts, as such a practice would interfere with justice and common sense. Id.
The Court found that the appellant did not qualify for protection under the
"innocent spouse provisions" set forth in the Internal Revenue Code § 66. Id.
at 1007. The "innocent spouse provisions" allow a spouse who lives in a com-
munity property state to avoid paying taxes on the other spouse's income from
which the spouse did not receive benefit. Id. The first provision applies if the
spouses have been living apart, a condition that did not exist here. Id. The
second provision gives the Secretary the discretion to prevent a taxpayer from
taking advantage of the community property laws if the taxpayer acted as if he
or she was entitled to the entire income and failed to notify the spouse of the
income prior to the due date for filing taxes. Id. Since this is a discretionary
provision, the appellant could not claim entitlement to relief under the second
provision. Id. The third provision provides tax relief for an innocent spouse if
(1) the spouse does not file a joint tax return for any taxable year; (2) if the
spouse does not include community income in their gross income; (3) the inno-
cent spouse did not know of, and had no reason to know of, the community in-
come, and (4) it is inequitable to include the community income in the innocent
spouse's gross income. Id. Here, Hardy had reason to know that her husband
was earning a taxable income and as such could not receive protection from the
third innocent spouse provision. Id. at 1007-08.
FEES
Nicolaus v. West Side Transport, Inc.
185 F.R.D. 608 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 1999).
Applying the Nevada rule, rather than the federal rule, would encourage
forum shopping, and violate a principle purpose of the Erie doctrine.
Defendants West Side Transport, Inc., and West Side Unlimited Corp em-
ployed Defendant Reimers. Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. at 610. On August 27, 1996,
Reimers, while driving one of his employer's trucks, rear-ended a Roadway
Express truck driven by Nicolaus. Id. Following the accident, Nicolaus re-
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ceived worker's compensation benefits from Helmsman, his employer's
worker's compensation administrator. Id. Nicolaus then initiated a personal
injury action against the defendants alleging negligence on the part of Reimers.
Id. Helmsman subsequently intervened in order to assert it's right of subroga-
tion. Id. On January 19, 1999, a jury awarded Nicolaus $426,000. Id. at 610-
11. In this opinion, the Court sought to resolve a number of post-trial motions
including: "(a) Intervenor Helmsman Management Services, Inc.'s ('Helms-
man') motion for enforcement of subrogation rights; (b) Helmsman's motion
for attorney fees and costs; (c) Defendants' objections to Helmsman's bill of
costs; (d) Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's bill of costs; and (e) Defendants'
objection to Helmsman's filing of an opposition to Defendants' objections to
Helmsman's bill of costs." Id. at 610.
The Court granted Helmsman's motion for enforcement of subrogation
rights. Id. at 611. Based on records of Helmsman's indemnification of Nico-
laus, the court awarded Helmsman a portion of Nicolaus' recovery from De-
fendant's and further ordered that "[a]s to Helmsman's obligation for future in-
demnity and medical expenditures, that obligation is suspended to the extent of
Plaintiffs remaining recovery of the jury's verdict from defendant's." Id.
(citing AT&T Tech. v. Reid, 109 Nev. 592, 596, 855 P.2d 533, 536 (1993)).
Helmsman demanded attorney fees and costs based on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 54(d) and 68 and Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. The Court's opinion states that the relevant inquiry under
FRCP 54(d) when "assessing a prevailing intervenor's request for costs is
whether the intervenor substantially contributed to the resolution of the issues
presented." Id. (citing American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1089, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and MDT Corp. v. New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). Ac-
cording to the Court, Helmsman had both prevailed and "substantially contrib-
uted to the resolution of the issues involved by conducting discovery, proposing
jury instructions, and presenting pre-trial argument. . ." Id. Thus, the Court
concluded that Helmsman was entitled to costs. Id..
Defendants also asserted that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 and Rule 68 of the
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Helmsman could not recover costs and fees
because it was not a defendant in the case. Id. The Court began its analysis of
this assertion by distinguishing the two rules. Id. "Federal Rule 68 provides
that, if a defending party makes an offer to allow judgment to be taken against
it, and that offer is rejected, the defending party may recover its post-offer costs
where the attacking party obtains a judgment less than the amount offered." Id.
Thus, the federal rule makes no provision for intervening plaintiffs such as
Helmsman. Id. The Nevada rule, however, makes no such distinction and al-
lows both attacking and defending parties to recover. Id.
Having distinguished between the two rules, the Court resorted to the Erie
Doctrine to determine which rule should be applied. Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
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Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) and Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965)). The court cited
Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995), in
which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held "that Wisconsin's offer-of-
settlement rule supplanted Federal Rule 68 under the Erie doctrine." Nicolaus,
185 F.R.D. at 612-613. The Seventh Circuit found no direct conflict between
the two rules, found no influence over state substantive outcomes, determined
that the Wisconsin rule would not encourage forum shopping, and reasoned that
the rule would not upset the balance between plaintiff and defendant rights. Id.
at 613. The Court found the reasoning applied in Healy to be persuasive on the
issue of costs, but determined that the issue of attorney's fees required further
consideration. Id.
Under the Nevada rule, "post-offer attorney fees are recoverable as a mat-
ter of course," id. (citing Yamaha Motor Co. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 223, 955
P.2d 661 (1998) and Nev. R. Civ. P. 68(f)(2) (1997)), the federal rule only al-
lows for the recovery of fees when those fees are included as costs by the sub-
stantive statute. Id. (citing Nusom v. Comh Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830 (9 th
Cir. 1997). The substantive statute applied in the present case, Nevada Revised
Statute § 41.130, contained no provision for the awarding of attorney's fees.
Id. The Court determined that the state and federal rules were in conflict. Id.
(citing Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1168 ( 9 th Cir. 1995)). The
Court reasoned that applying the Nevada rule, rather than the federal rule,
would encourage forum shopping, and violate a principle purpose of the Erie
doctrine. Id. at 614. The Court held that, under the circumstances of this case,
the Erie doctrine prevents the recovery of attorney fees through the application
of state law. Id.
GAMING LAW
Coury v. Robison
976 P.2d 518 (Nev. Apr. 26, 1999)
City 's right to restrict gaming limited.
In Coury v. Robison, the Nevada Supreme Court considered gaming licens-
ing restrictions initiated by the Henderson city council to promote its goal of
limiting gaming activity within the city. In 1989, the City of Henderson pro-
vided the appellants, operators of the Thirstbuster tavern, with a restricted gam-
ing license to operate fifteen gaming machines. Coury , 976 P.2d at 518. In
1991, the city rejected appellants' application for an expansion of its gaming
activities. After the appellants filed a district court action, the city council re-
solved the matter under a 1992 settlement agreement that allowed the tavern to
expand to forty machines.
This resolution depended upon the appellants' agreement that they would
never seek further expansion of their gaming activities as long as they were the
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corporation's sole shareholders. Id. However, between 1992 and 1995, the city
council approved at least eighteen applications for expanded gaming activities
by competing businesses within the tavern's geographic area. Subsequently,
given the increase in competition, the appellants sought approval for additional
gaming machines. Id. After the City Council rejected this request, the appel-
lants sought a special use permit to remove the forty-machine restriction con-
tained in the settlement agreement. The City Clerk refused to file this applica-
tion or to place the issue on the City Council agenda. Id. Although the
appellants obtained a district court writ of mandate compelling the City Clerk
to place the matter on the agenda, the council refused to approve the applica-
tion. Id.
As a result, the appellants and the city government respondents initiated
cross-motions for summary judgment on the appellants' declaratory relief
claim. The district court, without a formal comment, rejected the appellants'
claim. Id. On appeal, appellants argued that the previous settlement agreement
was void as an ultra vires act and that the doctrine of changed conditions in-
validated the forty machine restriction. Id. at 519-20.
The Nevada Supreme Court, however, overruled the district court's dis-
missal of the appellants' claim due to the doctrine of changed conditions. Al-
though it was within the City Council's power to limit gaming activity, it could
not restrict such activity in a manner producing an inequitable or oppressive ef-
fect upon the appellants' use of their property. Id. The Court noted that it had
adopted the doctrine of changed conditions in the restrictive covenant context
where that the changed condition fundamentally thwarted the restrictions'
original purpose. Id. at 521. Significantly, the Court extended the application
of the doctrine beyond the restrictive covenant context to evaluations of city
restrictions on gaming activity.
The Court determined that the restrictions may be invalid under the doc-
trine if gaming conditions in the Henderson area had changed fundamentally
since the 1992 settlement agreement. Consequently, if the city's geographical
limitation on gaming activity was no longer operative, the underlying purpose
for the restrictions in the settlement agreement might no longer be promoted.
Since the city had approved of an increase in gaming activity for appellants'
competitors, this changed condition within the community could invalidate the
1992 settlement agreement since the original goal of limiting such activity may
no longer be consistent with the city's actions.
The Court, therefore, determined that a genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted and that the district court's dismissal of appellants' claim was in error.
The court subsequently remanded the case so as to allow the City Council to
make findings as to whether such changed conditions contradict the original
purposes of the settlement agreement's restrictions. Id.
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HARMLESS ERROR
Schoels v. The State of Nevada
975 P.2d 1275 (Nev. Mar. 24, 1999)
Interests in fairness and avoidance of unfair prejudice supercede the lower
court's legitimate interest in efficiency and judicial economy.
This case involved the rehearing of appellant's petition for review of con-
viction at the district court level. Schoels, 975 P.2d at 1275-1276 . The dis-
trict court convicted the appellant (jury verdict) "for first-degree murder with
use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon." Id. at
1275-76. Upon rehearing, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district
court's refusal to allow Schoels to sever and plead guilty to the charge of pos-
session of a firearm by an ex-felon was not harmless error and remanded the
case for new trial. Id. at 1278.
Before trial, Appellant had moved that the district court allow him to plead
guilty to the charge of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. Id. at 1276. He
intended to prevent the jury from hearing of his prior conviction for robbery.
Id. "The court denied [the motion], saying that the change of plea was 'highly
detrimental to the state."' Id.. Appellant then moved to sever the charge, but
the court, citing judicial economy, refused to do so. Id. at 1277.
Citing the lower court's interest in assuring fairness to the prosecution, the
Court initially concluded that the lower court had not abused its discretion. Id.
However, on rehearing, the appellant cited to Brown v. State, a recent case in
which the Court had "held that henceforth where the state seeks conviction on
multiple counts, any counts of ex-felon in possession of a firearm must be sev-
ered so that the jury trying the other counts will not be exposed to evidence of a
defendant's prior felony convictions." Id. The Court stated that the interests in
fairness and avoidance of unfair prejudice embodied in the Brown ruling super-
cede the lower court's "legitimate interest in efficiency and judicial economy."
Id.
Though the state argued that the new rule applied in Brown should only be
applied prospectively and thus would not apply to the present case, the court
stated that two material distinctions justified an independent approach to the
present case. Id. (citing Gier v. District Court, 106 Nev. 208, 212, 789 P.2d
1245, 1248 (1990) ("New rules apply prospectively unless they are rules of
constitutional law, and then they apply retroactively only under certain circum-
stances.")). First, in Brown, the appellant had failed to preserve the issue
through timely objection. Id. As mentioned previously, the appellant in the
present case preserved both the issue of the guilty plea and severance through
objections at trial. Id. Second, the appellant in Brown had sought only sever-
ance. Id. In the present case, the appellant had first sought to plead guilty
rather than to sever the trial. Id. Thus, at least initially, rather than decreasing
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judicial economy by requiring new proceedings, the plaintiffs plea of guilty
would have furthered judicial economy. Id.
The Court determined that the "character of the error [made] it possible
that absent the evidence of his prior conviction for robbery, the jury might have
given Schoels the benefit of the doubt and found him guilty of only second-
degree murder rather than premeditated first-degree murder." Id. The Court
reversed the judgment of conviction in regard to first-degree murder, and re-
manded the case for retrial. Id.
INSURANCE
Humana Inc., et al., v. Forsyth, et al.
525 U.S. 299 (Jan. 20, 1999)
A suit under RICO does not impair Nevada law under section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Plaintiff-respondents are the beneficiaries of group health insurance poli-
cies issued by Humana. Humana Inc., 525 U.S. at 302, 119 S. Ct. at 714. As
part of the policy, plaintiff-respondents would pay 20% of charges while Hu-
mana would pay 80%. Id. Upon receiving care at Humana Hospital-Sunrise, the
beneficiaries paid more than 20%, while Humana paid less than 80%, all due to
a concealed agreement between the hospital and the insurer, which gave the in-
surer large discounts on the insurer's portion of the bill. Id. The beneficiaries
brought suit alleging that Humana violated RICO through a pattern of racket-
eering activity; however, Humana moved for summary judgment, citing §2(b)
of McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. The McCarran-Ferguson Act's 2(b) provides
that no federal statute "shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any State law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically re-
lates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
The United States District Court granted Humana's motion for summary
judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. Humana, 525 U.S. at 304-305.
The District Court found that RICO's treble damages provision so exceeded
Nevada's administrative penalties for insurance fraud that it was tantamount to
federal intervention in an area left to the states. Id. at 304. The Ninth Circuit,
however, reversed in relevant part. The Circuit adopted a "direct conflict" test
for determining when a federal law "invalidates, impairs, or supersedes" a state
law governing insurance (See Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B.
Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486 (1995)). Id. at 305. Following Merchants Home and
assuming that Nevada law provided for administrative penalties only, the Ninth
Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar suit under RICO by
the beneficiaries. Id.
Since the circuit courts have divided on the question of "Does a federal
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law, which proscribes the same conduct as state law, but provides materially
different remedies, 'impair' state law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act," the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question. Id.
The Supreme Court held that even though RICO did not specifically relate
to the business of insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson Act nevertheless does not
preclude its application. Id. at 306. Using the standard definitions of "invali-
date" and "supercede", RICO's application to the beneficiaries' complaint
would neither invalidate nor supercede Nevada law. Id. In addition, RICO pro-
scribed the same conduct as in Nevada law, but provides for materially differ-
ent remedies. Id. at 309. Furthermore, under Humana's definitions, Human sug-
gests that Congress intended to cede the field of insurance regulation to the
states except where Congress expressly orders otherwise, a concept the Court
rejects. Id. On the other hand, the Court declined to accept the opposite view of
permitting federal legislation whenever it does not conflict with state regula-
tion. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court announced a standard to determine if federal law
impairs state law. Id. There is no impairment if federal law did not "directly
conflict with state regulation," application of federal law did not "frustrate any
declared state policy," or "interfere with a State's administrative regime." Id.
Under this standard, the Court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the judgment
of the Ninth Circuit. Id.
A suit under RICO would not impair Nevada law and therefore is not pre-
cluded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 311. Nevada's insurance laws
provide administrative as well as private actions. Id. In addition, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded where there is clear and convincing evidence that the an
insurer is guilty of "oppression, fraud or malice." Id. at 313. RICO's private
right of action and treble damages complement Nevada's claims for relief. Id.
As a result, a suit under RICO does not impair Nevada law under section 2(b)
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act because RICO advances Nevada's interest in
combating insurance fraud, and does not frustrate any Nevada law. Id.
Powers vs. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n. and USAA Casualty Ins. Co.
979 P.2d 1286 (Nev. Apr. 2, 1999)
It is only in the rarest of cases involving deception in the claims process
that the materiality issue can be taken from the jury.
Appellant Powers' boat sank. Powers initially informed insurer USAA that
an exhaust hose had deteriorated before the boat sank. It was later determined
that Powers had cut the exhaust hose in his attempt to stop a siphoning effect.
The respondent insurer USAA denied coverage on the basis that Powers had
lied about cutting the hose. Powers sued.
Following a jury trial, the court held that respondent admitted that the mis-
statement by Powers was not material and did not impede or hamper the in-
surer's investigation. The court also determined that the misstatement had no
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effect on coverage because it was immaterial, and that, therefore, the insurer
was liable for insurance coverage. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed in
Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 114 Nev. 690, 962 P.2d 596 (1998). Re-
hearing was sought but the Court affirmed its original decision.
The Court ruled that materiality of a misrepresentation is generally a ques-
tion of fact, and only where reasonable minds cannot differ may the issue be
resolved as a matter of law. Powers, 979 P.2d at 1289. The Court reempha-
sized "it is only in the rarest of cases involving deception in the claims process
that the materiality issue can be taken from the jury." Id.
Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Blazer
51 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 1999)
Insurer not required to defend insured in assault case.
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada held the Plain-
tiff had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendant due to the exclusion pro-
visions of the insurance policy.
Capitol Indemnity Corp. ("Capitol") brought a motion for summary judg-
ment to determine its obligation to indemnify or defend its insured, Blazer. In
addition, Capitol requested reimbursement for the cost of litigation from the
Blazer. The court held that the exclusion provisions of the policy precluded
coverage.
Defendant Blazer is the owner and operator of the Bird Off Paradise
Lounge. The underlying case involved an assault and battery of a patron by fel-
low patrons of the bar. The victim filed a civil suit, naming Blazer as a defen-
dant. Blazer maintained a commercial general liability policy with Capitol,
which was effective at the time of the assault and battery. The policy provided
coverage for bodily injury only if it was caused by an occurrence. See Blazer,
51 F. Supp 2d at 1082. The policy defined occurrence as an "accident." Id.
The policy also contained various exclusions for events that qualified as occur-
rences, including an assault and Battery Exclusion, a Liquor Liability Exclusion
and an exclusion for bodily injury that is "expected" from the standpoint of the
insured. Id.
Capitol filed a Complaint for declaratory relief on July 13, 1998, alleging
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendants in the underlying
case. After Blazer filed his answer, Capitol moved for summary judgment.
The court first sought to determine whether an intentional tort such as as-
sault and battery could be defined as an occurrence. The policy defined occur-
rence as an "accident" but "accident" was not defined in the policy. The court
relied on Nevada case law which defines "accidental" from the perspective of
the insured as to whether the result of his actions was accidental, rather than
looking at the intended nature of the means. See Catania v. State Farm Life
Ins. Co. Inc., 598 P.2d 631 (Nev. 1979). Since Capitol presented no evidence
that Blazer expected or intended the resulting injury to the victim, the actions
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could not suggest something other than an occurrence. Thus, the court could
not award summary judgment as to that issue.
However, the court explained that even if the injuries constituted an occur-
rence, the other exclusionary provisions could still bar coverage. See Blazer,
51 F. Supp 2d at 1085. The policy excluded coverage for injuries "arising out
of assault and/or battery." But, as with any restriction in an insurance policy,
Capitol was required to have clearly communicated to Blazer the nature of the
limitation. Id. Any ambiguity would be construed in Blazer's favor. The court
addressed Blazer's contention that the exclusion should not apply because the
policy does not include language regarding tortious assault and battery by third
persons and the application of the exclusion to the situation involving third per-
sons renders the exclusion ambiguous.
The court rejected Blazer's assertions that the Assault and Battery Exclu-
sion was ambiguous. The court found a New York Court of Appeals decision,
Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous., Ltd., 93 F. 3d 63 (2d Cir. 1996),
instructive on the subject. The New York Court employed a "but for" approach
and decided, "the crucial inquiry is not who perpetrated the assault, but rather
whether the cause of action would exist 'but for' the assault." Id at 66. Al-
though Nevada had not specifically addressed the "arising out of' language in
the context of an assault and battery exclusion, the court noted Nevada's broad
policy of interpretation of such provisions. See Blazer, 51 F. Supp 2d at 1089.
The court found that none of the victim's claims could have arisen without the
commission of assault and battery. Therefore, the absence of reference to third
parties in the policy did not render the policy ambiguous. Thus, the exclusion
precluded coverage and Capitol had no duty to defend or indemnify for dam-
ages resulting from the assault and battery.
The court also found the Liquor Liability Exclusion barred coverage on
some of the claims for relief. It focused on the nexus between the allegations
and the consumption of alcohol and found that the Liquor Liability Exclusion
barred claims having a direct nexus to the service of or the consumption of al-
cohol. Id. But, the exclusion would not bar coverage for any allegations that
could arise in a non-alcohol related context. Nonetheless, all of the claims were
barred under the Assault and Battery Exclusion.
Finally, the court found that Capitol was not entitled to reimbursement for
expenses incurred in the defense and investigation of the claims against Blazer.
In order for a right of reimbursement to exist, there must be an understanding
between the parties of such an agreement. Id. at 1090. The court found no evi-
dence presented by Capitol to indicate the existence of an agreement that the
insured could be held responsible for the costs incurred. Therefore, the court
denied Capitol's request for reimbursement of costs.
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Perelman v. Nevada
981 P.2d 1199 (Nev. Aug. 20, 1999)
Nevada Supreme Court finds insurance fraud a continuing offense under
NRS § 686A.291.
Defendant appealed his conviction for insurance fraud. He claimed that in-
surance fraud was not a continuing offense under NRS § 686A.291. Further-
more, he claimed the statute of limitations had run by the time the complaint
was filed because each of the false statements was a separate offense. Perel-
man v. State of Nevada, 981 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).
The court considered the statutory language of NRS § 686A.291 and de-
termined that the statute treated insurance fraud as a continuing offense. The
court held that if insurance fraud were the result of a single, criminal intent and
a continuous course of conduct. Id. The court concluded that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the continuous commitment of the offense
is completed. Id.
Defendant also claimed that the complaint did not allege any facts estab-
lishing when his continuous course of conduct ended. The court stated that nei-
ther the continuing nature of the insurance fraud nor the statute of limitations
was an element of the crime. Thus, neither had to be pleaded in the complaint.
Id.
The court also noted that although there may have been questions of fact
for the fact finder to resolve on the statute of limitations defense, defendant's
failure to request such an instruction waived the issue. Id. at 1201. Therefore,
the court affirmed the appellant's judgment of conviction.
Advanced Countertop Design, Inc. v. Nevada
984 P.2d 756 (Nev. Sept. 23, 1999)
An employer who commits an intentional tort upon an employee cannot
claim that the intentional act resulted in accidental injury.
Employee, Tenney was injured on his first day of his job with Petitioner
Advanced Countertop Design, Inc., a Nevada corporation, "ACD." While us-
ing a table saw which had an unshielded blade, Tenney lost part of three fingers
of his right hand. As a result of the accident, Tenney filed a claim with the
State Industrial Insurance System "SIIS," which accepted the claim and paid
him a full settlement in excess of $19,000.00, in the form of a lump sum. Nev-
ertheless, Tenney later brought an action in the trial court seeking damages
against ACD on negligence theories, as well as for an intentional tort, specifi-
cally "intentional knowing and willful failure to provide safeguards for the saw
Tenney used."
The trial court dismissed the negligence claims; however, they refused to
dismiss the intentional tort claim under a misreading of two prior Nevada Su-
preme Court opinions. As argued by Tenney, the Court, in Arteaga v. Ibarra,
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109 Nev. 772, 776, 858 P.2d 387, 390 (1993), held that "an injured employee's
acceptance of a final S11S award acts as an accord and satisfaction of any com-
mon law rights, thereby extinguishing any common law right the employee
might have had against his employer." But the Court also held in Barjesteh v.
Faye's Pub, 106 Nev. 120, 122, 787 P.2d 405, 406 (1990), that "[a]n employer
who commits an intentional tort upon an employee cannot claim that the inten-
tional act resulted in accidental injury." As a result, Tenney's advanced the ar-
gument that Arteaga must mean that the acceptance of a final S11S settlement
acted to dispose of the negligence claim, but not the intentional tort claim. The
Court disagreed with this argument and granted the writ of mandate in favor of
petitioner ordering the trial court to dismiss Tenney's intentional tort claim.
Dwello v. American Reliance Ins. Co.,
990 P.2d 190 (Nev. Dec. 28, 1999)
Court adopts two-factor test to determine whether activity engaged in is a
"business pursuit. "
For commentary on Dwello, see the note in this issue: Roger 0. Steggerda,
Watching Your Neighbor's Child.- Is Babysitting Really a Business
Pursuit? A Comment on Dwello v. American Reliance Insurance Company
at 323.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In Re; Discipline of Roderic A. Carucci
Nev. LEXIS 22 (Mar. 8, 1999)
Court upholds attorney suspension but reduces fine.
The Supreme Court heard an automatic appeal of a decision by the North-
ern Nevada Disciplinary Board that recommended attorney, Roderic A. Ca-
rucci, be suspended for three months from the practice of law for a violation of
SRC 203(3). The Board also recommended that Carucci be required to pay a
substantial fine and costs. The Board found that Carucci violated the canon that
forbids attorneys from engaging in conduct of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation. Carucci engaged in such conduct by false duplicate tax returns
in order to qualify for a loan for a yacht.
The Court held that the disciplinary panel's findings and recommendation
are persuasive but not binding on the Court. The Court will review such find-
ings de novo. The Court supported the Board's findings and upheld the suspen-
sion, but ruled the Board's fine excessive and reduced it.
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In Re Discipline of Gary Keith Salomons
1999 Nev. LEXIS 24 (Mar. 25, 1999)
Discipline ordered for attorney convicted of out-of-state felony.
A hearing panel of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board recommended
disciplinary action in Nevada for an attorney convicted of a felony in Califor-
nia. The Court agreed with the panel's recommendation and imposed an order
for discipline.
A California court convicted Salomons, a member of both the California
and Nevada bars, of aiding and abetting the structuring of a transaction to evade
federal reporting requirements. The California bar imposed a suspension of
one year and a probationary period of three years. In addition, Salomons was to
abide by the conditions of his criminal probation, to attend the California State
Bar Ethics School and pass the MPRE.
The panel recommended reciprocal discipline, mirroring the California
sanctions. The panel sought disciplinary action on the finding that Salomons
violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule 203(2) and 202(3) in that he committed a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer, and he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit,
fraud or misrepresentation. This case was brought before the Court on an auto-
matic appeal from the panel's recommendation of discipline.
The Court agreed with and accepted the panel's recommendation for disci-
plinary action.
In re Discipline of Lee E. Walker
1999 Nev. LEXIS 25 (Nev. Mar. 25, 1999)
Attorney seeking to overcome a petition by the state bar counsel for a tem-
porary suspension of licensure must present convincing, certified evidence of a
reason not to be suspended.
Bar counsel for the State Bar of Nevada petitioned the court to enter an or-
der temporarily suspending attorney Lee E. Walker from the practice of law
pursuant to the provisions of Nevada Supreme Court Rule Ill (SCR 11). The
petition was documented with a certified copy of a judgment of conviction en-
tered against Walker on February 3, 1999, from the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Washington County, Utah, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count of se-
curities fraud, a felony under Utah law, and one count of money laundering, a
second degree felony under Utah law. Walker was placed on probation for a
period of thirty-six months, ordered to pay restitution, and prohibited from vio-
lating the law or engaging in any transaction involving the offer or sale of secu-
rities to any third person. Walker opposed the petition, asserting he was mov-
ing for post-conviction relief and a new trial, and would be appealing his
conviction if those motions were unsuccessful. Walker's supporting partial un-
official transcript was not certified or attested to as accurate.
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The legal issues presented concerned the procedure for temporary suspen-
sion of law license and a determination of what the disciplinary proceedings are
in order to decide the extent of discipline to be imposed.
The Court noted that the petition and the supporting documentation submit-
ted by bar counsel conclusively established Walker's conviction. In Re Disci-
pline of Lee E. Walker, 1999 Nev. LEXIS 25 *1 (March 25, 1999). Walker
had failed to present adequate supporting documentation, presenting only an
uncertified, unattested document that did not even clearly identify the tran-
scriber in his defense and opposition to the motion.
The Court held that the petition conclusively established Walker's convic-
tion of a serious crime warranting temporary suspension, and temporarily sus-
pended Walker from the practice of law and referred the matter to the Southern
Nevada Disciplinary Board for the initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings.
The sole issue to be determined was the extent of discipline to be imposed. Id.
An attorney seeking to overcome a petition by the state bar counsel for a
temporary suspension of licensure will have to present convincing, certified
evidence of a reason not to be suspended in accordance with Nev. Sup. Ct. R.
111(1) through 111(3). Id. at 2. Once suspended, the sole issue before the
Court is whether the Disciplinary Board proceedings may be dealing is the ex-
tent of discipline to impose. Id.
In re Reinstatement of Robert S. Gelb
1999 Nev. LEXIS 23 (Nev. Mar. 25, 1999)
Court found clear and convincing evidence in support of recommendations
of Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board.
Attorney Gelb filed a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. In
July 1993, the Court suspended Gelb from the practice of law for six months
and one day. Gelb filed his petition for reinstatement in April 1998.
The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State of Nevada conducted
a hearing on Gelb's petition for reinstatement. The Board concluded that Gelb
had met his burden pursuant to Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 116(3), and recommended that
Gelb be reinstated subject to certain conditions, among which was the condition
that Gelb fulfill the Continuing Legal Education, "CLE," requirements as set
forth in Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 210, complete two additional hours of ethics CLE, and
attend the Bridge the Gap program offered by the state bar. The Court found
clear and convincing evidence in support of the recommendations of the Board,
and approved its recommendations in substantial part.
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In re: Reinstatement of Eugenia Ohrenschall Ross
1999 Nev. LEXIS 35 (Nev. May 20, 1999)
Court ordered attorney automatically reinstated, based on submission of
proof that she is no longer precluded from practicing law.
In 1989, the court ordered Eugenia Ohrenschall Ross to disability inactive
status based on a disabling bone disease, which prevented her from the practice
of law pursuant to SUP. CT. R. 117. Any disciplinary proceedings at that time
were suspended. Subsequently, the court additionally suspended attorney Ross
from the active practice of law for failure to comply with continuing education
requirements under SUP.CT. R. 213. In April 1999, attorney Ross filed a peti-
tion for reinstatement to active status.
The court ordered that attorney Ross shall automatically be reinstated,
based on submission of proof that she is no longer precluded from practicing
law or defending herself in disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the court or-
dered that she has fully comply with the continuing education requirements as
set forth in SUP.CT. R. 213. The court further ordered resumption of discipli-
nary proceedings previously suspended.
In re Discipline of Arnold Weinstock.
1999 Nev. LEXIS 36 (Nev. May 27, 1999)
Clear and convincing evidence supported Southern Nevada Disciplinary
Board'sfindings of violations.
The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board charged the Petitioner for violat-
ing various disciplinary rules. The panel, finding that certain alleged violations
were supported by evidence, ordered a six-month suspension of the petitioner's
license to practice law. The board also required that petitioner pass the state's
professional responsibility exam within six months of the court order and take
additional hours of continuing legal education.
This action was brought as an automatic appeal from the board's hearing
and report, where the Court found that clear and convincing evidence supported
the Board's findings of violations. Hence, the Court found that the board's
recommendation was appropriate.
In re Discipline of Christopher Maglaras
1999 Nev. LEXIS 34 (Nev. May 27, 1999)
Attorney disbarred and ordered to pay the costs of disciplinary proceeding.
This action is an automatic appeal from the recommendation of the South-
ern Nevada Disciplinary Board that attorney, Mr. Maglaras, be disbarred and
ordered to pay restitution to former clients from whom he had misappropriated
funds. The panel found various violations of professional conduct on the part
of Maglaras, including misappropriation of client funds in an amount of at least
$183,284.00 for his own use. Since Maglaras failed to answer the charges
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brought by the hearing panel, they were deemed admitted and the panel's rec-
ommendations were approved. Therefore, Maglaras was disbarred and ordered
to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding as well as to make restitution to
his former clients.
In re Discipline of Peter A Perry
Nev. LEXIS 80 (Nev. Nov. 19, 1999)
Attorney suspension for commission of serious crime upheld
The State Bar of Nevada requested that the Supreme Court temporarily
suspend attorney, Peter A. Perry, from the practice of law. Perry was convicted
of wire fraud in federal district court of Nevada, fined and sentenced to six
months in a community confinement center to be followed by three years of
supervised release.
The Court found that the Bar's evidence conclusively established Perry's
conviction and held that the conviction for committing a serious crime war-
ranted Perry's temporary suspension from the practice of law. The Court re-
ferred the matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for decision on the
extent of discipline to be imposed.
Snyder v. York
988 P.2d 793 (Nev. Nov. 29, 1999)
Court refused to enforce attorney's fees clause in contract when in excess
of $15 statutory limit for attorney'sfees in small claims court.
This case involved an appeal from a district court order granting summary
judgment and denying attorney's fees in excess of $15, the amount limited by
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 73.050 for appeals from small claim actions. Snyder, 988
P.2d at 794.
The appellant sold a house to the respondent. The purchase agreement
provided that if a dispute arose between the buyer and seller, attorney's fees
would be awarded to the prevailing party. The respondent brought a claim for
$2,500 against the appellant, in justice court, alleging that appellant did not dis-
close known defects to the house. The appellant prevailed on the claim and re-
quested $11,932.50 in attorney's fees. As the amount of attorney's fees re-
quested exceeded the jurisdictional amount of the justice court, the court
transferred the appellant's Motion for Attorney's Fees to the district court to be
heard with the respondent's appeal. Id. at 793. The District Court found that
its original jurisdiction to consider the Motion for Attorney's Fees was limited
by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 73.050 and granted the appellant's Supplemental Motion
for Attorney's Fees in the amount of $15. Id. at 793-94. The appellant filed a
separate action in district court for attorney's fees pursuant to the purchase
agreement between the parties. The district court granted summary judgment
to the respondent, as the appellant received reasonable attorney's fees under
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Nev. Rev. Stat. § 73.050. The appellant appealed, resulting in this decision. Id.
at 794.
The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that "the legislature
intended to make the small claims court a 'people's court' and to discourage
attorneys from appearing." Id. at 795. The court further found it absurd to
award large attorney's fees in a small claims case, observing that the small
claims appeals form clearly indicates the $15 limit on attorney's fees. Id.
In re Reinstatement of Danny M. Winder
1999 Nev. LEXIS 82 (Nev. Dec. 2, 1999)
Court affirmed Nevada State Bar panel's denial of reinstatement for failure
to comply with the terms set forth in the plea agreement.
A Nevada attorney, indefinitely suspended in 1990 from law practice pur-
suant to a plea-agreement, petitioned the Nevada State Bar for reinstatement. A
panel of the Bar denied his petition. The attorney appealed this denial to the
Nevada Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the panel's denial of reinstatement
for failure to comply with the terms set forth in the plea agreement without
prejudice, thus permitting the attorney to re-petition for reinstatement once the
terms of the plea agreement were met.
The panel's decision to deny the petition was based on Winder's failure to
comply with three of the ten conditions he agreed to at the time of his indefinite
suspension. The panel was concerned about Winder's testimony that he had
lied in the original discipline proceeding about having a gambling problem.
Specifically, in the original discipline proceeding, Winder testified that he had
a gambling problem, and that this contributed to his disciplinary troubles.
Subsequently, at the reinstatement hearing, Winder testified that he had
previously lied about having a gambling problem, and stated that he had
claimed to have such a problem because he thought it was more acceptable than
a drug problem. Winder's testimony to this effect at the reinstatement hearing
was intended to show that the condition with respect to gambling should not be
considered important. However, one of Winder's counselors also testified at the
reinstatement hearing, and stated that he had treated Winder for a gambling
problem after Winder was suspended.
In re Reinstatement of Gary Keith Salomons, Esq.
1999 Nev. LEXIS 81 (Nev. Dec. 2, 1999)
Southern Board of State Bar recommended reinstatement of attorney on
certain conditions.
The Nevada Supreme Court suspended the petitioner Gary Keith Salomons
on June 23, 1998 for one year. After conducting a hearing pursuant to Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 116(3) upon petition for reinstatement, the Southern
Board of the State Bar recommended reinstatement of Salomons on condition
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that: (1) he provide Nevada bar counsel with quarterly reports that petitioner is
providing California bar counsel until his California bar probation expires, (2)
he notify Nevada bar counsel of any violation of his California bar probation,
and (3) he notify Nevada bar counsel of any violation of his criminal probation.
In re Discipline of Mark L. Sturdivant No. 33359
1999 Nev. LEXIS 26 (Nev. March 25, 1999)
This is an automatic appeal by an attorney who represented a husband and
wife in the husband's adoption of the wife's two children. The appellant en-
gaged in a series of baffling lies to his clients, resulting in a delay. The appel-
lant readily admits to lying and misleading his clients in regard to the filing of
the adoption petition and court dates that were never scheduled. Courts holding
and analysis: the courts accepted the recommendation of the Disciplinary
Board, calling for suspended disbarment and a monetary fine of $5,000.
PROPERTY
County of Clark v Briant Buckwalter
974 P.2d 1162 (Nev. Apr. 9, 1999)
Supreme Court replaces "highest price" with "most probable price" stan-
dard in land valuation.
This case is an appeal from a jury verdict in the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County. The respondents purchased the property in question in the
early 1980's, and used it to house apartment buildings, despite its' commercial
zoning. In September of 1993, Clark County adopted a resolution of "need and
necessity", and sought to condemn the parcels for an expansion of the Las Ve-
gas Convention Center. When negations between the parties failed, the appel-
lant filed a condemnation action against the landowners.
Prior to trial, the respondents filed a motion to define the fair market value
of the land as the "highest price" that would be yielded on the open market.
This interpretation conflicted with Nev. Rev. Stat. § 37.009 (1993), which de-
fines the fair market value as the "most probable price" the land would yield on
the open market. Nevada Revised Statute § 37.009 provides that, "'Value'
means the most probable price which a property would bring in a competitive
and open market under the conditions of a fair sale, without the price being af-
fected by undue stimulus, whereby the sale is consummated on a specified date
and the title to the property is passed from the seller to the buyer."
Respondents argued that the statute was unconstitutional because the legis-
lature had no authority to determine the fair market value. The district court
granted the respondents' motion, and instructed the jury accordingly. The jury
returned a special verdict, dictating that the proper value of the property was
$9,000,000.00. This figure was substantially higher than the $4,560,000.00 es-
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timate from Clark County's expert, based on the "most probable price" stan-
dard.
The appellants contended that the district court committed reversible error
in adopting the "highest price" standard. The county claimed that the jury in-
struction regarding the "highest price", assumed from Wheeler v State Depart-
ment of Transportation, 105 Nev. 217, 773 P.2d 728 (1989), was rejected by
the Nevada legislature in 1993, with the amendment of Nev. Rev. Stat. §
37.009.
The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with appellants. The Court also found
that § 37.009 is not unconstitutional because the legislature has authority to
make laws concerning eminent domain, despite prior holdings dictating that
just compensation for private property is a judicial function that cannot be in-
terfered with by statute. Further, the Court expressly overruled the portions of
Wheeler that referenced this issue.
In concurring, Justice Maupin separated from the majority's holding that §
37.009, as amended, warranted an overruling in the Wheeler case. Maupin
concluded that the terms "highest price" and "most probable price" are syn-
onymous. The theory is that if the jury were given two instructions, one con-
cerning the statutory language, and the other defining the "highest price" as that
which would be agreed to buy a buyer and seller under normal market condi-
tions, the outcome would have been the same, and the Wheeler case could re-
main intact.
Schmanski v. Schmanski
984 P.2d 752 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999)
Court makes community property division offamily trusts.
At issue are the proceeds of three trusts in a divorce proceeding between
Dean and Kim Schmanski. Dean's father Don established the first two trusts
from a stock gift to Dean. Dean subsequently sold the stock and placed the pro-
ceeds in a joint account to which both Dean and Kim Schmanski had access
and used for community purposes. Later, Dean used funds from the account to
purchase shares of stock that were transferred to the two trusts. Don established
the third trust for the benefit of Dean and any children of Dean under the terms
of a stock purchase agreement in which the trust was to pay for the stock with a
note issued on a non-recourse basis. Don was to fund the payments on the note
with annual contributions.
The district court decided that the first two trusts were community property
and ordered an equal division. The district court found the third trust was
85.12% community property and 14.88% Deans separate property -- the divi-
sion being made on the basis of the note already paid by Dean's father Don.
Schmanski v. Schmanski, 984 P.2d 752, 756 (1999). Dean appealed the district
court decision and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the district court's rulings
as to the first two trusts, but reversed as to the third, declaring the proceeds of
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the trust to be Dean's separate property.
In the court's analysis of the first two trusts, the court focused on three is-
sues: whether Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(2) requires that separate property
placed into joint tenancy is irrevocably transmuted into community property,
whether separate property placed into joint tenancy is presumed to be a gift to
the community and whether the ability to purchase the stock placed in the trust
was a function of a special relationship of the son and the father or a result of
employment within the marriage.
The court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150 (2) did not require the
irrevocable transmutation of separate property placed into joint tenancy into
community property, but only required that it be disposed of in the same man-
ner, subject to other provisions. The court further determined that in accordance
with Gordon, separate property placed into joint tenancy is presumed to be a
gift to the community unless the presumption is overcome by clear and con-
vincing evidence. It further concluded that the opportunity to purchase the
stock, which had been placed into the trusts, was a function of the employment
of Dean during the marriage, as the opportunity was given to other employees,
and as such, was not a gift from the father. Based on this analysis, the court de-
termined the district court's decision was supported by substantial evidence and
affirmed the decision as to the first two trusts. Id.
As to the third trust, the court focused on the intent of Dean's father Don in
establishing the trust, and on a community obligation for the balance of the note
used to purchase the stock. The court reviewed the testimony of Don and found
the intent of the donor was to benefit only Dean and any children of Dean. It
further determined that since the note used to purchase the stock was non-
recourse, there was no community obligation for its payment. Since the deter-
mination of the district court that 85.12% of the trust was community property
based on a community obligation to pay the note, the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed the district court's order with respect to the third trust and determined
the trust proceeds were the separate property of Dean. Id.
TORTS
Sahara Gaming Corporation v. Culinary Workers Union Local 226
984 P. 2d 164 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999)
Defamation claim denied in union's use of false allegations from foreign
state case.
In Sahara Gaming Corporation v. Culinary Workers Union Local 226, 984
P. 2d 164 (Nev. 1999), the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether the pub-
lication by a labor union of false and malicious fraud allegations made in an out
of state judicial proceeding constituted defamation. Id. Appellant Sahara
Gaming was involved in a labor dispute at the time it was negotiating a multi-
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million dollar gaming management and land sales contract with Players Inter-
national. Respondent labor union sent a letter to Players International in which
it quoted from a complaint filed against Sahara Gaming in Mississippi. The un-
ion's letter noted the fraud allegations against Sahara Gaming in the out of state
complaint. Id. at 165. After receiving the letter, Players International cancelled
the management consulting agreement that would have provided a $2,900,000
consulting fee. Sahara filed suit against the union for defamation, civil con-
spiracy, interference with contract, and interference with prospective economic
advantage. Sahara alleged that the union knew that the fraud allegations were
false and that it published the allegations with the intent to injure Sahara Gam-
ing. Id.
The district court granted the union's motion for summary judgment on the
defamation claim. The trial court held that the union had fairly and accurately
quoted the allegations contained in the Mississippi complaint and that the union
had the right to provide a fair recital of the court case. Id. Since the civil con-
spiracy and interference with contract and economic advantage claims were de-
rivative of the defamation claim, the district court granted the union's summary
judgment motions on these issues as well. Id.
In its affirmation of the district court's ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court
considered whether an immunity privilege could be extended to the union's ac-
tions. It noted that courts provide a special privilege of absolute immunity
from defamation liability to the news media and the general public when
reporting events in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 166. The Court explained that
the same privilege extends to any person who republishes material from a judi-
cial proceeding available to the general public. According to the Court, this
privilege applies even when a party publishes the defamatory statements with
full knowledge of their falsity and with intent to injure. Id.
The Court established that the defamatory statement must meet a broad
relevancy requirement to be privileged. Specifically, the defamatory material
must have some bearing on the subject matter of the judicial proceeding in or-
der to be absolutely privileged. Id. at 168. Since the Court viewed the union's
letter as a fair and accurate republication of the fraud allegations relevant to the
issues in the Mississippi judicial proceeding, the union could not be held liable
on a defamation claim. The Court justified this approach by asserting that
promotion of freedom of speech in such circumstances by the common law
privilege outweighs the risk that individuals will abuse the privilege with false
and malicious statements.
A number of concurring opinions challenged this rationale. Justice Shear-
ing, joined by Justice Agosti, disputed the majority's analysis of the relevant
case law and disagreed with the limitations placed upon the privilege by The
Restatement (Second) of Torts ' 611. Id. at 168-69. Chief Justice Rose and
Justice Young opposed the majority's broad application of the privilege to
cases involving the publishing party's knowledge of the falsity of the defama-
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tory material. In contrast, Chief Justice Rose and Justice Young would remove
the privilege in cases involving actual malice. They affirmed the lower court
ruling only due to the lack of an issue of material fact that could be tried in
court. Id. at 171. Similarly, Justice Becker reasoned that courts should apply
an absolute privilege to the press but only a limited and conditional privilege to
the general public. For Justice Becker, the privilege should not be available to
individuals who have actual knowledge of the falsity of the information con-
tained in a legal proceeding. Id. at 172.
Vinci v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.
984 P.2d 750 (Nev. Aug. 27, 1999)
Court concludes there is no statutory or common-law duty imposed upon
Sands or its employees to warn patrons that conduct is unlawful.
The plaintiff, Angelina Vinci, brought one claim against the Sands Hotel
for a trip-and-fall accident, and another for abuse of process, negligence, and
negligent hiring and training. These claims stemmed from an incident in which
she was arrested for accepting gaming chips without a marker. The charges
against Vinci were ultimately dropped. However, two of the Sand's employ-
ees were indicted on charges of conspiracy under sections 199.480 and 465.070
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The district court granted partial summary
judgment for the Hotel and refused to continue the trip-and-fall case until
Vinci's appeal was decided since they involved two separate and distinct is-
sues. Vinci stipulated to dismiss the remaining claim because the court ex-
cluded evidence of the gaming incident from the trip-and-fall claim.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded there were no issues of material fact
to Vinci's negligent hiring and training claim, citing Nevada Rules of Criminal
Procedures 56(c) and Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, 106 Nev. 265, 267; 792 P.2d
14, 15 (1990). The Court stated there was no evidence in the record to support
the notion that the Sands failed in any of its duties regarding employee hiring
and training. Vinci did not appeal the dismissal of her abuse of process claim.
Citing Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 100 Nev. 703, 707; 692 P.2d 1282, 1285
(1984), the Court concluded that there is no statutory or common-law duty im-
posed upon the Sands or its employees to warn patrons that their conduct is
unlawful, and that the district court correctly determined that section 456.101
of the Nevada Revised Statutes does not create such a duty.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court expressly overruled two cases that
implied there was a duty on casinos and employees to warn patrons of unlawful
conduct, and in El Dorado Hotel, Inc. v. Brown, 100 Nev. 622, 625; 691 P.2d
436, 439 (1984), casino employees knew that a patron, who was later arrested,
was playing a slot machine out of adjustment. In Hazelwood v. Harrah's, 109
Nev. 1005, 1007-09; 862 P.2d 1189, 1191 (1993), a patron, who also was ar-
rested, was allowed by an employee to search for a winning keno ticket that
had been thrown in the trash for which he had not paid. The Court expressly
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stated that the decision in Vinci overruled these two cases and concluded that
neither the Sands nor its employees have any duty to warn patrons of illegal
conduct. Therefore the Court decided the claim was properly dismissed by the
district court.
Kusmirek v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., et al.
73 F.Supp.2d 1222 (Nev. Sept. 29, 1999)
MGM not negligent for plaintiffs injuries caused when third party exited
valet area.
At the valet area of the MGM Hotel and Casino, Defendant Machowsky
received his car from an attendant. Kusmirek v. MGM Grand Hotel, 73
F.Supp.2d at 1223 (Nev. 1999). The car was running when Machowsky en-
tered it. Id. Machowsky put the car into gear and it shot forward, pinning
Plaintiff Kusmirek between the back of her car and the front of Machowsky's
car. Id. Kusmirek, as a result of the accident, lost her left leg and underwent
surgical amputation of her right leg above the knee. Id. Defendant MGM seeks
summary judgment against plaintiff and Machowsky. Id. The Court granted
MGM's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1227.
The Court held the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether MGM's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs
injuries. First, MGM had no duty to take precautions to protect guests from
sudden acceleration by vehicles in the valet area. There were no past similar
accidents to put MGM on notice to reasonably anticipate negligent conduct by
third parties or mechanical malfunctions likely to endanger the safety of per-
sons in the valet area. Id. at 1225. Second, MGM's failure to provide additional
personnel in valet area was not proximate cause of injury. It is mere specula-
tion that additional personnel in the valet area would have prevented the acci-
dent. Id. at 1226. Furthermore, the forward surge of the car was the intervening
cause of the accident. Id. Finally, MGM's duty to deliver cars does not require
that the vehicle would be first in line to exit valet area. This proposal would
impose upon MGM a burden out of proportion to the anticipated risk by in-
creasing driver inconvenience and wasting valuable valet time. Id. at 1226-
1227.
Grotts v. Zahner
989 P. 2d 415 (Nev. Dec. 13, 1999) (Nev. 1999)
Standing for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim limited to
family members.
In Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415 (Nev. 1999), the Nevada Supreme Court
considered whether the fianc6 of an accident victim had standing for an action
based on bystander emotional distress. Id. at 416. With respect to her negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claim against Gertrude Zahner, the appel-
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lant, Kellie Grotts, asserted that she had standing due to her "affianced relation-
ship to the victim." Id. The appellant claimed that such damages were justifi-
able due to the death of her fianc6 and the appellant's resulting distress as a by-
stander.
In its affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the claim, the Nevada
Supreme Court noted that a witness to an accident can recover damages for
emotional distress in limited situations. Id. In Zahner, the court concluded that
standing for such claims is dependent upon the closeness of the relationship be-
tween the victim and the bystander. As a general proposition, the relationship
should be based upon family membership, either by blood or by marriage. Id.
As a matter of law, immediate family members would satisfy this standing re-
quirement. If the relationship extends beyond the immediate family, the fact
finder must assess the nature and quality of the relationship to determine if the
it is close enough to confer standing. Id.
Such relationships constitute the few cases in which standing becomes an
issue of fact. Zahner, 989 P.2d at 416 (the Zahner court's approach overruled
its previous decision in State Department of Transportation v. Hill, 963 P.2d
480 (Nev. 1998). In Hill, the Court held that the closeness of the relationship
between the bystander and victim was a question of fact. In contrast, the Zah-
ner court concluded that a more limited approach was needed, thus justifying a
denial of recovery as a matter of law for claimants in non-family relationships).
In rejecting the appellant's standing, the Nevada Supreme Court held that,
as a matter of law, non-family relationships fail to qualify for the required
standing for such claims. The Court noted that the appellant, although the vic-
tim's fianc&, was not a member of the victim's family by blood or by marriage.
Lacking the required close relationship with the victim, the appellant lacked
standing for a bystander emotional distress claim. Id. The majority reasoned
that such a limitation was necessary in order to promote predictability and fair-
ness in such cases. Id. at 416- 17.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rose challenged the majority opinion's departure
from its recent ruling in Hill. Specifically, the dissent argued that the Zahner
opinion undermined the consistency and predictability promoted by the doc-
trine of stare decisis. Chief Justice Rose concluded that the majority had pre-
maturely disregarded its recent precedent in Hill. Id. at 417. Further, the dissent
argued that a rule limiting recovery only to those with a marital or blood rela-
tionship to the victim was prejudicial to those who had non-traditional relation-
ships. The dissent also noted that, by preventing a factual determination of the
standing issue, the Zahner rule would preclude recovery by those who had a
loving, non-family relationship. Id. at 417 n.6.
In response to the dissent, the majority opined that, in the absence of an ob-
jective test, almost any type of close relationship could justify a "triable" claim.
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